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Essays In Health Economics 
Abstract 
This dissertation studies the U.S. healthcare market, with a focus on provider behaviors and their 
implications for market efficiency. 
The first chapter examines physician learning and treatment choices. Physicians often choose among 
alternative treatment options based on their beliefs over the treatment effectiveness and their skills in 
delivering the treatment. I examine how two kinds of physician learning jointly shape their treatment 
choices: Bayesian learning that updates beliefs about treatment-patient match values and learning by 
doing that improves surgical skills. Using case-level data on the history of brain aneurysm treatments by 
over 200 physicians, I find that both kinds of learning are present and that physicians are forward-looking. 
In light of these empirical patterns, I develop and estimate a dynamic structural model of physician 
learning and treatment choices for heterogeneous patients. I then disentangle the impacts of the two 
kinds of learning and explore to what extent forward-looking physicians deviate from myopic best 
choices. Physicians are more than twice as likely to experiment on unhealthy patients than healthy ones, 
which hurts short-term outcomes but improves overall treatment success rates by 13-17%. I also evaluate 
the impacts of several alternative payment schedules. Uniform payments across treatments facilitate the 
adoption of the new treatment while outcome-contingent payments have heterogeneous effects across 
physicians. The heterogeneity highlights the coexistence of two opposing effects: the incentive to exploit 
the myopic best option and the incentive to experiment with less familiar options due to the increased 
return from learning. 
The second chapter (co-authored with Hanming Fang) proposes a novel and easy-to-implement approach 
to detect potential overbilling based on the hours worked implied by the service codes physicians submit 
to Medicare. Using the Medicare Part B Fee-for-Service (FFS) Physician Utilization and Payment Data in 
2012 and 2013 released by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, we construct estimates for 
physicians' hours spent on Medicare beneficiaries. We find that about 2,300 physicians, representing 
about 3% of those with 20 or more hours of Medicare Part B FFS services, have billed Medicare over 100 
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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS IN HEALTH ECONOMICS
Qing Gong
Hanming Fang
This dissertation studies the U.S. healthcare market, with a focus on provider behaviors
and their implications for market efficiency.
The first chapter examines physician learning and treatment choices. Physicians of-
ten choose among alternative treatment options based on their beliefs over the treatment
effectiveness and their skills in delivering the treatment. I examine how two kinds of physi-
cian learning jointly shape their treatment choices: Bayesian learning that updates beliefs
about treatment-patient match values and learning by doing that improves surgical skills.
Using case-level data on the history of brain aneurysm treatments by over 200 physicians,
I find that both kinds of learning are present and that physicians are forward-looking. In
light of these empirical patterns, I develop and estimate a dynamic structural model of
physician learning and treatment choices for heterogeneous patients. I then disentangle the
impacts of the two kinds of learning and explore to what extent forward-looking physicians
deviate from myopic best choices. Physicians are more than twice as likely to experiment
on unhealthy patients than healthy ones, which hurts short-term outcomes but improves
overall treatment success rates by 13-17%. I also evaluate the impacts of several alternative
payment schedules. Uniform payments across treatments facilitate the adoption of the new
treatment while outcome-contingent payments have heterogeneous effects across physicians.
The heterogeneity highlights the coexistence of two opposing effects: the incentive to exploit
the myopic best option and the incentive to experiment with less familiar options due to
the increased return from learning.
The second chapter (co-authored with Hanming Fang) proposes a novel and easy-to-
v
implement approach to detect potential overbilling based on the hours worked implied by
the service codes physicians submit to Medicare. Using the Medicare Part B Fee-for-Service
(FFS) Physician Utilization and Payment Data in 2012 and 2013 released by the Centers
for Medicare and Medicaid Services, we construct estimates for physicians’ hours spent on
Medicare beneficiaries. We find that about 2,300 physicians, representing about 3 percent
of those with 20 or more hours of Medicare Part B FFS services, have billed Medicare over
100 hours per week. We consider these implausibly long hours.
vi
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CHAPTER 1 PHYSICIAN LEARNING AND TREATMENT
CHOICES: EVIDENCE FROM BRAIN ANEURYSMS
1.1. Introduction
Physicians often need to choose among alternative treatment options and are constantly
learning through experience which treatments are the best match for different types of
patients. They experiment with the options and update their beliefs based on patient out-
comes, essentially doing Bayesian learning.1 At the same time, physicians accumulate the
skills to deliver each treatment via learning by doing. The coexistence of Bayesian learning
and learning by doing are especially relevant for surgical care. Physicians’ beliefs about
treatment-patient matches and surgical skills affect the treatment choices and outcomes,
which in turn change their future beliefs and skills.
In this chapter, I study how these two kinds of learning shape physician decision-making,
using the treatment of brain aneurysms as an example. I focus on how belief updating via
Bayesian learning and skill accumulation via learning by doing jointly affect the treatment
choices. I then evaluate the impacts of payment reforms on physician learning and patient
outcomes.
The treatment of brain aneurysms is a particularly desirable setting to study the two kinds
of physician learning. First, a brain aneurysm is a neurological condition with three treat-
ment options: surgical clipping, the traditional option; endovascular coiling, a new option;
no intervention, the outside option. Clipping and coiling are both surgical procedures,
hence physician beliefs and skills are relevant to treatment choices. Second, the emergence
of coiling as a promising yet under-explored alternative gives physicians strong incentives
to learn. Third, medical guidelines for brain aneurysm treatment choices are still lacking,
which further necessitates learning by individual physicians. Finally, the learning environ-
1See, for example, Coscelli and Shum (2004) and Crawford and Shum (2005) on physician learning about
anti-ulcer drug choices; Dickstein (2014) on anti-depressant drugs; and Saxell (2014) on cholesterol drugs.
1
ment is fairly clean, with a limited number of options, unilateral decision-making,2 and an
immediately observable outcome measures, namely whether the patient can be discharged
home without the need for assisted care.3
My empirical analysis is based on the New York Statewide Inpatient Database (SID). The
SID covers the universe of inpatient care within the state and provides detailed case-level
information on diagnoses, treatments, and outcomes. Most importantly, it allows me to
track physicians across hospitals and years, thereby retrieving the uninterrupted history of
brain aneurysm cases by physician.
I start with reduced-form evidence of whether and how physicians learn. First, I show that
a physician is more likely to choose a treatment if she has used it on more patients or has
had better patient outcomes with it on similar patients. The path dependence suggests the
presence of skill accumulation and patient type-specific belief updating, respectively. Using
the subsample of emergency cases, I show that the dependence is not driven by the sorting
of patients. I also rule out learning from peers by showing that a physician’s utilization rate
of a treatment is not affected by that of her colleagues, once conditional on her own history.
Second, I find that the average patient outcome improves over time, but such improvement
is mainly driven by better treatment-patient matches instead of skill accumulation. The
outcomes of similar patients no longer vary over time, once conditional on receiving the
same treatment. That is, while both learning by doing and learning about treatment-patient
match values affect physician choices, they have different effects on patient outcomes. Third,
I document suggestive evidence that physicians are forward-looking.4 Physicians with high
future patient arrival rates are more likely to adopt coiling, the new option, in the earlier
periods. The response to future patient arrivals suggests physicians are likely to be forward-
2The treatment of brain aneurysms features strong information asymmetries between physicians and
patients and barely any shared decision-making. See The Dartmouth Atlas Working Group (2015) for a
detailed discussion.
3This binary outcome measure is widely used in the medical literature and has been shown to be a good
proxy for patients’ longer term health outcomes (Zacharia et al., 2014).
4The tests follow Abaluck et al. (2015), who identifies the extent to which Medicare Part D enrollees are
forward-looking from their response to future prices.
2
looking, because a myopic physician would not account for the return of learning, which
partially depends on the frequency of patient arrivals.
The reduced-form results motivate a model with forward-looking physicians who mainly
learn from their own experiences, accumulating skills and updating beliefs about treatment-
patient matches. The choice dynamics and the intertemporal tradeoff in learning also
necessitate a structural model that can disentangle the two kinds of learning and evaluate
alternative policies that change physician learning incentives.
I develop a dynamic model of physician treatment choices under two distinct kinds of
learning. Each physician holds (a) a set of beliefs about the latent and invariant match
value between each pair of treatment and patient type and (b) a set of evolving, treatment-
specific surgical skills. The forward-looking physician then makes treatment choices for a
sequence of heterogeneous patients, maximizing the discounted sum of her expected payoffs.
The physician’s flow payoff consists of the expected patient outcome, which depends on
her beliefs regarding treatment-patient match values; the cost of delivering a treatment,
which decreases as she accumulates more surgical skills in that treatment; and the expected
treatment revenue, which reflects her financial incentives. Finally, the physician’s beliefs
and skills evolve after treating each patient. The physician starts with heterogeneous prior
beliefs about the match value between each pair of treatment and patient type. She updates
her belief in a Bayesian fashion after observing the outcome of the particular treatment-type
combination. At the same time, her surgical skill in that treatment grows deterministically
regardless of the patient type or the outcome.
The model features a high-dimensional state space and spillovers between the two kinds
of learning; that is, an increase in the skill of one treatment affects the physician’s future
evaluation of that treatment for all types of patients. To address these challenges, I solve
the model by modifying the Gittins index, which uses forward induction to circumvent
the curse of dimensionality (Gittins, 1979). The modified Gittins index accommodates the
spillover of learning by doing across patient types, provides a sufficient statistic for the value
3
of each option, and only depends on the current state.5 I follow Whittle (1982) and prove
that always choosing the option with the highest index is an optimal policy.
I estimate the model on the SID data using maximum likelihood. The learning parameters
imply that physician beliefs converge after Bayesian learning from 10-20 cases, and that
the accumulation of skills has large impacts on treatment choices: a physician will be
indifferent between an option she has used twice and another option she believes to have a
6.5-percentage-point lower success rate but has used 7 times, the average annual caseload
in the sample. Using simulation, I disentangle the impacts of the two kinds of learning.
The effect of Bayesian learning dominates that of learning by doing on the utilization of
clipping, explaining 78% of the changes in clipping probability when both kinds of learning
are shut down. This reflects the high initial stock of skills in clipping, which limits further
learning by doing. On the contrary, the effect of Bayesian learning is dominated by that of
learning by doing on the adoption of coiling, explaining only 26% of the changes.
With counterfactual experiments, I explore how physicians would choose differently if they
were myopic and ignored the value of learning. I find that the adoption rate of coiling would
decrease from 41% to 31% if physicians were myopic. In particular, forward-looking physi-
cians are more than twice as likely to deviate from the myopic best choices and experiment
with coiling on unhealthy patients than healthier ones. This echoes the intuition of the
“stepping stone” model by Jovanovic and Nyarko (1997), in which agents first experiment
with options that suffer from smaller losses in case of a failure. I also find that the exper-
imentation hurts short-term outcomes, but the overall treatment success rates are 13-17%
higher than they would be with myopic physicians.
In the second set of counterfactuals, I evaluate the impacts of two payment reforms. I find
that uniform payments across treatments facilitate the adoption of coiling for almost all
physicians, as current choices are partly influenced by the lower payment for coiling. I also
5As pointed out by Dickstein (2014), the Gittins index also provides an intuitive rule of thumb for
physician decision-making, which may be more relevant in practice.
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examine outcome-contingent payments such as the on-going Value Modifier (VM) program
by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services. VM pays physicians 102% of the base
amount for good patient outcomes and 98% for bad ones. I find that the responses to VM are
heterogeneous across physicians, highlighting the classic exploitation versus experimentation
tradeoff in learning. The increased reward from a success induces physicians to exploit the
myopic best option while the greater return of learning encourages experimentation with
less familiar options.
My study in this chapter contributes to three strands of literature. First, I build on the
literature of physician learning by explicitly incorporating physician skill accumulation into
a Bayesian learning model. Previous studies have primarily focused on Bayesian learn-
ing about prescription drugs (e.g., Coscelli and Shum (2004); Crawford and Shum (2005);
Ferreyra and Kosenok (2011)).6 Dickstein (2014) examines physician Bayesian learning
in a multi-armed bandit framework with forward-looking physicians and correlated learn-
ing across similar drugs. My study is the first to model physician skill accumulation in
tandem with belief updating. The inclusion of the learning-by-doing channel is especially
relevant in the context of surgical conditions such as brain aneurysms. I complement pre-
vious studies by allowing for endogenous beliefs and skills, which jointly shape physicians’
treatment choices and evolve depending on those choices. Moreover, I am able to estimate
an otherwise high-dimensional model with the modified Gittins index, which accommodates
forward-looking physicians and spillovers across the two kinds of learning.
Second, my work complements an earlier literature on worker learning in the labor market.
Jovanovic (1979) proposes a model in which the worker learns about his productivity on
each job. Jovanovic and Nyarko (1997) focus on worker mobility and compare the stepping-
stone model, in which worker productivities evolve on the job, with the bandit model à la
Miller (1984), in which workers learn about their latent match values with each job. Recent
6Also see Ching et al. (2013) for an excellent survey of studies on consumer learning in experience good
markets. Other studies extend the focus beyond physicians’ learning from their own experiences and examine
learning from watching peers (Ho, 2002), detailing (Narayanan and Manchanda, 2009), patients’ prescription
history (Saxell, 2014), and public disclosure of physician performances (Kolstad, 2013).
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work by Papageorgiou (2014) studies workers who learn about their comparative advantages
in different occupations. My work in this chapter focuses on a combination set of learning
objectives that are more relevant in the context of medical decision-making: physicians try
to recover the latent match value between treatments and patients via Bayesian learning
while simultaneously accumulating surgical skills in each treatment via learning by doing.
Finally, I contribute new empirical evidence to the large literature on physician practice
styles and variations in the choice of care.7 On the demand side, studies find that patient
preferences are relatively unimportant (Cutler et al., 2013; Baker et al., 2014; Finkelstein
et al., 2016). On the supply side, researchers have looked into how physician behaviors are
impacted by factors such as financial incentives (Gruber et al., 1999; Johnson and Rehavi,
2016), litigation risks (Baicker et al., 2007), team composition (Chan, 2016), and practice
environments (Molitor, 2018). Even for completely benevolent physicians, specialization
can also affect treatment decisions by changing the return of different treatment options
(Chandra and Staiger, 2007). Other studies point to more tacit characteristics of physicians.
The heterogeneity in physician beliefs (Cutler et al., 2013), aggressiveness (Abaluck et al.,
2016), procedural skills and the responsiveness to patient conditions (Currie et al., 2016;
Currie and MacLeod, 2017) all have significant impacts on the choice of care and patient
outcomes. I add to this literature by documenting the within-physician choice dynamics
with a novel dataset that includes physician histories and observable outcomes, which are
rarely available in previous studies.
The chapter proceeds as follows. In Section 1.2, I introduce the background on brain
aneurysm treatments, describe the SID data, and document reduced-form evidence on physi-
cian learning. I then develop a dynamic model of physician learning and treatment choices
in Section 1.3. I specify the econometric model and discuss the identification strategy in
Section 1.4. In Section 1.5, I present the estimation results and disentangle the impacts
of the two kinds of learning. With counterfactual experiments in Section 1.6, I show how
7See Skinner (2011) and Chandra et al. (2011) for comprehensive surveys of related studies in both the
economic and the clinical literature.
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physician myopia and payment reforms would influence treatment choices and outcomes. I
conclude in Section 1.7.
1.2. Empirical Backgrounds and Data
1.2.1. Brain aneurysms and treatment options
Brain aneurysms (also known as cerebral aneurysms or intracranial aneurysms) are blisters
formed on weakened spots of brain arteries. Vlak et al. (2011) estimated that about 3.2
percent of the population have brain aneurysms. The average age of brain aneurysm patients
is 50, with a large variance. Despite their prevalence, the detection of brain aneurysms is
not as common because the majority of aneurysms are asymptomatic. Diagnoses have only
increased starting in the early 2000s with the advances of imaging technologies (Wiebers et
al., 2003).
Although mostly asymptomatic, brain aneurysms can be life-threatening if they rupture,
which happens with an average probability of 1% per year (Wiebers et al., 2003). Ruptured
aneurysms will cause bleeding inside the brain (subarachnoid hemorrhage, SAH). 10-15%
of SAH sufferers die before reaching the hospital. Even for those who manage to reach the
hospital and receive emergency care, the mortality rates are still as high as 25%.
There are three options for managing brain aneurysms. The first option, surgical clipping,
is the traditional treatment for brain aneurysms since the 1920s. The neurosurgeon cuts
an opening in the skull and places a clip across the neck of the aneurysm to stop the
blood flow into the aneurysm.8 This treatment is both durable and effective in preventing
ruptures, yet is invasive and poses relatively high mortality and morbidity risks. The second
option, endovascular coiling, is a more recent procedure approved by the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) in 1997. Its take-up rates were below 10 percent until a 2003 study
in The Lancet showing its comparable outcomes to clipping (Wiebers et al., 2003). But
the medical community is still uncertain about how well it suits different types of patients.
8Figure 20 in the Appendix illustrates the procedure.
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The third, outside option is watchful observation and no intervention. In this case, the
neurosurgeon orders follow-up diagnostic imaging tests every 6-12 months to monitor the
development of the aneurysm.
A commonly used measure of treatment success is whether the patient can be discharged
home and does not need assisted care (Zacharia et al., 2014). This binary indicator is
shown to be a good predictor of the patient’s long-term health and wellbeing. Moreover,
it is clearly defined and observable to the attending physician. Hence the physician can
easily get feedback on her treatment, thereby learning from it. It is also readily available in
hospital records, so I am able to observe the treatment outcomes in the inpatient care data
that I use.
Table 1 summarizes the key differences among the three treatment options using data from
New York State from 2003-2014. Both options of intervention are costly and require several
days of inpatient stay. The median total charge of clipping is 36% more expensive than
coiling, partially driven by the extra cost incurred during the significantly longer stay.
The bottom half of the table shows the different match values between treatments and
patient types. The probability of having treatment success rates is higher for patients with
unruptured aneurysms, as well as patients with no major comorbidities.
1.2.2. The New York Statewide Inpatient Database (2003-2014)
I use the State Inpatient Database (SID) for New York from 2003 to 2014 for my empirical
analyses. The SID includes the universe of inpatient discharges at almost all of the over 200
hospitals in New York State. More importantly, each physician has a unique ID that stays
unchanged across hospitals and time. Hence I am able to identify all the brain aneurysm
cases treated by a given physician over the sample period, as long as the procedures are done
within the state borders.9 This is crucial for retrieving the entire history of a physician’s
treatment choices and patient outcomes over time.
9Due to licensing requirements, practicing neurosurgery in multiple states is not common. Thus I will





Since 1920s 1997 -
Invasiveness Invasive Minimally -
craniotomy invasive
Median charges ($1,000) 123.72 90.34 7.55
Median inpatient days 12 4 2
Treatment success rates by patient type:
Ruptured, no major comorbidity 27.1% 40.0% 37.7%
Ruptured, with major comorbidity 29.0% 35.1% 16.6%
Unruptured, no major comorbidity 73.4% 93.1% 90.7%
Unruptured, with major comorbidity 59.1% 84.3% 84.9%
Table 1: Treatment options for brain aneurysms
Notes: Charges are in real 2014 thousands of dollars and include all charges for the inpatient stay. A
treatment is a success if the patient can be discharged home and does not need assisted care. Ruptured
and unruptured aneurysms are identified from standardized diagnosis codes (ICD-9-CM) in the SID data.
Healthy patients are those with no major comorbidities (diseases or disorders in addition to the primary
condition, i.e. brain aneurysm) as recorded in the SID.
Each observation in SID is an inpatient discharge and has a rich set of information on the
timing, source, and source of the admission; demographic and medical information of the
patient; up to 15 standardized codes on diagnoses and treatments; the cost, length, and,
most importantly, the outcome of the inpatient stay.
I construct the main sample in two steps. First, I impose the following selection criteria on
the SID: I exclude maternal or neonatal admissions (20.09%) to focus inpatient admissions
with disease-related medical needs. I also exclude admissions that are transferred from
law enforcement (0.08%), those with missing physician identifiers (0.47%), or those with
the patient’s age under 15 (15.31%). Admissions that belong to one of the above cases
account for 25.78% of the whole SID panel and are dropped in this step. The remaining
sample has 22.40 million inpatient cases. Second, I identify and focus on the subsample
of admissions due to brain aneurysms using the standardized ICD-9-CM diagnosis codes
following Brinjikji et al. (2011). I further identify and exclude emergency cases with only
first-aid procedures and resulted in patient deaths, which indicate limited room for medical
decision-making.
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Mean S.D. Min Max
A. Physician workload
Annual caseload 7.48 9.16 1 67
Annual number of patients 6.98 8.42 1 67
Annual number of cases treated with clipping 2.25 4.27 0 37
Annual number of cases treated with coiling 3.07 5.92 0 48
B. Physician choice patterns
Share of cases treated with clipping 0.30 0.46 0 1
Share of cases treated with coiling 0.42 0.49 0 1
Share of cases treated with observation 0.29 0.45 0 1
Share of cases treated with clipping, conditional on intervention 0.42 0.49 0 1
Share of cases treated with coiling, conditional on intervention 0.58 0.49 0 1
C. Physician experience and professional affiliations
Fraction of young physicians 0.35 0.48
Fraction of teaching-hospital physicians 0.33 0.47
Number of hospitals worked at 1.46 0.96 1 8
Number of physicians at the same hospital in a month 1.86 1.16 1 9
Number of physicians at the same hospital in a year 3.25 2.55 1 13
Table 2: Physician workload, choice patterns, and professional affiliations in the main
sample
Notes: The main sample is constructed from the New York SID (2003-2014) and includes 11,767 inpatient
cases for which aneurysms are the primary cause of admission. Caseload refers to the number of inpatient
cases treated by a neurosurgeon in a year. Young physicians are those with no more than 5 years of
experience in the data. Teaching-hospital physicians are those working primarily (measured by caseload) at
a teaching hospital. If a physician works at multiple hospitals, the one with the largest share of the physician’s
cases is used.Number of hospitals worked at is the number of hospitals a neurosurgeon every practiced in.
Number of physicians at the same hospital in a month (year) is the number of other neurosurgeons who
treat brain aneurysms at the same hospital as a physician in a calendar month (year).
The resulting main sample includes 11,767 brain aneurysm cases (10,629 unique patients)
treated by 219 physicians at 111 hospitals. Note that the vast majority of patient-physician
encounters are only one-shot. About 50% of the cases are emergency ones where patients
can barely search for or be referred to certain physicians. This subsample will help me
address the potential endogeneity issues in Section 1.2.3. Table 2 summarizes the workload,
choice patterns, and professional affiliations of the physicians in the sample.
1.2.3. Reduced-form evidence
I draw upon the SID data for empirical patterns of treatment choices. I explore (a) whether
Bayesian learning and learning by doing are present, (b) how the two kinds of learning
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affect patient outcomes differently if they are present, and (c) to what extent physicians are
forward-looking.
Presence of both kinds of learning. My first set of reduced-form results provide ev-
idence that both kinds of learning are present and affect physicians’ treatment choices.
Figure 1 illustrates the convergence in physician choices over time. Panel A plots the cu-
mulative shares of patients treated by clipping (left) and coiling (right) by physicians who
have high clipping adoption rates when they are last observed in the SID data (i.e. in 2014
or when they leave the sample, whichever comes earlier). The share of cases treated by
these physicians with clipping is dispersed in the earlier months, but converges to a rela-
tively high level over time. The share of cases treated with coiling is also dispersed at the
beginning, but converges to 0-20%. Panel B shows similar patterns among physicians who
end up with high coiling adoption rates.
I then show that physician choices respond to past experiences and outcomes with the
treatments. Table 3 reports the estimates from multinomial logit regressions of the case-
level choice probabilities. I regress physician i’s choices for the patient in period t on
the physician’s past experiences with each treatment and the resulting patient outcomes.
Columns (1) and (2) show that physicians are more likely to choose a treatment if they have
used it more on previous patients; they also tend to favor the treatment with which they
have had better outcomes on similar patients. The path dependence suggests that both
skill accumulation (learning by doing) and patient type-specific belief updating (Bayesian
learning) are present. In Columns (3) and (4), I use the subsample of emergency cases
where there is limited room for selection or sorting based on patient characteristics. The
choice patterns are highly similar to those using the whole sample, thereby ruling out the
endogeneity problem.
I further rule out a physician’s peers as the major source of learning. Previous studies have
found the impact of team learning or learning by watching on physician choices (Ho, 2002;
Reagans et al., 2005). But in the SID sample, I observe only one physician treating brain
11
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Figure 1: Convergence of choices over time
Notes: Panel A plots the cumulative shares of patients treated by clipping (left) and coiling (right) by
physicians who have high clipping adoption rates when they are last observed in the SID data (i.e. in 2014
or when they leave the sample, whichever comes earlier). The share of cases treated by these physicians
with clipping is dispersed in the earlier months, but converges to a relatively high level over time. The share
of cases treated with coiling is also dispersed at the beginning, but converges to 0-20%. Panel B plots the
same convergence patterns in the shares of coiling (left) and clipping (right) by physicians who end up with
high coiling adoption rates.
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Dependent variable: case-level treatment choice d ∈ {Clip,Coil,Obs}
Whole sample Emergency cases
Pr(clipping) Pr(coiling) Pr(clipping) Pr(coiling)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(previous clipping cases) 0.068*** -0.044*** 0.077*** -0.050***
[0.004] [0.004] [0.006] [0.006]
ln(previous coiling cases) -0.046*** 0.048*** -0.043*** 0.071***
[0.005] [0.005] [0.007] [0.006]
ln(previous clipping successes*) 0.147*** -0.057*** 0.137*** -0.023**
[0.006] [0.007] [0.009] [0.009]
ln(previous coiling successes*) -0.077*** 0.162*** -0.048*** 0.128***
[0.006] [0.005] [0.011] [0.009]
Observations 11,746 6,296
Table 3: Reduced-form evidence: treatment choices respond to past experiences and out-
comes
Notes: The table reports the marginal effects on choice probability from a multinomial logit regression,
where the dependent variable is physician i’s choice (clipping, coiling, or observation) for the patient in period
t. ln(previous cases of clipping) is the log number of cases physician i has treated with clipping up to but
not including t. ln(previous clipping success*) is the cumulative number of physician i’s cases treated with
clipping where (i) patients are of the same type as the current patient and (ii) the outcome was a success. A
treatment is a success if the patient can be discharged home and does not need assisted care. Columns (1)-(2)
use the entire sample; (3)-(4) use the subsample of emergency cases to rule out the alternative explanation
that the path dependence shown in (1)-(2) is driven by the sorting of patients over time. Other covariates
include patient demographics, insurance status, comorbidities, aneurysm types, sources of admission, hospital
fixed-effects, and year fixed-effects. Standard errors are reported in brackets.** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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aneurysms at each hospital more than 50% of the time. In addition, I show in Table 4
that a physician’s utilization of clipping and coiling respond to her own but not her peers’
choices. Columns (1)-(2) use the subsample of physicians who have at least one colleague
at the same hospital within a calendar year. I find that while the physician’s utilization
is strongly affected by her past choices and outcomes, it is not correlated with her peers’
choices. The physician’s utilization rate of coiling is even negatively correlated with her
peers’, although the magnitudes are tiny compared with other factors. Columns (3)-(4)
use the smaller subsample of physicians who have colleagues at the same hospital within a
calendar month, and find similar results.
Dependent variable: physician i’s utilization rate of clipping or coiling
Clip% Coil% Clip% Coil%
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Own share of clipping -0.5722*** -0.5869***
[0.0116] [0.0130]
Own share of coiling -0.3963*** -0.3920***
[0.0081] [0.0087]
Own success rate with clipping 0.0950*** 0.1606*** 0.0967*** 0.1808***
[0.0058] [0.0069] [0.0064] [0.0077]
Own success rate with coiling -0.0411*** 0.2944*** -0.0400*** 0.3037***
[0.0064] [0.0070] [0.0071] [0.0079]
Peers’ share of clipping -0.0011 0.0042*** -0.0012 0.0047***
[0.0009] [0.0011] [0.0012] [0.0014]
Peers’ share of coiling -0.0012 -0.0069*** -0.0009 -0.0071***
[0.0009] [0.0011] [0.0010] [0.0013]
Adjusted R2 0.5387 0.6301 0.5116 0.6197
Observations 8,402 8,402 6,870 6,870
Table 4: Reduced-form evidence: physicians are not following peers’ choices
Notes: The table reports estimates from linear regressions with the dependent variable being a physician’s
cumulative shares of clipping ((1) and (3)) and coiling ((2) and (4)). Columns (1)-(2) use the subsample
of physicians who have at least one colleague at the same hospital within a calendar year. Columns (3)-(4)
uses the subsample of physicians who have at least one colleague at the same hospital within a calendar
month. A treatment is a success if the patient can be discharged home and does not need assisted care.Other
covariates include year and hospital fixed effects. Standard errors are reported in brackets. *** p < 0.01
Different outcome implications between Bayesian learning and learning by do-
ing. My second set of reduced-form results look into the change in patient outcomes over
time. Although previous results show that both beliefs and skills influence physician choices,
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I find that they have different implications for patient outcomes. Column (1) of Table 5
shows that the outcomes of a physician’s patients do improve over time. But the improve-
ment is likely the result of more accurate beliefs and better matching between treatments
and patients, not skill accumulation: column (2) shows that once conditional on receiv-
ing the same treatment, the patient outcomes no longer vary discernibly over time. This
will motivate my specification of the structural model, in which physician beliefs affect the
expected outcome, but skills only help to reduce the physician’s cost of delivering care.10
Dependent variable: 1(treatment success)
(1) (2)
ln(cumulative number of patients) 0.105** -0.0257
[0.050] [0.0316]
Physician fixed effects Y Y
Patient type dummies Y Y
Treatment dummies N Y
Observations 8,709
Table 5: Reduced-form evidence: evolution of patient outcomes
Notes: The table summarizes the results from a panel regression with physician fixed effects, where the
dependent variable is whether the treatment is a success. A treatment is a success if the patient can be
discharged home and does not need assisted care.ln(previous cases of clipping) is the log number of cases
physician i has treated with clipping up to but not including t. ln(cumulative number of patients) is the total
number of patients the physician has treated up to but not including the current patient. Other covariates
include patient demographics, insurance status, comorbidities, aneurysm types, and sources of admission.
Column (1) also controls for patient types. Column (2) controls for both patient types and the chosen
treatment. Standard errors are reported in brackets.** p < 0.05
Forward-looking physicians. In the last set of reduced-form analyses, I test whether
physicians’ initial choices also respond to patient arrival rates in the future. The evidence
will shed light on the extent to which physicians are forward-looking: the return from
learning is higher if a physician expects to have frequent arrivals of brain aneurysm patients,
or if the current patient is of a common type. Hence a forward-looking physician will
be more likely to experiment with the lesser known treatment option in these scenarios,
whereas a myopic physician will be indifferent. Table 6 indeed shows that physicians with
more experience in the past are more likely to choose clipping than coiling in the early
10Stone and Bernstein (2007) studied 2684 errors in 1108 neurosurgical cases, and found that only 2.7%
of all errors have significant impacts on patient outcome.
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periods, which reflects some degree of path dependence. But experienced physicians who
have higher future patient arrival rates are more likely to choose coiling over clipping than
their experienced peers with low arrival rates. Table 7 also finds that a given physician is
more likely to choose coiling on a patient if she expects more patients with the same type
in the future.
Dependent variable: case-level treatment choice d ∈ {Clip,Coil,Obs}
Pr(clipping) Pr(coiling)
1(experienced physician) 0.143*** -0.141***
[0.0303] [0.0357]
1(Low arrival rates)×1(experienced physician) 0.153*** -0.142***
[0.0205] [0.0342]
1(High arrival rates)×1(experienced physician) -0.144*** 0.139***
[0.0298] [0.0348]
Observations 6,276
Table 6: Reduced-form evidence: initial treatment choices respond to future patient arrival
rates
Notes: The table reports the marginal effects on choice probability from a multinomial logit regression,
where the dependent variable is physician i’s choice (clipping, coiling, or observation) for the patient in period
t. The sample is restricted to the first 15 cases of each physician in order to show how initial choices respond
to future patient arrivals. Experienced physicians are those with at least 6 years of experience. 1(Low
arrival rates) indicates the physician’s future monthly patient arrival rate is below 30%. 1(High arrival
rates) indicates the physician’s future monthly patient arrival rate is above 70%. Other covariates include
arrival rate dummies, patient characteristics, teaching hospital dummy, and year fixed-effects. Standard
errors are reported in brackets.*** p < 0.01
The reduced-form results provide strong evidence of learning by physicians who are forward-
looking, accumulate skills, and update beliefs from their own experience. The rich choice
dynamics also call for a structural model to disentangle the two kinds of learning and to
do counterfactual experiments. In the next section, I develop such a model in light of
the empirical patterns to study how Bayesian learning and learning by doing jointly shape
physicians’ treatment choices.
1.3. A Dynamic Model of Physician Learning
I first develop a dynamic model featuring forward-looking physicians who make treatment
choices for patients with different observable types. I then show how physician beliefs and
skills evolve in two separate learning processes. The model highlights the tradeoff between
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Dependent variable: case-level choices and outcomes
(1) (2) (3)
Pr(clipping) Pr(coiling) Pr(success)
Type arrival rate 0.0979*** 0.210*** -0.195***
(%) [0.0306] [0.0314] [0.0273]
Physician fixed-effects Y Y Y
Observations 4,766 4,766 4,766
Table 7: Reduced-form evidence: initial treatment choices respond to future type-specific
patient arrival rates
Notes: The table reports estimates from panel regressions with physician fixed effects, where the dependent
variables are (1) the probability of choosing clipping; (2) the probability of choosing coiling (column 2); (3)
the probability of treatment success. A treatment is a success if the patient can be discharged home and
does not need assisted care. The sample is restricted to the first 15 cases of each physician in order to
show how initial choices respond to future patient arrivals. Type arrival rate is the probability of having a
patient with the same type as the current patient in any given month in the future. Other covariates include
patient characteristics and initial market shares of treatment options in the quarter of the physician’s entry.
Standard errors are reported in brackets.*** p < 0.01
exploiting high flow payoffs and exploring lesser-known options for information and skills
that may generate high continuation values. I solve the model by modifying the standard
Gittins index (Gittins, 1979; Whittle, 1982) to circumvent the curse of dimensionality and
to accommodate the spillover of learning by doing across patient types. I conclude the
section by characterizing the modified Gittins index following the numerical approximation
by Brezzi and Lai (2002).
1.3.1. Model setup
The decision maker and time. Consider the decision-making process of physician i
treating patients with a given condition over an infinite planning horizon, t = 0, 1, 2, ....
Each time period is a month. Physicians share a common discount factor, β̃ ∈ (0, 1).
Patients. At most one patient arrives in each period, with probability λi0 no patient
arrives. Hence I index the patient arriving in period t by t for notational simplicity. Each
patient has an observable type, kt ∈ K, where K = {1, . . . ,K} is a finite set.11 The
distribution of kt is i.i.d. across time and known to the physician. Let λik be the probability
that patient t is of type k conditional on arrival, subject to the constraint
∑
k∈K λik = 1.
11For convenience, I denote the case of no patient arrival by having a patient of type 0.
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Treatment options. The physician is to choose a treatment for each patient t. Denote
the set of available treatments by D, which comprises three options: watchful observation
(d = 0), surgical clipping (d = 1), and endovascular coiling (d = 2). Let θdk be the match
value between option d for type-k patients, which governs the distribution of patient outcome
y, F (y; θdk). The true match values are time-invariant but unknown to the physician and
will be learned over the course of a physician’s practice.
Physician beliefs, skills, and flow payoffs. 12 At the beginning of period t, the physi-
cian holds a complete set of beliefs and skills, ({θdt }d∈D, {edt }d∈D). θdt = (θd1t , . . . , θdKt )′ is a
K × 1 vector of beliefs about the match value of treatment d for each type of patient. edt
is the physician’s cumulative experience in d up to, but not including, period t. Note that
the beliefs, θdt , are type-specific but physician experience e
d
t is not—treating any type of
patient with d improves the physician’s surgical skills for d.









E[ydkt | θdkt , kt] + αrdkt − c(edt ), if kt ≥ 1
0, if kt = 0
(1.1)
I normalize the payoff to 0 when there is no patient. When there is a patient of type
kt = k, the payoff has three components. First, the physician cares about the patient’s
expected outcome, E[ydt | θdkt , kt = k]. She forms the expectation using her belief θdkt at the
beginning of period t. Second, the physician takes into account the revenue she generates,
rdkt . Because the physician does not know the exact amount at the time of decision-making,
she uses the hospital average for type-k patients treated with d in the same year as t.
The physician observes rdkt at the beginning of each period and holds naive expectations
that future revenues remain unchanged. The expected revenues are weighted by α in the
physician’s utility. Third, the physician subtracts the (physical or psychological) cost to
deliver treatment d, c(edt ). The cost shrinks as the physician accumulates more skill, e
d
t .
12I suppress the i subscript from now on.
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Discussion: effects of Bayesian learning vs. learning by doing. The physician
improves her treatment-specific surgical skills, edt , and beliefs about the treatment-patient
match value, θdkt . The two kinds of learning have different effects on future physician
payoff in my model: belief updating changes the physician’s expectation of outcome for
a treatment-patient pair; skill accumulation lowers treatment costs for the physician. I
choose this modeling approach in light of the empirical patterns discussed in Section 1.2.3.
An alternative modeling approach is to let both the belief and the surgical skill affect the
patient outcome, ydk. In that case, the physician’s belief updating will depend on the
realized outcome and her skill level when furnishing the treatment.
1.3.2. The learning processes
Learning by doing and skill accumulation
For clipping (d = 1) and coiling (d = 2), the physician’s treatment-specific skills accrue as
she treats more patients:
edt+1 = e
d
t + 1{dt = d} (1.2)
The evolution of skills is independent of patient type and treatment outcome. That is, the
additional experience gained from treating a type-k patient with d has spillover effects on
all types of patients to be treated with d in the future.
A physician who is more experienced with clipping or coiling incurs lower costs to deliver
the treatment. The c(·) function maps the stock of skills, edt , into the cost of doing d in
period t.
I assume that the physician’s experience for watchful observation (d = 0) is fixed at zero.
The physician does not accumulate experience because she merely refers the patient to
a neurologist for regular brain scans, which neither improves nor requires her own skills.
Consequently, the cost of d = 0 is also fixed.
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Bayesian learning and belief updating
Let Y dt be the latent outcome of patient t when treated with d. Assume Y
d
t follows a
Bernoulli distribution with success rate θdk:
Y dt =

1, with probability θdk
0, with probability (1− θdk)
(1.3)
where k is the type of patient t, and θdk0 is the latent match value that the physician needs
to learn. The physician holds Beta-distributed prior beliefs about θdk
θdk0 ∼ Beta(adk0 , bdk0 ) (1.4)
where (adk0 > 0, b
dk
0 ) are strictly positive parameters. They determine the mean and variance


















Suppose the physician has treated ndkt cases of type-k patients with d at the beginning of
period t. Further suppose that sdkt cases are successful. Then the physician’s posterior










t − sdkt ) (1.8)
The posterior mean is higher if sdkt is larger, holding n
dk
t constant; the posterior variance
will be larger if sdkt and (n
dk
t − sdkt ) are close. That is, the physician is more optimistic
about the match value of d for type-k when she sees more successes in the past, and is more
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confident in her beliefs when past successes outnumber failures by a larger margin.
1.3.3. Model solution: the modified Gittins index policy
The physician’s dynamic problem











t , kt, r
dk
t ) | θ0, e0, k0, rdk0 ] (1.9)
where β̃ is the monthly discount factor. The expectation is over the transition of future
states under the chosen policy, conditional on the physician’s prior beliefs about treatment-
patient match values (θ0) and initial stock of skills (e0).
Define βi = β̃(1 − λi0) as the physician-specific discount factor that accounts for patient
arrival rates, which vary significantly across physicians (Table 2). The physician receives
zero payoff and does not learn when no patient arrives. Therefore I transform problem (1.9)
for physician i to abstract away no patient arrival. The discount factor in the transformed













t , kt, r
dk
t ) | θ0, e0, k0, rdk0 ] (1.10)
Model solution: an extension to Gittins index policy
The model above features (a) a high-dimensional state space that is typical of learning
models; (b) spillover effects of treatment-specific learning by doing across patient types.
Once a physician’s skill in one treatment improves, her future evaluation of that treatment
is higher for all types of patients. To meet these challenges, I solve the model by extending
13I keep the notation of t for convenience. All subsequent ts index the patient.
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the standard Gittins index policy in a multi-armed bandit framework.
The multi-armed bandit framework. First, the physician’s problem fits naturally into
a multi-armed bandit (MAB) framework. Each treatment option, d ∈ D, represents an arm
of the bandit machine. The arms generate random payoffs, udt , that depend on their states,
(θdt , e
d
t , kt, r
dk
t ). The physician’s problem (1.10) is to find the optimal way to operate the
arms sequentially that maximizes her total expected payoff.
Fitting into the MAB framework reduces the dimensionality of the physician’s problem by
circumventing backward induction. Gittins (1979) proposes an index policy for the classic
MAB model. He calculates for each arm an index that only depends on the arm’s current
state and calibrates the value of pulling it until some optimal stopping time. The Gittins
index policy simply selects the arm with the highest index in each period. Gittins then
shows the index policy is optimal in the standard MAB framework, which requires four
assumptions: (a) exactly one arm is chosen (or active) in each period; (b) the unchosen
arms do not generate rewards; (c) states of the unchosen arms remain frozen, generating
the same average rewards in later periods; and (d) the arms are independent.
Assumptions (a) and (b) hold trivially for the physician’s learning problem; (d) holds by
the assumption that treatment-patient match values are independent across options; (c) is
where the physician’s problem deviates from the classic MAB model and falls into the realm
of restless bandits. Restless bandits extend the classic MAB by allowing even the inactive
arms to generate payoff and change states, but the stopping rule and the resulting index
policy may no longer be optimal.14
The restlessness of the physician learning model, however, solely stems from the exogenous
transition of patient types (kt). Hence it is a special case in two ways. First, unlike the
generic restless bandit, the unchosen treatments do not generate any payoff. Second, the
transition of patient types does not convey new information: both physician beliefs and
14Whittle (1988) examines generic restless bandit models in detail.
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experience (θdt , e
d
t ) remain frozen for the unchosen d in period t; the restless state k only
controls which of the K elements in θdt to use when the physician makes the decision.
15
Thanks to these special features, the physician learning model has an optimal solution that
closely resembles the standard Gittins index policy.
The modified Gittins index policy and its optimality. Now consider an auxiliary
two-armed bandit: one arm is treatment option d in state (θd, ed, k, rd); the other arm is the
option of taking a lump-sum payoff M and retiring the arm. Denote by φd(θd, ed, k, rd,M)
the optimal expected payoff from the auxiliary bandit. Let τd be the time to retire, which
could be +∞ if d is chosen indefinitely.
Assumption 1 Conditional on physician beliefs and skills, the expected time to retire in
the two-armed bandit process is independent of the current patient’s type, k:
E[τd | θd, ed, k, rd] = E[τd | θd, ed, rd], ∀k ∈ K (1.11)
Note that Assumption 1 does allow the expected time to retire to depend on the physician’s
beliefs about treatment-patient match value, treatment-specific skills, and financial incen-
tives. It only requires that the current patient’s type has no persistent effect on the expected
duration of the physician’s learning process. The assumption essentially treats the realiza-
tion of patient type in the initial period as a transitory shock. It is similar to assuming
that the expected number of trials with d does not depend on the order in which patients
arrive, but is even less restrictive and only focuses on the type of the current patient.16
Now I define the modified Gittins index and establish the optimality of the index policy:
Definition 1 For arm d in state (θd, ed, k, rd), construct a two-armed bandit process by
15This is different from typical restless bandits, where the evolving states of unchosen arms do change the
expected payoff in future periods. See Whittle (1988) or Chapter 6 of Gittins et al. (2011).
16The generic restless bandit process does not always have a state variable whose effect is as transitory
as the patient type in the physician’s learning model, making Assumption 1 too restrictive to impose on
restless bandit models in general.
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adding an auxiliary arm with a lump-sum retirement payment M . The Gittins index for
arm d, Mdk(θd, ed, rd), is the infimum of all the M values that the physician is willing to
take and retire. That is
Mdk(θd, ed, rd) := inf
M
{M : φd(θd, ed, k, rd,M) = M} (1.12)
The auxiliary arm helps calibrate the Gittins index for arm d, which can be seen as a price
for the sequence of payoffs from operating d while the option of taking Mdk and retiring is
always available (Whittle, 1982).
Proposition 1 Under Assumption 1, the modified Gittins index policy that always selects
the treatment option with the highest Mdk(θd, ed, rd) is optimal for the physician’s problem
(1.10).
I defer the complete proof to the Appendix. The intuition follows Whittle (1982) and is
straightforward: recall that the patient type, k, is the only state variable that makes the
MAB restless; the distribution of types is also exogenous, invariant over time, and known
to the physician. The physician’s problem from period (t+ 1) onwards is no longer restless
in expectation. Hence the modified Gittins index can evaluate current and expected future
payoffs separately, and the latter resembles the standard Gittins index. Moreover, with
Assumption 1, the optimal time to retire an arm is independent on the current k. Hence
the optimal stopping argument for the Gittins index policy in standard MAB models goes
through.
1.3.4. Characterization of the Gittins index
Although conceptually intuitive, the definition of the Gittins index in (1.12) is not helpful
for calculating its value in a given state.17 Brezzi and Lai (2002) developed a closed-form
solution: they first transform the MAB problem to a Wiener process; then they apply a
17Gittins et al. (2011) discussed various numerical methods of approximating the Gittins index with finite-
horizon models, but the computational cost is still prohibitively high.
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diffusion approximation. They show that the closed-form approximation is asymptotically
optimal and performs well for short or moderate horizons as well. I adapt their results to
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d
t ). The Gittins index has a one-to-one relationship with the flow payoff:
the former must exactly compensate for any change in the latter to make the physician just
indifferent between continuing with d and taking the retirement pay, M .
The second component, M̃ , highlights the result that the physician’s Bayesian learning
problem becomes a standard MAB from period (t+ 1) onward.18 The physician expects to
have a type-k patient with probability λk, making the ex ante expected success rate in any






t+s, s ≥ 1 (1.14)





thus getting rid of the restlessness in expectation. The (t + 1) states depend on the physi-
cian’s learning result from period t: she updates her skill to edt+1 = e
d
t + 1; she adjusts her
belief θdk upward (downward) if period t treatment is a success (failure) for k = kt; the
beliefs about all other types θdk
′
(k′ 6= k) remain unchanged. The expectation in the second
term of (1.13) is over the realization of yt.
Now I approximate the Gittins index of the standard MAB from (t+1) onward, M̃ , following
the closed-form approximation by Brezzi and Lai (2002):

















































and ψ(·) is a closed-form, strictly increasing function with pre-calculated parameters.19
Finally, the last component of (1.13) accounts for the learning-by-doing effects and the
financial incentives. The physician expects future revenues of d for each type of patient to
remain at their current level; she also takes the type-specific arrival rates into account and











t , τ ≥ 0 (1.19)
The physician also expects treatment cost, c(edt+τ ), for clipping and coiling to keep decreas-
ing as the she accumulates more experience. The treatment cost of observation (d = 0)
remains constant over time. The financial incentives and treatment costs are then summed
up from (t+ 1) onwards.




t , kt, r
d) and µdt+1
terms of (1.13) show that the Gittins index is larger when the physician holds more opti-
mistic beliefs about treatment d’s (average) match value. The νdt+1 terms imply that the
index is larger when the physician’s beliefs are less precise, in which case the informational
value of learning is higher. The β terms indicate that the index is larger when the physician
19I show the complete derivation and detailed specification of ψ in the Appendix.
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discounts the future less heavily or expects more frequent patient arrivals. The σ2(µdt+1)
term shows that the index is larger when µd takes on more extreme values, and is the smaller
when µd gets closer to 0.5. Moreover, the index is larger when the physician is not yet at
the flat part of c, i.e. when the gain from learning by doing is higher.
Finally, the above effects of µd and νd on the Gittins index carry over to those of type-
specific statistics, (µdk, νdk), because the former are linear combinations of the latter. For
example, if the physician’s belief about the match value between d and type-k is imprecise
(a large νdk), then the physician has stronger incentives to experiment with procedure d.
But the magnitude of such effects is governed by the type-specific arrival rates, λk. When
type-k patients are rare, a small λk limits the incentive of learning on type k patients. This
result is intuitive as it connects the value of learning with the probability of applying the
information learned to future cases. It also echoes the third set of reduced-form evidence
presented in Section 1.2.3.
1.3.5. The physician’s decision rule
Given states (θdt , e
d







t ) + ξ
d
t (1.20)
where ξdt is an error term that is observed by the physician but unknown to the econome-
trician. It could stem from any idiosyncratic, treatment-specific shock such as patient pref-
erences.20 I assume that ξdt follows i.i.d. Type I extreme value distribution. The approach
is common in the literature and avoids degeneracy problems when forming the likelihood.
It also implies simple logistic choice probabilities, thereby facilitates computation.
20For example, patients may be concerned about the cosmetic effects of craniotomy during surgical clipping.
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1.4. The Econometric Model and Identification
1.4.1. The econometric model
Heterogeneous prior beliefs. I follow Dickstein (2014) and parameterize the beta-
distributed prior beliefs as
θdki0 | Xdki0 ∼ Beta(adki0 , bdki0 ) (1.21)


















i0 = exp(γη) (1.23)
The prior mean, µdki0 , is a logistic function of X
dk
i0 : the state average adoption rate of d
for type-k patients, its interaction with the dummy variable for whether physician i works
primarily at a teaching hospital, its interaction with the dummy variable for whether i is a





and the Beta distribution parameters
adki0 = µη (1.25)
bdki0 = (1− µ) η (1.26)
Cost of delivering treatments, c(·). Following the literature on learning by doing (e.g.
Argote and Epple (1990)), I assume c(·) is bounded, monotonically decreasing, and convex
21All variables in Xdki0 are measured in period t = 0.
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for clipping and coiling. Specifically,
c(edt ) =

αc1 exp(−αc2edt ), d = 1, 2
αc0, d = 0
(1.27)
where αc1 is the initial treatment cost before the physician has any experience; α
c
2 charac-
terizes the speed of learning, i.e. the rate at which treatment costs decreases with physician
experience.22 The cost of “delivering” watchful observation (d = 0) is constant at αc0. It is
not clear whether watchful observation requires any skill from the attending physician at
all, so I make the simplifying assumption that there is no learning by doing for d = 0.
Initial skills. I assume all physicians start with no stock of skills in coiling, i.e. e2i0 = 0.
For clipping, I set e1i0 = 0 for all physicians who enter the SID panel in 2004 or later
because of data limitations. Then I extrapolate the experience for the other physicians as
e1i0 = (30 − Ti) × n1i0, where n1i0 is physician i’s caseload in 2003, and Ti is the number of
years that i show up in the SID data. I assume each physician works for 30 years after
completing residency and that the caseloads stay constant over time. 23
Patient types. I group patients into 4 types along two dimensions: the type of aneurysm
the patient has (ruptured or unruptured), and the patient’s health condition. Ruptured
and unruptured aneurysms are identified from standardized diagnosis codes (ICD-9-CM) in
the SID data. Patients are considered relatively healthy if they have no major comorbidi-
ties (diseases or disorders co-existent with the primary condition, i.e. brain aneurysm) as
recorded in the SID.
22Argote and Epple (1990) show that most studies model learning in manufacturing as: c = α1x
−α2 .
Compare it with the specification above, edt = lnx. I am essentially assuming that experience with d reduces
the marginal cost of the next case faster than in a typical manufacturing setting, all else equal. It is likely to
be the case because c() captures the learning of an individual physician, who is immune to many decelerating
problems with team learning, e.g. turnover and miscommunication (Reagans et al., 2005).
23The assumption implies that a physician retires when her record discontinues in the SID data. Thus it
may overestimate the pre-2003 experience for physicians showing up in all 12 years of SID data (2003-2014).
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Type-specific patient arrival rates. I parameterize patient arrival as follows: λi0 is
the probability of having no patient, and is allowed to vary across physicians. λik for
types k ∈ {1, . . . ,K} are type-specific arrival rates. I allow them to depend on observable
characteristics of physicians, namely physician tenure (young or experienced) and whether
the physician works primarily at a teaching hospital.
1.4.2. Likelihood
Denote data on physician i in period t as ωit and the model parameters as Θ. The likelihood
contribution from (i, t) is
Lit(ωit; Θ) =














)yt (1− θdk)1−yt]dit=d o.w.
(1.28)
where Mdkit is specified in (1.13) and captures the dk-specific flow utility, the informational
value of learning, and the value of cost reduction from learning. Mdkit depends on the
current states: the type of current patient, k; the physician’s belief, θdit, which summarizes
the information on the match value of d for each type of patient she collected in the past;
the physician’s stock of surgical skills, edt ; and the expected revenues of d at the hospital




t ) work as summary statistics
for the physician’s entire learning history. They affect the choice probability through the
modified Gittins index, Mdkit , which takes into account the transition of future beliefs and
skills that are contingent on the current choice.
1.4.3. Identification
I estimate the following parameters outside the model using the SID panel data: physician-
specific patient non-arrival rate, λi0; type-specific patient arrival rates that are dependent
on physician characteristics, λik; and the true match values governing treatment success
rates, θdk. The richness of the SID data allows for precise estimates of these parameters.
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Parameters on the treatment-type-specific prior belief determinants are identified in two
steps. First, the relative size of the parameters are identified from the variation in initial
choices across physicians with different observable characteristics, and the variation in type-
specific market shares of each treatment at the time each physician started to practice.
Second, locations of the prior means are pinned down by the differential response to patient
outcomes, which is reflected in the switching patterns of physician choices in subsequent
periods. Intuitively, the choice of a physician after the initial period will respond strongly
to treatment failures if her prior belief is close to 1, but only moderately if her prior belief is
close to 0. The reverse is true for choice responses after a success. The observable outcomes
in the SID data are crucial for the second step of identification.
Parameters in the cost function for delivering treatments are identified from two sources.




t ) = α
c
1 exp(−αc2edt ) for clipping and
coiling (d = 1, 2) are identified using the spillover of treatment-specific skills across pa-
tient types. Consider a physician who treated a type-k patient in period t with option
d = 1 and receives another type-k patient in period (t + s). Suppose the physician has
treated other types of patients between periods t and (t+ s). The experience increases her
treatment-specific surgical skill (edt+s > e
d
t ) but does not affect her treatment-type-specific
belief (θdki,t+s = θ
dk
it ). Hence the average change in the probability of choosing d = 1 again
among similar physicians identifies the shape of the cost function. Second, the location
parameter that captures the cost of observation (d = 0) is identified from the variation in
the choice probabilities between observation relative and intervention by new physicians
who have zero initial skills.
Finally, the weight on expected revenue in the physician’s flow payoff is identified from the




I estimate the model on the SID data from 2003 to 2014 with the maximum likelihood
method. Table 8 summarizes parameters estimated directly from the data; Table 9 reports
the estimates of structural parameters. For prior belief determinants, I find young and
teaching-hospital physicians tend to favor intervention in general, and coiling in particular.
Moreover, the prior beliefs regarding the match value of treatment d for type-k patients
respond positively to the market share of d among type-k patients in the calendar quarter
when a physician treated her first case. The prior beliefs of young physicians are only
moderately more responsive to the initial market shares, but those of teaching hospital
physicians are substantially more responsive.
The estimate on the weight of expected revenues shows that physicians have moderate finan-
cial incentives, which is consistent with findings in the literature (e.g., Johnson and Rehavi
(2016)). For example, the median total charge for clipping is $20,000 higher than that for
coiling. All else equal, a physician who believes the coiling success rate is 2 percentage
points higher than clipping will be indifferent between the two options.
The cost to deliver clipping or coiling declines fairly rapidly under the estimates. The
marginal return from learning by doing almost diminishes to zero after 15 cases. To put the
numbers in perspective, a physician who has done clipping 7 times and coiling only twice
will be indifferent between the two options even if she believes the coiling success rate to
be 6.5 percentage points higher.
I plot the evolution of physician posterior beliefs about the match values of the three options
for healthy patients with unruptured aneurysms as an example. Figure 2 traces the simulate
posterior beliefs against the number of times physicians have used the treatment on that
type of patient. The horizontal blue line shows the latent match value estimated directly
from the data as a benchmark. The thick black line in each figure plots the posterior mean of
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Conditional arrival rates by physician characteristics (λk)
Young Young Experienced Experienced
Patient type teaching non-teaching teaching non-teaching
Ruptured, healthy 0.350 0.301 0.284 0.273
(k = 1) (0.014) (0.010) (0.008) (0.006)
Ruptured, unhealthy 0.247 0.221 0.298 0.264
(k = 2) (0.013) (0.009) (0.008) (0.006)
Unruptured, healthy 0.248 0.287 0.198 0.214
(k = 3) (0.013) (0.010) (0.007) (0.006)
Unruptured, unhealthy 0.155 0.191 0.220 0.249
(k = 4) (0.011) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006)
Treatment-patient match value (θdk)
Clip Coil Obs
Patient type d = 1 d = 2 d = 0
Ruptured, healthy 0.271 0.400 0.377
(k = 1) (0.015) (0.016) (0.012)
Ruptured, unhealthy 0.290 0.351 0.166
(k = 2) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013)
Unruptured, healthy 0.734 0.931 0.907
(k = 3) (0.018) (0.007) (0.010)
Unruptured, unhealthy 0.591 0.843 0.849
(k = 4) (0.017) (0.009) (0.025)
Table 8: Parameters estimated directly from the SID data
Notes: Parameters are estimated using the main sample constructed from New York SID (2003-2014).
Standard errors of the mean estimator are reported in parentheses. Conditional patient arrival rate, λk, is
the probability of getting a type-k patient in any given month, conditional on having any patient. Treatment-
patient match value, θdk, is measured by the success rate when using treatment d on type-k patients. A
treatment is a success if the patient can be discharged home and does not need assisted care. Clip stands for
surgical clipping; coil stands for endovascular coiling; obs stands for watchful observation, i.e. no intervention.
Ruptured and unruptured aneurysms are identified from standardized diagnosis codes (ICD-9-CM) in the
SID data. Healthy patients are those with no major comorbidities (diseases or disorders in addition to the
primary condition, i.e. brain aneurysm) as recorded in the SID. Young physicians are those with no more
than 5 years of experience in the data. Teaching-hospital physicians are those working primarily (measured
by caseload) at a teaching hospital. If a physician works at multiple hospitals, the one with the largest share
of the physician’s cases is used.Standard errors of the mean estimator are reported in parentheses.
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Parameters Notation Coefficient Std. Error
A. Determinants of prior belief (θdki0 )
Constant γµ0 -1.3261 0.4427
1(d = clip)× 1(young physician)i γµ1 0.6205 0.1316
1(d = coil)× 1(young physician)i γµ2 0.8853 0.2066
1(d = clip)× 1(teaching hospital)i γµ3 0.2267 0.0349
1(d = coil)× 1(teaching hospital)i γµ4 2.4203 0.2316
Initial market share of d for k γµ5 0.1026 0.0134
Initial market share of d for k × 1(young physician)i γµ6 0.0053 0.0097
Initial market share of d for k × 1(teaching hospital)i γµ7 0.2354 0.0373
Prior belief imprecision γη 5.7387 0.0013
B. Financial incentives
Weight on total revenue (in thousand real 2014 USD) α 0.0009 0.0001
C. Cost of delivering treatments
Weight on surgical costs αc1 0.1575 0.0665
Speed of cost reduction from learning αc2 0.3761 0.1240
Cost of no intervention αc0 0.0397 0.0054
− log(Likelihood) 12805.118
Table 9: Structural parameter estimates
Notes: Parameters are estimated using maximum likelihood on the main sample constructed from New
York SID (2003-2014). The vector of γµ are coefficients in the logistic function that determines the mean of
physician i’s prior belief about the match value of d for type-k patients. Initial market shares are the shares
of type-k patients treated by d in the calendar quarter of physician i’s entry. Total revenue is the total
charge for the inpatient stay in thousands of real 2014 dollars. Young physicians are those with no more
than 5 years of experience in the data. Teaching-hospital physicians are those working primarily (measured
by caseload) at a teaching hospital. If a physician works at multiple hospitals, the one with the largest share

































































Figure 2: Example of model-implied belief evolution: converging posterior means and
shrinking variances
Notes: The horizontal axes show the number of times physicians have used the treatment on the given
type of patient (healthy with unruptured aneurysms). The vertical axes show beliefs about the treatment-
type match value, measured by the treatment success rate. A treatment is a success if the patient can
be discharged home and does not need assisted care. Clip stands for surgical clipping; coil stands for
endovascular coiling; obs stands for watchful observation, i.e. no intervention.The thick black line in each
figure plots the posterior mean of physicians’ beliefs about that treatment for the particular type of patient.
The thin gray lines delineate the 95% confidence interval. The belief evolution is simulated from 1,000
samples using the estimated parameters and the observed sequences of patients. The horizontal blue line
shows the “true” latent match value estimated directly from the data as a benchmark.
physicians’ beliefs about that treatment for the particular type of patient, which converges
rapidly to the “truth.” The thin gray lines delineate the 95% confidence interval, which
shrinks over time.
1.5.2. Model fit: choice probabilities and transition dynamics
I first compare the observed and model-predicted choice probabilities as a first evaluation of
model fit. Table 10 compares the observed and predicted choice probabilities, and Figures
3 and 4 illustrate the comparison. The model captures the overall pattern, with slightly
higher choices probabilities for the two interventions. It also does a good job in fitting the
patient type-specific choices probabilities for 2 of the 4 types. For patients with unruptured
aneurysms, the model over-predicts the probability of no intervention on healthy patients
and the probability of clipping on unhealthy ones. Note that the direct comparison of
choices probabilities is a stringent assessment of the model fit. The strong learning-related





Overall Data 0.303 0.409 0.288
Model [0.342] [0.339] [0.320]
By patient type
Ruptured, healthy Data 0.251 0.275 0.474
Model [0.237] [0.282] [0.481]
Ruptured, unhealthy Data 0.401 0.351 0.248
Model [0.487] [0.313] [0.200]
Unruptured, healthy Data 0.236 0.466 0.299
Model [0.131] [0.358] [0.511]
Unruptured, unhealthy Data 0.325 0.594 0.082
Model [0.519] [0.425] [0.056]
Table 10: Model fit: choice probabilities by patient type
Notes: The Data rows report observed choice probabilities in the SID data. The Model rows report model-
predicted choice probabilities (in brackets) from 1,000 simulations using the estimated parameters and the
observed sequences of patients. Ruptured and unruptured aneurysms are identified from standardized
diagnosis codes (ICD-9-CM) in the SID data. Healthy patients are those with no major comorbidities
(diseases or disorders in addition to the primary condition, i.e. brain aneurysm) as recorded in the SID.
I then compare the observed and model-predicted choice transition probabilities conditional
on previous period choices, outcomes, and patient types. Table 11 summarizes the results;
Figure 5 visualizes the comparison.
The model predictions closely resemble what is observed in the data. I first examine the
overall probability of choosing the same treatment in period (t + 1) as that in period dt,
conditional on the previous period choice (dt), outcome (yt), and whether patient types
in the two periods are the same. The conditional probabilities capture the reluctance of
physicians to experiment further with a treatment option.
Both the data and the model predictions show that physicians are more likely to keep using a
treatment when the previous case treated with it was a success, especially when the patients
in the two adjacent periods are of the same type. This is consistent with the relevance of
Bayesian learning only for the same type, because beliefs about treatment match values are
type-specific.
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Pr(dt+1 = dt | dt, yt, kt, kt+1)
Clip Coil Obs
(1) (2) (3)
Same type, previous case was a success
Pr(dt+1 = dt | dt, yt = 1, kt = kt+1)
Data 0.574 0.761 0.703
Model [0.633] [0.703] [0.684]
Same type, previous case was a failure
Pr(dt+1 = dt | dt, yt = 0, kt = kt+1)
Data 0.553 0.541 0.607
Model [0.597] [0.622] [0.564]
Different type, previous case was a success
Pr(dt+1 = dt | dt, yt = 1, kt 6= kt+1)
Data 0.464 0.591 0.350
Model [0.450] [0.671] [0.312]
Different type, previous case was a failure
Pr(dt+1 = dt | dt, yt = 0, kt 6= kt+1)
Data 0.463 0.524 0.468
Model [0.445] [0.652] [0.355]
Table 11: Model fit: choice transition probabilities conditional on preceding choice, patient
type, and outcome
Notes: The table reports the probability of choosing the same treatment in period (t+ 1) as that in period
dt, conditional on the previous period choice (dt), outcome (yt), and whether patient types in the two periods
are the same. A treatment is a success if the patient can be discharged home and does not need assisted care.
Clip stands for surgical clipping; coil stands for endovascular coiling; obs stands for watchful observation,
i.e. no intervention.Data rows show observed probabilities; Model rows show model-predicted probabilities























Figure 3: Model fit: overall choice probabilities
Notes: The Data bars plot the average choice probability of a treatment observed in the data. The Model
bars plot the predicted probability simulated from 1,000 samples using the estimated parameters and the
observed sequences of patients. Clip stands for surgical clipping; coil stands for endovascular coiling; obs
stands for watchful observation, i.e. no intervention.
I further break down the whole sample by physician skill level. Table 12 shows the transition
probabilities when the physician’s experience edt is high (greater than the 75th percentile),
medium (below the 75th percentile and above the 25th percentile), or low (below the 25th
percentile). Figure 6 illustrates the comparison. The predicted choice transition probabil-
ities are able to capture the stronger tendency to keep choosing the same treatment when
the physicians already have high skills in it. The choice patterns highlight the diminishing
learning by doing incentives as the surgical skills accumulate.
1.5.3. Disentangling Bayesian learning from learning by doing
With the model estimates, I use simulation to disentangle the impacts of Bayesian learning
and learning by doing. Because of interactions between the two kinds of learning, their
implications on treatment choices and outcomes are often hard to separate in reduced-form
analyses.
Table 13 compares the observed choice probabilities and patient outcomes with those when
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Figure 4: Model fit: choice probabilities by patient type
Notes: The Data bars plot the average choice probability of a treatment for each of the four patient types
observed in the data. The Model bars plot the predicted probability simulated from 1,000 samples using the
estimated parameters and the observed sequences of patients. Clip stands for surgical clipping; coil stands
for endovascular coiling; obs stands for watchful observation, i.e. no intervention. Ruptured and unruptured
aneurysms are identified from standardized diagnosis codes (ICD-9-CM) in the SID data. Healthy patients
are those with no major comorbidities (diseases or disorders in addition to the primary condition, i.e. brain












































































Figure 5: Model fit: choice transition probabilities conditional on preceding choice, patient
type, and outcome
Notes: The Data bars in each figure plot the probability of choosing the same treatment in a period as the
previous period, conditional on whether patients in the two periods are of the same type, and whether the
previous treatment is a success (y = 1). A treatment is a success if the patient can be discharged home and
does not need assisted care.The left panel shows this probability for clipping, and the right for coiling. The
Model bars plot the predicted probability simulated from 1,000 samples using the estimated parameters and
the observed sequences of patients.
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Pr(dt+1 = dt | dt, yt, kt, kt+1)
High experience Medium experience Low experience
Clip Coil Obs Clip Coil Obs Clip Coil Obs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Same type, previous case was a success: Pr(dt+1 = dt | dt, yt = 1, kt = kt+1)
Data 0.635 0.792 0.662 0.566 0.740 0.758 0.453 0.627 0.625
Model [0.683] [0.795] [0.753] [0.604] [0.653] [0.600] [0.582] [0.562] [0.606]
Same type, previous case was a failure: Pr(dt+1 = dt | dt, yt = 0, kt = kt+1)
Data 0.628 0.681 0.563 0.575 0.515 0.652 0.375 0.382 0.594
Model [0.662] [0.769] [0.587] [0.574] [0.589] [0.549] [0.537] [0.450] [0.560]
Different type, previous case was a success: Pr(dt+1 = dt | dt, yt = 1, kt 6= kt+1)
Data 0.486 0.668 0.411 0.484 0.563 0.331 0.369 0.311 0.287
Model [0.422] [0.867] [0.213] [0.484] [0.673] [0.303] [0.520] [0.432] [0.340]
Different type, previous case was a failure: Pr(dt+1 = dt | dt, yt = 0, kt 6= kt+1)
Data 0.516 0.635 0.484 0.468 0.520 0.504 0.363 0.221 0.339
Model [0.442] [0.862] [0.467] [0.439] [0.681] [0.350] [0.489] [0.416] [0.361]
Table 12: Model fit: choice transition probabilities conditional on preceding choice, patient
type, and outcome (by physician skill level)
Notes: The table reports the probability of choosing the same treatment in period (t+ 1) as that in period
dt, conditional on the previous period choice (dt), outcome (yt), and whether patient types in the two
periods are the same. A treatment is a success if the patient can be discharged home and does not need
assisted care. Clip stands for surgical clipping; coil stands for endovascular coiling; obs stands for watchful
observation, i.e. no intervention. Data rows show observed probabilities; Model rows show model-predicted
probabilities (in brackets) from 1,000 simulations using the estimated parameters and the observed sequences
of patients. The first three columns report the transition probability for the whole sample. The remaining
9 columns show the transition probabilities when the physician’s experience edt is high (greater than the
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Figure 6: Model fit: choice transition probabilities conditional on preceding choice, patient
type, and outcome (by physician skill level)
Notes: The Data bars in each figure plot the probability of choosing the same treatment in a period as the
previous period, conditional on whether patients in the two periods are of the same type, and whether the
previous treatment was a success (y = 1). A treatment is a success if the patient can be discharged home
and does not need assisted care.The top 3 panels report the probability for clipping, and the bottom 3 for
coiling. The Model bars plot the predicted probability simulated from 1,000 samples using the estimated
parameters and the observed sequences of patients. The 3 columns use the subsamples of physicians whose
experience edt is high (greater than the 75th percentile), medium (below the 75th percentile and above the
25th percentile), or low (below the 25th percentile), respectively.
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the overall choice probabilities in the data. The second row (No Bayesian learning) reports
the choice probabilities from 1,000 simulations based on the model estimates, assuming
physicians only accumulate skills via learning by doing but no longer update beliefs via
Bayesian learning. The resulting choice probability of clipping is 48.3%, a sizable increase
from the observed 30.3%; that of coiling decreases to 34.4% from the observed 40.9%. The
corresponding patient outcomes also worsens: the overall treatment success rate is 52.6%,
a 1.8 percentage points reduction from the observed 54.4%.
The third row (No learning) further assumes that physicians no long accumulate skills via
learning by doing as well, thereby blocking both kinds of learning. The simulated choice
probability of clipping increases even more to 53.4%, while that of coiling more than halves
from the previously level to a mere 16.3%. Treatment success rate also decreases to 51%,
3.4 percentage points lower than that observed in the data.
The comparison disentangles the effects of Bayesian learning and learning by doing. The
effect of Bayesian learning dominates that of learning by doing on the utilization of clipping,
explaining 78% of the changes when learning is shut down; but it is dominated by learning
by doing on the adoption of coiling, explaining only 26% of the changes. Their effects on
patient outcomes are comparable in magnitudes, with Bayesian learning’s share being 54%
and learning by doing’s being 46%.
The relative magnitudes of Bayesian learning and learning by doing incentives also vary
substantially across different types of physicians. The remainder of Table 13 breaks down the
comparison by physician subgroups. For example, experienced physicians at non-teaching
hospitals demonstrate a stronger tendency to choose clipping instead of coiling when their
learning incentives are removed. This is consistent with their higher initial stock of surgical
skills in clipping, as well as less optimistic prior beliefs in coiling.
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Choice probability Success
Pr(clip) Pr(coil) Pr(obs) rates
Overall
Data 0.303 0.409 0.288 0.544
No Bayesian learning 0.483 0.344 0.173 0.526
No learning 0.534 0.163 0.304 0.510
By physician subgroups
Experienced physicians at non-teaching hospitals
Data 0.307 0.341 0.353 0.528
No Bayesian learning 0.579 0.138 0.283 0.509
No learning 0.640 0.048 0.312 0.496
Experienced physicians at teaching hospitals
Data 0.293 0.431 0.277 0.557
No Bayesian learning 0.427 0.475 0.098 0.514
No learning 0.711 0.092 0.198 0.465
Young physicians at non-teaching hospitals
Data 0.334 0.460 0.206 0.559
No Bayesian learning 0.408 0.503 0.090 0.562
No learning 0.302 0.372 0.326 0.565
Young physicians at teaching hospitals
Data 0.242 0.498 0.260 0.541
No Bayesian learning 0.425 0.450 0.125 0.531
No learning 0.236 0.282 0.483 0.541
Table 13: Simulation analyses: disentangling the effects of two kinds of learning
Notes: No Bayesian learning and No learning rows report the simulated choice probabilities and patient
outcomes assuming there is only learning by doing but no Bayesian learning, and no learning at all, re-
spectively. The results are based on 1,000 simulations using the estimated parameters and the observed
sequences of patients. A treatment is a success if the patient can be discharged home and does not need
assisted care. Clip stands for surgical clipping; coil stands for endovascular coiling; obs stands for watchful
observation, i.e. no intervention. Young physicians are those with no more than 5 years of experience in
the data. Teaching-hospital physicians are those working primarily (measured by caseload) at a teaching




I conduct two sets of counterfactual experiments in this section. First, I explore how physi-
cian choices and patient outcomes would change if physicians were myopic and maximize
only the current patient’s outcome or their own flow payoff. Second, I evaluate the impacts
of two payment reforms: uniform payments regardless of the choice of intervention; and
outcome-based payments that reward good patient outcomes and penalize bad ones.
1.6.1. Physician myopia
Physicians could be myopic in two ways: they could make treatment choices solely based on
the expected outcome of the current patient; or they could make treatment choices based on
their flow payoff, taking into account the current patient’s outcome, the expected revenue,
and the cost of delivering the chosen treatment.
Table 14 compares the choice probabilities and patient outcomes, assuming physicians max-
imize the expected outcome of their current patients. With this form of myopia, physicians
would choose clipping less often than observed in the data. The contrast suggests that
the observed choices of clipping may be partially driven by lower costs of delivering treat-
ment due to high stocks of clipping skills, or by the higher expected revenue of clipping.
The change in the choice probabilities of coiling varies across different groups of physicians:
young physicians at teaching hospitals would choose coiling more often, reflecting the above-
noted higher prior beliefs about the value of coiling; other types of physicians choose coiling
less often. But all groups of physicians would choose no intervention more often had they
been solely maximizing patient outcomes, which suggests over-intervention in the data.
The over-intervention is often at the expense of inferior patient outcomes. Panel B of Table
14 shows that all types of patients would have moderately higher chances of good outcomes
if physicians were myopic and maximizing patient outcomes. Moreover, patients of the
two unhealthy types are most likely to receive a different treatment and would see more
improvement in outcomes than with physician myopia. This suggests that forward-looking
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physicians tend to deviate more from the myopic best treatment on unhealthy types, thereby
hurting the outcomes of these patients.
The deviation from myopic best choices does not imply inferior outcomes for all patients,
though. The right panel of Figure 7 compares the observed outcomes (dark bars) with those
under outcome maximization (light bars). The outcomes would be better under physician
myopia on average, but the potential changes vary. For patients observed to receive clipping,
the outcomes would improve significantly if physicians were myopic. For patients observed
to receive coiling, however, the outcomes would be slightly worse under myopia. This shows
that experimentation can help physicians learn about the match value of some treatments,



































All Clip Coil Obs
Data Model
Counterfactual: success rate maximization
Figure 7: Counterfactual experiment: choice probabilities when physicians maximize cur-
rent patient outcomes
Notes: The Data bars plot the observed choice probabilities (left panel) and treatment success rates (right
panel). The Model bars plot the simulated choice probabilities and patient outcomes, assuming physicians
maximize current-period expected patient outcomes (plus a treatment-specific, Type-I extreme value error).
Clip stands for surgical clipping; coil stands for endovascular coiling; obs stands for watchful observation, i.e.
no intervention. A treatment is a success if the patient can be discharged home and does not need assisted
care.
That physicians only maximize the expected outcome of current patients is in stark contrast
with strategic forward-looking physicians maximizing their total discounted payoffs. Hence
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Choice probability Success Fraction with
Pr(clip) Pr(coil) Pr(obs) rates deviation
Overall
Data 0.303 0.409 0.288 0.544
Model 0.222 0.399 0.379 0.573
A. By physician subgroups
Experienced physicians at non-teaching hospitals
Data 0.307 0.341 0.353 0.528
Model 0.270 0.263 0.466 0.579
Experienced physicians at teaching hospitals
Data 0.293 0.431 0.277 0.557
Model 0.234 0.341 0.425 0.536
Young physicians at non-teaching hospitals
Data 0.334 0.460 0.206 0.559
Model 0.127 0.659 0.214 0.605
Young physicians at teaching hospitals
Data 0.242 0.498 0.260 0.541
Model 0.228 0.448 0.323 0.561
B. By patient types k
Ruptured, healthy
Data 0.251 0.275 0.474 0.357
Model 0.116 0.185 0.699 0.369 0.301
Ruptured, unhealthy
Data 0.401 0.351 0.248 0.281
Model 0.633 0.276 0.092 0.295 0.908
Unruptured, healthy
Data 0.236 0.466 0.399 0.877
Model 0.009 0.318 0.673 0.913 0.327
Unruptured, unhealthy
Data 0.325 0.594 0.082 0.761
Model 0.087 0.909 0.004 0.821 0.996
Table 14: Counterfactual experiment: physicians maximizing current patient outcomes
Notes: The Model rows report the simulated choice probabilities and patient outcomes, assuming physicians
maximize current-period expected patient outcomes (plus a treatment-specific, Type-I extreme value error).
The results are based on 1,000 simulations using the estimated parameters and the observed sequences of
patients. A treatment is a success if the patient can be discharged home and does not need assisted care.
Clip stands for surgical clipping; coil stands for endovascular coiling; obs stands for watchful observation,
i.e. no intervention.Fraction with deviation is the fraction of patients with the given type who would receive
a different treatment had the physician been maximizing patient outcome. Panel A breaks the whole sample
down by physician subgroups; Panel B by patient types. Young physicians are those with no more than
5 years of experience in the data. Teaching-hospital physicians are those working primarily (measured by
caseload) at a teaching hospital. If a physician works at multiple hospitals, the one with the largest share of
the physician’s cases is used. Ruptured and unruptured aneurysms are identified from standardized diagnosis
codes (ICD-9-CM) in the SID data. Healthy patients are those with no major comorbidities (diseases or
disorders in addition to the primary condition, i.e. brain aneurysm) as recorded in the SID.
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I also examine the choices and outcomes if physicians only maximize their flow payoff but
ignore the continuation values. Table 15 compares the observed and simulated choices and
outcomes. On average, the choice probabilities for clipping stay relatively unchanged, but
those for coiling decrease substantially if physicians were only maximizing flow payoffs. Ad-
ditionally, there is a lower probability that patient outcomes would be good. The differences
imply that it is the future value of learning that encourages experimentation with coiling,
which helps improve patient outcomes.
Panel A of Table 15 breaks the whole sample down by physician groups. All groups of
physicians would reduce the adoption of coiling under myopia. Moreover, experienced
physician choices will mainly transition towards clipping, in which they had accumulated
more skills; young physician choices will mainly transition towards no intervention, given
their low skills in both clipping and coiling.
Panel B of Table 15 looks at the differential response by patient type. Physicians still tend to
deviate from the treatment that maximizes the flow utility when seeing patients of unhealthy
types. The difference between observed and predicted treatment success rates also shows
that these types of patients actually benefit from the experimentation of forward-looking
physicians: their success rates would be 4-9 percentage points lower had the physician
ignored the future values of learning.
Figure 8 illustrates the changes in choice probabilities and patient outcomes if physicians
only maximize their own flow payoffs. Patients would get inferior outcomes on average,
which is the artifact of the physicians taking into account the cost of delivering care and
expected revenue in addition to patient outcomes. Patients who are observed to receive
coiling see the largest decline in outcomes with physician myopia. The decline highlights
the value of learning by forward-looking physicians.
Finally, Figure 9 summarizes the heterogeneous effects on outcomes by patient type. Not
surprisingly, all patients would get better outcomes if physicians were maximizing the cur-
48
Choice probability Success Fraction with
Pr(clip) Pr(coil) Pr(obs) rates deviation
Overall
Data 0.303 0.409 0.288 0.544
Model 0.308 0.071 0.548 0.516
A. By physician subgroups
Experienced physicians at non-teaching hospitals
Data 0.307 0.341 0.353 0.528
Model 0.502 0.013 0.485 0.508
Experienced physicians at teaching hospitals
Data 0.293 0.431 0.277 0.557
Model 0.515 0.010 0.475 0.468
Young physicians at non-teaching hospitals
Data 0.334 0.460 0.206 0.559
Model 0.153 0.209 0.639 0.568
Young physicians at teaching hospitals
Data 0.242 0.498 0.260 0.541
Model 0.116 0.121 0.762 0.536
B. By patient types k
Ruptured, healthy
Data 0.251 0.275 0.474 0.357
Model 0.235 0.052 0.713 0.353 0.287
Ruptured, unhealthy
Data 0.401 0.351 0.248 0.281
Model 0.519 0.053 0.428 0.240 0.572
Unruptured, healthy
Data 0.236 0.466 0.399 0.877
Model 0.117 0.090 0.793 0.889 0.207
Unruptured, unhealthy
Data 0.325 0.594 0.082 0.761
Model 0.675 0.098 0.227 0.674 0.773
Table 15: Counterfactual experiment: physicians maximizing flow payoff
Notes: The Model rows report the simulated choice probabilities and patient outcomes assuming physicians
maximize flow payoff (plus a treatment-specific, Type-I extreme value error). The results are based on 1,000
simulations using the estimated parameters and the observed sequences of patients. A treatment is a success
if the patient can be discharged home and does not need assisted care. Clip stands for surgical clipping;
coil stands for endovascular coiling; obs stands for watchful observation, i.e. no intervention.Fraction with
deviation is the fraction of patients with the given type who would receive a different treatment had the
physician been maximizing her flow payoff. Panel A breaks the whole sample down by physician subgroups;
Panel B by patient types. Young physicians are those with no more than 5 years of experience in the data.
Teaching-hospital physicians are those working primarily (measured by caseload) at a teaching hospital.
If a physician works at multiple hospitals, the one with the largest share of the physician’s cases is used.
Ruptured and unruptured aneurysms are identified from standardized diagnosis codes (ICD-9-CM) in the
SID data. Healthy patients are those with no major comorbidities (diseases or disorders in addition to the




































All Clip Coil Obs
Data Model
Counterfactual: physician flow payoff maximization
Figure 8: Counterfactual experiment: choice probabilities when physicians maximize flow
payoff
Notes: The Data bars plot the observed choice probabilities (left panel) and treatment success rates (right
panel). The Model bars plot the simulated choice probabilities and patient outcomes, assuming physicians
maximize flow payoff (plus a treatment-specific, Type-I extreme value error). Clip stands for surgical
clipping; coil stands for endovascular coiling; obs stands for watchful observation, i.e. no intervention. A
treatment is a success if the patient can be discharged home and does not need assisted care.
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rent patient outcomes. But when physicians maximize their own flow payoffs, patients of
unhealthy types would have lower treatment success rates because of the reduced experi-



















































































Figure 9: Counterfactual experiment: patient outcomes under physician myopia
Notes: The Data bars plot the observed treatment success rates. The Model bars plot the simulated success
rates under physician myopia. A treatment is a success if the patient can be discharged home and does not
need assisted care.The right panel assumes physicians maximize current patient outcomes, and the left panel
assumes physicians maximize their own flow payoffs. Ruptured and unruptured aneurysms are identified
from standardized diagnosis codes (ICD-9-CM) in the SID data. Healthy patients are those with no major
comorbidities (diseases or disorders in addition to the primary condition, i.e. brain aneurysm) as recorded
in the SID.
1.6.2. Payment reforms
I continue to use the estimated model to evaluate the potential impacts of two payment
reforms. I first examine a payment reform where all payments are independent of the
treatment choices, except when no intervention is chosen. Then I examine a reform that
links payments with patient outcomes, using the Value Modifier (VM) program by the
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Centers for Medicare of Medicaid Services (CMS) as an example.
Uniform payments across treatment
As noted above, the payment differentials between clipping and coiling may induce physi-
cians to deviate from the treatment that maximizes patient outcomes. As such, I explore
the change in physician choice probabilities and patient outcomes if payments are indepen-
dent of the choice of intervention. In this counterfactual experiment, I set the total charges
for clipping and coiling to be the same within each hospital, conditional on patient type.
The charges for no intervention are left unchanged.
Table 16 shows that when clipping and coiling generate the same revenue, physicians tend
to choose more intervention in general. The resulting patient outcomes are similar, but
physician revenues per case increase substantially from 114 to 176 thousand dollars. The
physician responses vary by tenure and the type of hospital, though. Experienced physicians
at non-teaching hospitals tend to do even more clipping and less coiling when the revenues
are independent of choices. This implies that the existing fee differentials between clipping
and coiling for these physicians are counteracting the differences in physician beliefs and
skills that favor clipping. For other groups of physicians, however, the payment reform
induces more take-up of coiling, suggesting that the existing fee differentials are discouraging
the choice of coiling.
Figures 10 and 11 illustrate the comparisons of choice probabilities and patient outcomes,
respectively. Figure 10 highlights the heterogeneous response across physician groups to
the payment reform: all physicians except those who are experienced and work at non-
teaching hospitals would choose coiling more often when the fee differentials are eliminated.
Figure 11 summarizes the change in patient outcomes, breaking the whole sample down by
both physician groups and observed treatments in the data. Overall, patients treated by
experienced physicians would have slightly lower success rates under the payment reform,
and those treated by young physicians would have superior outcomes. Between patients
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Choice probability Success Revenue/case
Pr(clip) Pr(coil) Pr(obs) rates ($1,000)
Overall
Data 0.303 0.409 0.288 0.544 114.25
Model 0.366 0.472 0.162 0.545 176.06
By physician subgroups
Experienced physicians at non-teaching hospitals
Data 0.307 0.341 0.353 0.528 87.96
Model 0.515 0.211 0.274 0.521 138.00
Experienced physicians at teaching hospitals
Data 0.293 0.431 0.277 0.557 119.00
Model 0.324 0.591 0.085 0.530 203.45
Young physicians at non-teaching hospitals
Data 0.334 0.460 0.206 0.559 131.16
Model 0.207 0.713 0.080 0.594 184.56
Young physicians at teaching hospitals
Data 0.242 0.498 0.260 0.541 165.58
Model 0.261 0.631 0.108 0.557 238.07
Table 16: Counterfactual experiment: uniform payments for clipping and coiling
Notes: The Model rows report the simulated choice probabilities and patient outcomes, assuming uniform
payments between clipping and coiling, conditional on patient types and hospitals. The results are based on
1,000 simulations using the estimated parameters and the observed sequences of patients. Revenue per case
is in thousands of real 2014 dollars. A treatment is a success if the patient can be discharged home and
does not need assisted care. Young physicians are those with no more than 5 years of experience in the data.
Teaching-hospital physicians are those working primarily (measured by caseload) at a teaching hospital. If
a physician works at multiple hospitals, the one with the largest share of the physician’s cases is used.
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who are observed to receive different treatments, those treated with clipping in the data
would generally have better outcomes had the payments been equal. On the contrary, those
treated with coiling in the data would have moderately worse outcomes under uniform
payments.
Outcome-contingent payments
There have been ongoing proposals to link payments for medical services with patient
outcomes. The CMS is currently rolling out the Value Modifier (VM) program for Medicare
beneficiaries at participating hospitals, and they hope to expand it to all physician providers
in 2018. The VM program adjusts the payments on a claim basis for services in the Physician
Fee Schedule (PFS). The maximum reward for good patient outcomes is 2% of the baseline
fee, and the maximum punishment for adverse outcomes is also 2%. Hence the value at risk
for physicians amounts to 4% of the baseline fee.
I explore the impacts of VM-style payment reforms on physician choices and patient out-
comes in the context of learning. I assume a simplified payment schedule that pays physi-
cians 102% of the prevailing revenue for a successful treatment and 98% otherwise. Table
17 summarizes the physicians’ responses.
On average, physicians intervene more often under the outcome-based payments. In par-
ticular, they tend to choose more clipping but less coiling. The resulting patient outcome,
however, is inferior on average. The change seems counterintuitive, but it actually high-
lights the classic exploitation vs. exploration tradeoff in learning. With payoffs being higher
for a success and lower for a failure, physicians would be induced to lean toward the treat-
ment that maximizes current-period outcome. But on the other hand, the outcome-based
payments put more emphasis on the future values of learning, which could encourage more
experimentation. The overall effects are heterogeneous across physicians and depend on the
relative magnitudes of the two opposing forces.
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Figure 10: Counterfactual experiment: choice probabilities under uniform payments for
clipping and coiling
Notes: The Data bars plot the observed choice probabilities by physician groups. The Model bars plot the
simulated probabilities, assuming uniform payments between clipping and coiling, conditional on patient
types and hospitals. Clip stands for surgical clipping; coil stands for endovascular coiling; obs stands for
watchful observation, i.e. no intervention. Young physicians are those with no more than 5 years of experience
in the data. Teaching-hospital physicians are those working primarily (measured by caseload) at a teaching
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Figure 11: Counterfactual experiment: patient outcomes under uniform payments for clip-
ping and coiling
Notes: The Data bars plot the observed patient outcomes by physician groups. The Model bars plot
the simulated outcomes, assuming uniform payments between clipping and coiling, conditional on patient
types and hospitals. A treatment is a success if the patient can be discharged home and does not need
assisted care. Clip stands for surgical clipping; coil stands for endovascular coiling; obs stands for watchful
observation, i.e. no intervention. Young physicians are those with no more than 5 years of experience in
the data. Teaching-hospital physicians are those working primarily (measured by caseload) at a teaching
hospital. If a physician works at multiple hospitals, the one with the largest share of the physician’s cases
is used.
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Choice probability Success Revenue/case
Pr(clip) Pr(coil) Pr(obs) rates ($1,000)
Overall
Data 0.303 0.409 0.288 0.544 114.25
Model 0.478 0.349 0.173 0.526 159.24
By physician subgroups
Experienced physicians at non-teaching hospitals
Data 0.307 0.341 0.353 0.528 87.96
Model 0.571 0.146 0.283 0.511 130.90
Experienced physicians at teaching hospitals
Data 0.293 0.431 0.277 0.557 119.00
Model 0.417 0.484 0.100 0.515 180.70
Young physicians at non-teaching hospitals
Data 0.334 0.460 0.206 0.559 131.16
Model 0.410 0.500 0.090 0.562 161.52
Young physicians at teaching hospitals
Data 0.242 0.498 0.260 0.541 165.58
Model 0.427 0.448 0.124 0.531 212.56
Table 17: Counterfactual experiment: outcome-contingent payments
Notes: The Model rows report the simulated choice probabilities and treatment success rates, assuming
outcome-based payments: physicians receive 102% or 98% of the prevailing revenue when the outcome is a
success or a failure, respectively. The results are based on 1,000 simulations using the estimated parameters
and the observed sequences of patients. Revenue per case is thousand real 2014 dollars. A treatment is
a success if the patient can be discharged home and does not need assisted care. Clip stands for surgical
clipping; coil stands for endovascular coiling; obs stands for watchful observation, i.e. no intervention. Young
physicians are those with no more than 5 years of experience in the data. Teaching-hospital physicians are
those working primarily (measured by caseload) at a teaching hospital. If a physician works at multiple
hospitals, the one with the largest share of the physician’s cases is used.
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on future values of learning dominates for physicians who are experienced and working
at teaching hospitals and for those who are young and working at non-teaching hospitals.
These two groups of physicians would adopt more coiling, while the other two groups would
reduce coiling take-up under the outcome-based payment schedule.
Figures 12 and 13 summarize the responses in treatment choices and patient outcomes by
physician groups and by the patients’ observed treatment in the data. The two groups of
physicians (experienced at teaching hospitals, young at non-teaching hospitals) for whom
the future effect dominates tend to choose coiling more often. As for patient outcomes, those
who are observed to receive coiling would get worse outcomes under VM-style payments.
On the contrary, those who are observed to receive clipping would get moderately better
outcomes. This differential response corroborates the above-noted explanation further. The
value of learning about clipping, the traditional treatment, is generally lower. Therefore it
is more likely that the effect of outcome-based payments on future values is dominated by
that on the current-period outcome.
1.7. Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, I use the treatment of brain aneurysms as an example to study how two kinds
of learning jointly shape physicians’ treatment choices: Bayesian learning that updates
physician beliefs regarding treatment-patient type match value and learning by doing that
improves treatment-specific surgical skills and reduces the future costs of delivering the
same treatment. Using the detailed New York Statewide Inpatient Database (SID) from
2003 to 2014, I retrieve the uninterrupted history of physicians’ treatments and outcomes.
I then use the novel dataset to uncover empirical patterns that show that both kinds of
physician learning are present, and that physicians are forward-looking in their treatment
choices.
I develop a dynamic structural model in light of the reduced-form evidence. The model
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Figure 12: Counterfactual experiment: choice probabilities under outcome-contingent pay-
ments
Notes: The Data bars plot the observed choice probabilities by physician groups. The Model bars plot the
simulated probabilities, assuming outcome-based payments: physicians receive 102% or 98% of the prevailing
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Figure 13: Counterfactual experiment: patient outcomes under outcome-contingent pay-
ments
Notes: The Data bars plot the observed treatment success rates by physician groups. The Model bars
plot the simulated success rates assuming outcome-based payments: physicians receive 102% or 98% of
the prevailing revenue when the outcome is a success or a failure, respectively. The results are based on
1,000 simulations using the estimated parameters and the observed sequences of patients. Revenue per case
is thousand real 2014 dollars. A treatment is a success if the patient can be discharged home and does
not need assisted care. Clip stands for surgical clipping; coil stands for endovascular coiling; obs stands
for watchful observation, i.e. no intervention. Young physicians are those with no more than 5 years of
experience in the data. Teaching-hospital physicians are those working primarily (measured by caseload)
at a teaching hospital. If a physician works at multiple hospitals, the one with the largest share of the
physician’s cases is used.
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My model solution extends the Gittins index policy Gittins (1979) to accommodate a high-
dimensional state space and spillover effects between the two kinds of learning. I estimate
the model on the SID data and achieve good model fit with the observed choice dynamics.
I further disentangle the effects of Bayesian learning and learning by doing: the former
dominates the decisions to utilize clipping, the old treatment; the latter dominates the
decisions to adopt coiling, the new treatment. Relative magnitudes of the two kinds of
learning also vary across physicians. Bayesian learning has more influence on the treatment
choices of physicians at non-teaching hospitals, whose prior beliefs about coiling are less
optimistic. Learning by doing, on the other hand, is more influential on the decisions of
younger physicians, who have lower stocks of surgical skills.
I use the model estimates to compare the observed choices by forward-looking physicians
with counterfactual ones by myopic physicians. I find that forward-looking physicians devi-
ate substantially from the myopic best choices, especially on unhealthy patients. I also assess
the impacts of alternative payment schedules such as the CMS Value Modifier program that
links payments with outcomes. The heterogeneous responses in physician choices highlight
the key tradeoff in learning, namely exploiting high flow payoffs versus experimenting with
lesser-known options.
This chapter sheds light on how belief updating and skill accumulation jointly shape medical
decision-making. Moreover, I demonstrate how forward-induction approaches such as the
Gittins index can help with the estimation of otherwise high-dimensional models. I also
provide new empirical evidence and identify structural learning parameters with the rich
variation in the SID data.
My focus in this chapter is on individual physicians who make decisions independently
and learn from their own experiences. To this end, the treatment of brain aneurysms
is particularly suitable because of the scarcity of neurosurgeons and the lack of industry
guidelines. Collective or centralized decision-making could be more relevant, however, if a
hospital has multiple physicians specializing in the same condition. The hospital may have
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the dual goal of optimizing patient outcomes in tandem with building the skill portfolio of
its physicians. This is an interesting dimension to explore in future work.
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CHAPTER 2 DETECTING POTENTIAL OVERBILLING IN
MEDICARE REIMBURSEMENT VIA HOURS WORKED
This chapter is co-authored with Hanming Fang.1
2.1. Introduction
Medicare benefit payments in 2014 totaled $597 billion, accounting for 14 percent of the
United States federal budget (see Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation (2015)); and Congres-
sional Budget Office (2014) forecasts, as more baby boomers retire, government health care
program expenditures will further increase and will account for 14 percent of the U.S. GDP
by 2039. From a public policy perspective, mitigating the inefficiencies in the Medicare
system to ensure that every Medicare dollar is put to the best use is of first order impor-
tance. This chapter is about a particular form of inefficiency that is broadly referred to
as overbilling, where providers file improper claims in order to increase the reimbursement
from Medicare or other insurance companies. The Office of Inspector General at the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services loosely defines two common types of overbilling
(formally referred to as “improper claims”): upcoding refers to billing codes reflecting a
more severe illness than actually existed or a more expensive treatment than was provided;
overcharging refers to charging for more units of a service than was provided, or charging
for services not provided at all (see Department of Health and Human Services (2015)).2
Lorence and Spink (2002) estimated that overbilling costs the Federal government about $12
billion annually in the 1990s, and researchers have continued to find evidence of overbilling
since then (e.g., Brunt (2011)).
Efficient and cost-effective detection of overbilling, preferably at the individual provider
level, is crucial to reduce overbilling. However, this remains a challenging task. Most
1Copyright American Economic Association; reproduced with permission of the American Economic
Review
2There is a third type of improper claims that bill for services that lack medical necessity, sometimes
known as utilization abuse. Detecting utilization abuse could be much harder and potentially controversial,
so the approach we propose in this chapter only targets detecting upcoding and overcharging.
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papers in the literature measure “overbilling” by the differential probability that higher-
level codes are billed relative to lower-level codes, or by the high percentile rank in the
distribution of total Medicare reimbursement received by providers. But such measures
could be confounded by factors such as selection on patient and provider characteristics.
Medicare claims data, available in more recent years, enabled researchers to control for
some, but not all, patient and provider heterogeneities. Rosenberg et al. (2000) developed a
Bayesian model to adaptively detect questionable claims using previous hospital claims that
insurers already audited. However, new costly audits are required to apply the methods
to new claims data. The Comprehensive Error Rate Testing (CERT) program by the
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) faces a similar challenge, because the
program needs to hire experts to review a large sample of claims every year (see Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services (2015a)). Geruso and Layton (2015) identified upcoding
at the market level using risk scores and variations in financial incentives for physicians.
In this chapter, we propose a novel approach to efficiently detect, or at least flag, potential
Medicare overbilling using conservative estimates of the hours worked implied by service
codes providers submit to Medicare for reimbursement. Our idea is very simple. Every
provider has a fixed number of hours in any given period; and most of the service codes
that are submitted for reimbursement require that the provider spends a certain amount of
time with the patient. If the hours worked implied from the service codes a provider submits
to Medicare are implausibly long, the provider is suspicious for overbilling. Our approach to
flag potential Medicare overbilling has several key advantages. First, the existing physician-
level billing data are sufficient to implement this approach, thus no additional data collection
is needed. Second, by focusing on the implied hours worked within a given time period, our
approach is immune to confounding factors such as selection on patient conditions. Third,
our approach is flexible in the sense that it can be automated, and can be easily extended to
a more general setting with augmented data, for example, by including other components
of Medicare and/or additional physician billing information, say, billings for beneficiaries
of other insurance programs. We should also note that our calculation of implied physician
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hours worked is deliberately conservative for the moment, and it is certainly not fail-proof
especially given some well-noted data limitations (see, for example, O’Gara (2014); Jones
et al. (2015)). Nonetheless, we believe it can serve as a useful first step for effective and
more targeted auditing to reduce Medicare overbilling.
We apply our approach to detect potential Medicare overbilling using two waves of Medicare
Part B Fee-for-Service (FFS) physician payment data. We construct conservative estimates
for physicians’ implied hours worked treating Medicare Part B FFS beneficiaries in 2012 and
2013.3, 4 We find that about 2,300 physicians in our sample billed for more than 100 hours
per week for Medicare Part B FFS patients alone. We consider such long hours of work
highly implausible and refer to these physicians as “flagged physicians.” A comparison with
the unflagged physicians shows that flagged physicians are more likely to work in smaller
group practices, more likely to be a specialist rather than a primary care physician, and
provide both more and higher-intensity services. Results from simple regression analysis
also suggest that the coding patterns of the flagged physicians are sensitive to variations in
the marginal revenue of choosing a higher-intensity code. Interestingly, the revenues from
these higher-intensity services are not enough to offset the “longer” implied hours needed
to furnish them, resulting in substantially lower reported hourly revenues for the flagged
physicians than for the unflagged physicians. Moreover, this large gap in hourly revenues
is hard to reconcile using observable physician characteristics and geographical variations.
Our research is related to the literature on the prevalence and consequences of overbilling.
Lorence and Spink (2002) surveyed organizational providers and found significant “coding
optimization,” despite serious penalties if the fraudulent billing practices were found out.
Angeles and Park (2009) showed that upcoding imposed unnecessary cost to the already ex-
pensive Medicare program, was especially serious for Medicare Advantage, and this problem
may worsen as the 76 million baby boomers age. The Department of Health and Human
3CMS released two waves of the data to the public in April 2014 and May 2015, respectively.
4Details on how we construct the estimates for physicians’ hours worked based on the service codes
submitted to Medicare are described in Section 2.3.
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Services, alarmed at the rapid increase in Medicare spending from 2001 to 2010, conducted
an in-depth study on the coding trends of evaluation and management (E/M) services in
2012, and found some physicians consistently billed higher-level codes.
Our study is also related to the literature on the possible determinants of overbilling. Adams
et al. (2002) noted that the long documented difficulty of billing may lead to more erroneous
coding, which can provide room for fraudulent coding at the same time. Other factors ex-
amined include pressure from the management teams (Lorence and Spink (2002); Dafny
and Dranove (2009)), hospital ownership (Silverman and Skinner (2004)), anti-fraud en-
forcement effort (Becker et al. (2005); Bastani et al. (2016)), fee differentials across codes
(Brunt (2011); Bowblis and Brunt (2014)), and information technology such as electronic
health records (EHR) (Adler-Milstein and Jha (2014)).
Finally, our study is related to the recent growing list of papers that used the newly released
CMS Physician Utilization and Payment data. Most studies that use this dataset look at
utilization and/or payment patterns of a particular specialty or procedure (Bergman et al.
(2014); Harewood et al. (2014); Clair and Goyal (2015); Dusetzina et al. (2015); Ip et al.
(2015); Ko et al. (2015); Lapps et al. (2016); Menger et al. (2015); Schmajuk et al. (2014);
Sutphin et al. (2014); Skolarus et al. (2015); Skolasky and Riley III (2015)). For example,
Bergman et al. (2014) studied physician payments in general and found that high physician
earnings were mainly driven by more services furnished per patient instead of more patients.
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. In Section 2.2, we describe the data
and the construction of our sample. In Section 2.3, we discuss our approach to estimating
physician hours worked. In Section 2.4, we present our empirical results. In Section 2.5,
we corroborate some of our findings using two external datasets, the National Ambulatory
Medical Care Survey and the CMS Comprehensive Error Rate Testing (CERT) results.
Finally, in Section 2.6, we conclude.
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2.2. Data and Sample Construction
Our main data source is the Medicare Part B FFS Physician Utilization and Payment
data released annually to the public by the CMS since April 2014. The two waves of data
available now are derived from all Medicare Part B FFS claims made in 2012 and 2013,
respectively. Each wave of data has about 9 million records at the provider-place-service
level. Providers are uniquely identified by their National Provider Identifier (NPI) and
characterized by a limited set of basic information (e.g. address, individual or organization
indicator, gender and specialty). Places are categorized into “office” settings and “facility”
(such as hospitals) settings, and reflect where the provider furnished a service. Services are
identified by a 5-digit alpha-numeric code specified in the Healthcare Common Procedure
Coding System (HCPCS).5 Hence each observation is a summary of a provider’s rendition
of a service at a place within the calendar year, as well as the payment the provider received
for these services.
We supplement the Physician Utilization and Payment dataset with three other publicly
available datasets. First, we use the CMS Physician Compare database to get more detailed
physician characteristics such as education background and group practice affiliations. Both
datasets identify physicians by their NPI, which facilitates the matching process. Then
we use the National Physician Fee Schedule to get the Relative Value Units (RVUs) that
quantify the amount of work required to furnish each service, which we will use to estimate
the time needed for the services. Finally, we use a CMS on-site survey (Zuckerman et al.
(2014)) that objectively measured the time needed for a subset of services to corroborate
our estimates of physician hours worked.
Next, we construct our sample by including only providers who are individuals (“physi-
cians”) instead of organizations, are matched with a record in the Physician Compare
database, work in the continental U.S., completed professional medical training between
5For every physician, the HCPCS codes claimed for fewer than 10 times in a calendar year are excluded
from the datasets to protect patient privacy. Claims for durable medical equipment are also excluded.
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1946 and 2011, and have valid basic information (practice location, gender, and specialty).6
The first selection criterion discards about 5 percent of observations in the raw Physician
Utilization and Payment data, the second discards about 9 percent of the remaining ob-
servations, and the rest lead to only negligible reduction of the sample size.7, 8 We further
restrict our sample to include only HCPCS codes that are actually services; that is, we
exclude codes that are drugs, equipment or medical supplies, or are only for quality admin-
istration purposes and not paid for, or are temporary codes for new services.9, 10
Finally, we aggregate the data to the physician-service level. For each physician-service
combination, we observe the physician’s characteristics, the workload to furnish the service
(RVU and/or time needed), the volume of the service billed each year (the number of times
that the service is furnished and the number of unique Medicare Part B FFS beneficiaries
receiving the service), and total Medicare payments for these services. In the final sample,
we have 7.9 million physician-service observations on 623,959 physicians and 4,480 HCPCS
service codes.
2.3. Measuring Physician Hours Worked
We define physician hours worked to be the total time a physician spent with patients
to furnish the service codes submitted to Medicare for reimbursement. For some codes,
referred to below as the “timed codes”, the time needed per service is readily available; for
other service codes that do not have such information, we use the time codes to estimate the
6It is important in our analysis that all claims under the same NPI are services furnished by the same
individual. The NPI Final Rule by Department of Health and Human Services (2004) ensures that this
should be the case for individual NPIs. To the extent that some providers submit claims using another
provider’s NPI, we also consider it to be a form of inappropriate billing. See the Appendix for more detailed
institutional background regarding billing and individual provider NPIs.
7For expositional simplicity, we will refer to all individual providers as “physicians” even if a small fraction
of them are nurses or physician assistants.
8We exclude those graduated in or after 2012 because they are likely to be residents, who are known for
extremely long working hours. We discuss this in greater detail in the Appendix and show that our results
are not affected when more possible residents are excluded from the sample.
9Drug codes are excluded when we estimate total physician hours worked but not when we calculate total
revenues.
10We exclude temporary codes because they do not have RVU information that we can use to reliably
estimate the time needed to furnish them.
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time needed for providing these services based on their Work Relative Value Units (Work
RVUs) which are measures of workloads that CMS assigns to all services.
2.3.1. Timed Codes
The timed codes, which are the cornerstone of our estimation of physician hours worked,
fall into two categories. The first category is 145 timed codes with suggested or required
time in their definition, and accounts for 50.44 percent of total Medicare Part B FFS
reimbursement in 2012. These are mostly from the “evaluation and management” (E/M)
code group, which include office or home visits. An important feature of these services
is that there are usually multiple codes with different levels of intensity or complexity to
furnish even for a narrowly-defined service, and the physician has discretion over which one
to file. The American Medical Association (AMA) publishes guidelines on choosing the
most appropriate code, and usually includes typical time needed for E/M codes (Gabbert
et al. (2012)). As an example, Table 18 shows a typical cluster of E/M codes where multiple
codes are available for the same service but have varying workload requirement and fees.
All five HCPCS codes, 99201 through 99205, are for “office or other outpatient visits for
new patients.” But the lowest intensity code, 99201, only needs 10 minutes to furnish per
the AMA guidelines, and generates $31.09 of revenue, whereas the highest intensity code,
99205, needs 60 minutes and generates $145.81.11 Note that, incentive issues aside, if a
physician were to overstate the service intensity by one level, revenue would increase by at
least $20.
The second category is codes selected in a 2014 CMS survey that directly measures the time
needed for certain services (Zuckerman et al. (2014)). The survey targets 112 HCPCS codes
that are judged to be growing fast, frequently billed, or often billed together.12 These codes
make up 17.76 percent of 2012 Medicare Part B FFS reimbursement. Survey staff are sent
11These fees are the baseline reimbursement amounts in the 2012 Physician Fee Schedule. Actual Medicare
payments will vary slightly across geographic regions and specific settings in which the services are furnished.
12One of the 112 HCPCS codes in the 2014 CMS Survey is a Level-II code (mainly products and supplies)
with a service component, which we exclude when constructing our main sample.
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Coding requirement Typical Work Price
HCPCS History Exam MDM time RVU ($)
99201 PF PF Straightforward 10 min 0.48 31.09
99202 EPF EPF Straightforward 20 min 0.93 53.54
99203 Detailed Detailed Low 30 min 1.42 77.47
99204 Comprehensive Comprehensive Moderate 45 min 2.43 118.18
99205 Comprehensive Comprehensive High 60 min 3.17 145.81
Table 18: Example of codes with varying intensity and time needed for the same service
Notes: All five codes are for “office or other outpatient visits for new patients.” “Price” is the 2012 price
assuming services are furnished in office settings, prior to the adjustment using Geographic Practice Cost
Indices (GPCI). “History” refers to the process of asking about a patient’s health history; “Exam” refers to
the physical examinations; “MDM” refers to the complexity of medical decision making. To file a certain
code, all three elements of the service must meet the required level. “PF”(problem-focused) is limited to
the affected area or organ system; “EPF” (expanded problem-focused) also includes related areas. CMS
provides very detailed definitions of each level of service intensities in Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services (2015b), to which we refer the interested reader.
on site to document the time used to furnish the interested services at several participating
institutions with large volumes of these service. 13
Our idea is to use the time needed for timed codes described above to estimate the time
needed for all other codes. In order to do this, we construct the expected time needed for
each code based on the “typical time needed” suggested by the AMA guideline.14 This
is important because the actual time to furnish a service code may vary both across and
within physicians. We construct the “expected time needed” as follows. Assuming the
time needed follows a uniform distribution, we take the simple average of the minimum and
maximum time allowed for each code to get the expected time. Specifically, some codes may
have an explicit range of time needed, such as “5-10 minutes of medical discussion.” For
such codes, the expected time needed is simply the average of the lower and upper bounds.
For codes that do not have such a range, physicians are supposed to file the code whose
typical time needed is closest to the actual time spent. For example, between codes 99202
and 99203 as described in Table 18, a physician who spent 23 minutes should file the code
99202 instead of 99203. Following this logic, the expected time needed we will assign to
13The representativeness of specialties among the selected codes is discussed in the Appendix.
14An exception is when the AMA guideline requires the physician to spend a certain amount of time
when furnishing a service. For example, code 99360 is for “physician standby service, requiring prolonged
physician attendance, each 30 minutes (eg, operation standby, standby for frozen section, for cesarean/high-
risk delivery, for monitoring EEG),” and explicitly prohibits filing this code for services less than 30 minutes.
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HCPCS codes 99201 through 99205 are 7.5, 20, 31.25, 45, and 60 minutes, respectively. To
see this, consider HCPCS code 99201 for example. Note that physicians who spend 0 to 15
minutes with a new patient are supposed to file HCPCS code 99201 if they follow the AMA
guideline. Thus, under the plausible assumption that the actual time spent with patients
follows a uniform distribution, the simple average of the minimum (0 minute) and maximum
(15 minutes) time allowed for filing 99201 is 7.5 minutes. For the highest intensity codes
within a cluster of codes, e.g. code 99205 in Table 18, we set the expected time to be the
same as the typical time as there is no upper bound specified in the AMA guideline. In
order to err on the conservative side, we moreover choose the smaller of the typical time for
a service code and expected time we construct for the timed codes whenever the two differ.
Finally, we also exclude timed codes that do not require direct contact of the physician with
the patient, such as intravenous drug infusions and phototherapies, again to be conservative
in our estimate of the physicians’ hours worked.
2.3.2. Work RVUs and Time Needed for Untimed Codes
Next, we estimate the time needed for all other codes for which AMA guideline does not
specify typical or required time. Our estimation is based on the Relative Value Units (RVUs)
of the service codes. RVUs reflect the value of each HCPCS code along three dimensions.
AMA appoints a special committee of experts from various specialties to assign and reg-
ularly update the RVUs; and the CMS uses them to determine Medicare reimbursements
to physicians. The Physician Fee Schedule specifies the following formula for the baseline
payment amount for a given HCPCS code:
Payment =

(Work RVU)× (Work GPCI)
+(PE RVU)× (PE GPCI)
+(MP RVU)× (MP GPCI)
× CF,
where Work RVU captures the amount of work, primarily time, needed to furnish the ser-
vice; PE RVU captures the practice expense (PE) of the service; MP RVU captures the
71
malpractice insurance cost of the service; the Geographic Practice Cost Indices (GPCI)
adjust for the geographic differences in the costs of practicing medicine, and vary slightly
around 1 across 90 GPCI regions in the U.S.; and finally, the conversion factor (CF) trans-
lates the RVUs into dollar amounts, which is $24.6712 per RVU in 2012, and $34.023 per
RVU in 2013 (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (2013)).
We use Work RVUs to estimate the time needed for untimed codes. Though Work RVUs are
imperfect measures of service time, time still plays the central role in how Work RVUs are
determined, making Work RVUs the best available tool for our purposes.15 Our estimation
takes two steps. First, we take the timed codes, for which we know the time needed and the
Work RVUs, and estimate the time needed per work RVU. We use both the simple averages
and regressions for robustness, and allow for both the intercept and the coefficient on work
RVU to differ by the 15 service code groups that a HCPCS code can belong to in order to
account for the potential difference in the practice patterns across specialties.16 Second, we
use the Work RVU of each code, whether it is a timed code or an untimed code, and the
estimated time needed per Work RVU from the first step to calculate its time needed.
Thus, for every timed code, we will have three measures of time needed: its expected time
needed according to the AMA guideline, and two estimated time needed using the two
estimation methods in the first step; and for every untimed code, we will have the latter
two measures of time needed. Again to err on the conservative side, we pick the minimum
of the measures of the time needed for each service code.17 In the end, we get positive
estimates of time needed for 75 percent of the HCPCS codes. Codes that do not have
positive estimates of time needed, which we will refer to as “zero-time codes,” are either
drugs/supplies that do not require direct contact with the physician (thus have zero Work
15See Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (2014). Merrell et al. (2016) also show that time explains
80-90 percent of variation in work RVUs.
16We also include the code group fixed effects to control for possible distortions in the assignment of
RVUs across specialties. Some studies (e.g. Chan (2016)) found that better-represented specialties get more
favorable assignment by the RVU Update Committee.
17In particular, the service time of timed codes used in our estimation of physician hours worked are on
average 88.44 percent of the typical time for the timed codes from the AMA Guidelines, and are on average
93.53 percent of the measured time for the timed codes from the 2014 CMS survey.
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RVU), or those that have negative estimates of time needed according to our procedure.
Given the time needed estimates of the HCPCS codes, we calculate physician i’s total hours




[(Time needed per service j)× (Number of service j billed)it] ,
(2.1)
where j is a HCPCS code in the set of codes, J , for which we have obtained positive time
needed using the procedure described above.
2.3.3. Discussion of Estimated Physician Hours Worked
Our estimates of physician hours worked are likely to be a lower bound of the actual hours,
provided that the service codes truthfully reflect both the volume and the intensity of
services the physicians actually furnished. We acknowledge the possibility of imprecise
estimates, especially with the relatively small set of timed codes that we could use. That
said, we would like to note that the timed codes already account for over two-thirds of total
Medicare Part B FFS reimbursement, leaving limited room for the imputed time to affect
the key findings; moreover, we have taken a series of measures to prevent overflagging of
potential overbilling. First, as we described above we make every decision in the construction
of the hours worked to err on the conservative side. Second, the Medicare Part B FFS
Physician Utilization and Payment data that we use in our estimation only include Medicare
Part B FFS claims, which on average account for less than 31 percent of a physician’s
services (see The Physicians Foundation (2012)). Third, as we mentioned in Footnote 5,
to protect patients’ privacy the dataset released by CMS excludes, for each physician, the
HCPCS codes that were claimed by the physician for fewer than 10 times in a calendar year.
Fourth, we only include the time needed for 75 percent of HCPCS codes that represent
services requiring physicians’ direct contact with the patient, have non-zero work RVUs,
and end up with positive time estimates. Finally, sometimes physicians bill under the NPI
of organizational providers (e.g. a hospital or a group practice), which we exclude from our
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analysis because it is impossible to identify an individual physician’s contribution to the
organizations’ billing records.18
2.4. Describing Physician Hours Worked
We convert the total hours worked in year t to hours worked per week in year t for easier
interpretation in the analysis that follows, assuming physicians work 51 weeks each year (i.e.,
take only 9 days off). By doing so we essentially characterize physician hours worked per
week averaged over the entire year. Hence we are allowing the physicians to possibly smooth
hours of work intertemporally during the year, which of course is another conservative choice
that is likely to lead to under-detection of overbilling. This choice is necessitated by the
data limitation that utilization and payment records are aggregated to the calendar year
level, and not at a higher time frequency. However, if we are able to detect implausibly long
hours worked per week under the lenient criterion permitting smoothing across the weeks,
it would serve as a stronger signal for potentially inappropriate coding behavior.
Figure 14 graphs the distribution of the average reported hours worked per week across all
the physicians. Despite the conservative methods we used to estimate the physicians’ hours
worked, about 2,300 physicians submitted claims for service codes that would translate
into over 100 hours per week on services for Medicare Part B FFS beneficiaries. Moreover,
about 600 physicians submitted claims for service codes that would imply over 168 hours per
week (i.e., 24 hours per day and 7 days per week). To put these numbers into perspective,
the Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education (ACGME) restricts residency
working hours to 80 hours per week since 2003 in light of the much studied sleep deprivation
and performance deterioration of health care providers (Wolman et al. (2009)).
In Table 19 we take a closer look at physicians who billed Medicare for long hours. We use
different flagging thresholds in terms of weekly hours, 80, 100, 112 (16 hours per day for
7 days), and 168 (24 hours per day for 7 days) respectively, and present the statistics by
18In addition, we show in the Appendix that all key findings remain under four alternative methods of
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Figure 14: Distribution of estimated hours per week
Notes: The horizontal axis shows physicians’ hours worked per week estimated from the claims they
submitted to Medicare for reimbursement. We restrict the sample to physicians whose claims imply at least
20 hours per week in at least one year. The mass at 168 per week in the top panel represents hours larger



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































year. We will refer to physicians whose estimated weekly hours worked above the threshold
as flagged physicians and those below as unflagged physicians. For example, under the 100
weekly hours threshold, we flag 2,292 physicians in 2012 and 2,120 physicians in 2013 as
having submitted claims with implied hours worked exceeding that threshold. They account
for 2.71 percent and 2.55 percent of all physicians in our data that have submitted claims
implying at least 20 hours of service per week in at least one year, and 0.367 percent and
0.340 percent among all physicians in 2012 and 2013, respectively.
Physicians with very few implied hours worked in our sample could have few Medicare
patients, or could have just as many Medicare patients but they specialize in the 25 percent
zero-time service codes where information on the time needed is unavailable. If it is the
latter, one might be concerned that our results overlook physicians who are only overbilling
on the zero-time codes. Table 19 indeed shows that, for example, the number of distinct
zero-time HCPCS codes as a fraction of all 4,480 distinct HCPCS codes filed by flagged
physicians ranges from about 9 percent using the 80-hour threshold to about 4 percent using
the 168-hour threshold, while the corresponding fraction for unflagged physicians is over 13
percent using any threshold. However, when weighted by Work RVUs of the service codes,
the differences are much smaller. This is consistent with the fact that many of the zero-
time codes have low Work RVUs. Similarly, the differences between flagged and unflagged
physicians are big when we compare the unweighted number of claims for zero-timed codes,
but shrink significantly once weighted by revenues. These suggest that specialization in
different types of services is unlikely to result in large under-flagging of physicians, though
having differential fractions of Medicare patients still is.19
Table 20 decomposes the flagged physicians into those flagged in 2012 only, in 2013 only, and
in both years. For example, using the 80-hour threshold, 1,135 physicians are flagged in 2012
only, accounting for 27.52 percent of the 4,125 physicians flagged in 2012; 848 physicians
19We can not address this issue given the fact that our data only contains Medicare claims. However,
our method can be easily extended to a more general setting with augmented data from physician billing
information for beneficiaries of other insurance programs.
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Hours threshold 80+ 100+ 112+ 168+
Year(s) flagged N % N % N % N %
2012 only 1,135 27.52 704 30.72 539 31.91 233 37.89
2012 and 2013 2,990 1,588 1,150 382
2013 only 848 22.09 532 25.09 396 25.61 148 27.93
Table 20: Flag patterns across time
Notes: “Hours threshold” shows the cutoff number of hours billed per week above which a provider is
flagged. “N ” columns report the number of physicians flagged (in 2012 only, in both years, or in 2013 only).
“%” columns show the fraction of physicians who are only flagged in 2012 (2013) among all physicians
flagged in that year (percent).
are flagged in 2013 only, representing 22.09 percent of the 3,838 physicians flagged in 2013.
2.4.1. Who Reported Implausibly Long Hours?
In Tables 19 and 20, we used four different weekly hours thresholds to flag physicians. From
now on, we focus on physicians flagged using the 100-hour threshold, although all results
hold under alternative flagging criteria.20 In addition, we only focus on the subsample of
96,033 physicians with more than 20 hours worked per week treating Medicare Part B FFS
patients, as we believe this is the more relevant group to be compared with the flagged
physicians for reasons discussed earlier.
In Table 21 we compare the characteristics of the following groups of physicians, according
to their respective column headings: (1) flagged in any year; (2) flagged in 2012; (3) flagged
in 2013; (4) flagged only in 2012; (5) flagged in both 2012 and 2013; (6) flagged only in
2013. Column (7) shows the means for the baseline group, those never flagged. To account
for the heterogeneity in physicians’ exposure to local Medicare markets, we compare the
characteristics of physicians controlling for Hospital Referral Region (HRR) fixed effects.
The 306 HRRs represent local health care markets and are commonly used as the unit of
analysis for regional variations of health care in the U.S. (Wennberg and Cooper (1996)).
The number in each cell of the table is the estimated coefficient from an OLS regression on
the subset of physicians who are either never flagged, or have the flag status indicated by
the column heading. We use the physician characteristic in the corresponding row as the
20We present the results under the 112 and 168 weekly hours flagging thresholds in the Appendix.
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dependent variable, and the flag status dummy as the explanatory variable together with
HRR fixed effects. For example, physicians ever flagged are 3.2 percentage points more
likely to be male than never flagged physicians, 17.8 percentage points less likely to have
an MD, and tend to practice in groups with 52.3 fewer providers, etc.
We find that flagged physicians are slightly more likely to be male, non-MD, more expe-
rienced, and provide fewer E/M services. Importantly, they work in substantially smaller
group practices (if at all), and have fewer hospital affiliations.21 These characteristics are
similar to what Cutler et al. (2013) found about physicians who “consistently and unambigu-
ously recommended intensive care beyond those indicated by current clinical guidelines.”22
2.4.2. What are the Specialties of Flagged Physicians?
In addition to the individual characteristics of flagged physicians, we are also interested in
whether some specialties are more likely to be associated with flagged physicians. For this
purpose, we follow Fryer and Levitt (2004)’s approach toward quantifying the “blackness”
of first names, and construct the Specialty Flag Index (SFI) for specialty s:
SFIs =
100× Pr (s|flagged)
Pr (s|flagged) + Pr (s|unflagged)
(2.2)
where the conditional probability Pr (s|flagged) is defined as the fraction of flagged physi-
cians in specialty s among all flagged physicians, and Pr (s|unflagged) is the fraction of un-
flagged physicians in specialty s among all unflagged physicians.23 The index ranges from 0
to 100. If all physicians in specialty s are flagged, then SFIs takes on a value of 100. If only
21The CMS Physician Compare data, from which we obtain the physicians’ characteristics, do not report
their race and age. Also note that the coefficients measure correlational and not necessarily causal effects.
22The differences between flagged and unflagged physicians in the sizes of group practice and the number of
hospital affiliations could be due to various factors such as internal control, auditing stringency, and patient
selection. It may suggest a “group effect” where overbilling is “contagious” within a group (e.g. Gino et al.
(2009)) or even across groups (via, e.g., endogenous referrals as in Zeltzer (2016) ). It is also possible that
large group practices might have a more diverse pool of patients than small practices so that the share of
Medicare Part B FFS patients represent a smaller fraction of their total patients for physicians working in
larger practices. Unfortunately, with the current set of Medicare Part B FFS data we could not test which
of the aforementioned factors are driving the observed differences between flagged and unflagged physicians.
23We use the self-reported primary specialty when a physician is in multiple specialties.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Ever 2012 2013 2012 only Both 2013 only Never
1(Male) 0.032*** 0.037*** 0.037*** 0.015 0.046*** 0.007 0.856
[0.007] [0.007] [0.008] [0.011] [0.009] [0.018]
1(MD) -0.178*** -0.171*** -0.126*** -0.338*** -0.100*** -0.217*** 0.844
[0.034] [0.037] [0.032] [0.053] [0.036] [0.038]
Experience (years) 0.452* 0.799*** 0.046 1.624*** 0.429 -1.244** 24.124
[0.245] [0.278] [0.252] [0.602] [0.279] [0.593]
# providers in group -52.349*** -49.660*** -52.027*** -53.157*** -48.119*** -65.027*** 88.919
[5.991] [6.139] [5.981] [10.174] [5.969] [10.346]
# hospital affiliations -1.392*** -1.376*** -1.338*** -1.565*** -1.300*** -1.476*** 2.813
[0.124] [0.130] [0.114] [0.233] [0.116] [0.170]
1(in Medicare) 0.004 0.003 0.001 0.014 0.000 0.009 0.857
[0.007] [0.008] [0.008] [0.012] [0.009] [0.016]
1(in ERX) -0.003 0.007 0.030* -0.107*** 0.057*** -0.061** 0.463
[0.016] [0.019] [0.016] [0.026] [0.020] [0.025]
1(in PQRS) -0.001 0.002 0.026 -0.086*** 0.041** -0.022 0.396
[0.016] [0.017] [0.016] [0.025] [0.017] [0.025]
1(in EHR) -0.028** -0.023 -0.032** -0.012 -0.028* -0.045* 0.417
[0.014] [0.016] [0.015] [0.029] [0.017] [0.024]
Types of codes 2012 0.220 0.966 1.460* -3.611** 2.906*** -3.495*** 22.428
[0.905] [1.027] [0.889] [1.494] [1.045] [0.934]
Types of codes 2013 0.393 0.872 2.059** -4.705*** 3.248*** -2.034** 22.351
[0.905] [1.018] [0.901] [1.340] [1.047] [1.005]
Types of E/M 2012 -1.826*** -1.814*** -1.793*** -1.945*** -1.764*** -1.900*** 6.228
[0.193] [0.203] [0.199] [0.323] [0.212] [0.247]
Types of E/M 2013 -1.780*** -1.792*** -1.683*** -2.087*** -1.671*** -1.737*** 6.207
[0.193] [0.201] [0.198] [0.313] [0.210] [0.245]
Num. of physicians 2,824 2,292 2,120 704 1,588 532 93,209
Table 21: Characteristics of flagged physicians vs. unflagged physicians, conditional on
Hospital Referral Region (HRR)
Notes: The table summarizes the difference in physician characteristics between flagged subgroups and the
never-flagged subgroup (means reported in the last column) conditional on HRR. We restrict the sample to
physicians billing at least 20 hours per week in at least one year. The number in each cell is the estimated
coefficient from an OLS regression on the subset of physicians who are either never flagged, or have the flag
status indicated by the column heading. We use the physician characteristic in the corresponding row as
the dependent variable, and the flag status dummy as the explanatory variable together with HRR fixed
effects. Physician experience is imputed from the year of graduation. # providers in group refers to the
number of providers in the group practice where the billing physician works and it is 1 if the billing physician
works in a solo practice. The number of hospital affiliations is top coded at 5 in the data. 1(in Medicare)
is an indicator that the physician accepts Medicare-approved payment amount. 1(in ERX) is an indicator
for participation in the Medicare Electronic Prescribing (eRx) Incentive Program, which encourages eRx.
1(in PQRS) is an indicator for participation in the Medicare Physician Quality Reporting System Incentive
Program, which provides financial incentives to physicians who report quality measures. 1(in EHR) is an
indicator for participation in the Medicare Electronic Health Record (EHR) Incentive Program, which uses
financial incentives to reward the adoption of certified EHR technology. Standard errors clustered at the
HRR level are in brackets. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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unflagged physicians are specialty s, then SFIs is 0. If flagged and unflagged physicians are
equally likely to be in specialty s, then SFIs is 50. If flagged physicians are four times as
likely to be in specialty s than unflagged physicians, then SFIs = 100×4/(4+1) = 80. This
measure is invariant to the fraction of the flagged physicians among all physicians, and to
the overall popularity of the specialty among all physicians.
The SFI is a convenient summary of how a given specialty is represented among the flagged
relative to its share in the entire physician population. A SFI of 50 indicates that specialty
is “fairly represented” among the flagged, i.e. Pr (s|flagged) and Pr (s|unflagged) are both
equal to the fraction of specialty s among all physicians. A SFI above 50 indicates that the
specialty is over-represented among the flagged physicians.
Table 22 ranks the top specialties with at least 50 flagged physicians by their SFIs. For
example, optometry is considerably over-represented among the flagged physicians, account-
ing for more than 20 percent of flagged physicians but less than 2 percent of all physicians,
leading to SFIs over 90 in both years. On the contrary, internal medicine physicians are
much under-represented among the flagged physicians, with SFIs around 25. Moreover,
note how the SFI as defined in (2.2) differs from the simple probability that physicians of
a given specialty are flagged, namely Pr(flagged|s). For example, 386 (a mere 5 percent) of
the 7,664 ophthalmologists are flagged in 2012, yet ophthalmology still gets a high SFI of
68.5 because it only makes up 7.96 percent of all physicians in our sample but contributes
16.8 percent to the 2,292 flagged physicians.
2.4.3. What Codes Do Flagged Physicians Tend to Bill?
Similarly to how we constructed specialty flag index, we can also construct the Code Flag
Index (CFI) for each HCPCS code j as follows:
CFIj =
100× Pr (j|flagged)
Pr (j|flagged) + Pr (j|unflagged)
, (2.3)
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Fraction in all Num. unflagged Num. flagged SFI
Specialty\Year 2012 2013 2012 2013 2012 2013
Optometry 1.893 1,252 1,390 566 428 94.87 93.17
Dermatology 4.185 3,557 3,525 463 495 84.19 86.15
Ophthalmology 7.960 7,258 7,260 386 384 68.50 70.09
Pathology 2.746 2,567 2,578 71 60 53.08 50.76
Nephrology 4.900 4,607 4,615 99 91 46.78 46.62
Cardiology 11.120 10,543 10,579 136 100 34.54 29.51
Internal Medicine 11.089 10,573 10,567 77 83 22.95 25.81
All physicians 93,741 93,913 2,292 2,120
Table 22: Physician specialties and flag status
Notes: The table shows seven specialties with the highest SFI, defined in Equation (2.2), among the
specialties with at least 50 flagged physicians. “Fraction in all” shows the percentage of physicians in a
specialty among all physicians in our sample (restricted to physicians billing at least 20 hours per week in at
least one year). The last row labeled “All physicians” shows the number of flagged and unflagged physicians
by year in our sample.
where the conditional probability Pr (j|flagged) is defined as the number of claims for
HCPCS code j filed by flagged physicians as a fraction of the total number of claims for all
service codes filed by flagged physicians; and Pr (j|unflagged) is the number of claims for
HCPCS code j filed by unflagged physicians as a fraction of the total number of claims for
all service codes filed by unflagged physicians. Like SFI, the CFI takes on values between
0 and 100; if a code is filed only by flagged physicians, then its CFI will be 100; and if a
code is filed only by unflagged physicians, then its CFI is equal to 0. A code with a CFI of
50 indicates that it is filed by flagged and unflagged physicians at equal rates.
In Figure 15, we show that there is a nonlinear relationship between a code’s CFI and the
probability that it is filed by flagged physicians. For example, a HCPCS code with a 20
percent probability of being filed by flagged physicians can have a CFI over 75 if unflagged
physicians file the code at a much lower rate than flagged physicians.
In Figure 16 we plot the distribution of CFIs among all HCPCS codes in our data.24 Panel
(a) is the unweighted distribution, which is roughly uniform. Panel (b) weighs the codes by
their corresponding service volume, i.e., the total number of times they are filed. Panel (c)
weighs the codes by their total Medicare reimbursement. A comparison between Panels (b)
24Of the 4,480 HCPCS codes, about 1,800 have a CFI of 0 in either year, and about 220 have a CFI of
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Figure 15: The Relationship between HCPCS Code Flag Index and its Probability of Being
Filed by Flagged Physicians
Notes: The horizontal axis shows the probability of the HCPCS code being filed by a flagged physician (in
percent). The vertical axis shows the Code Flag Index (CFI). We restrict the sample to HCPCS codes filed
by physicians billing at least 20 hours per week in at least one year. Each circle represents a HCPCS code,
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(c) Weighted by total Medicare reimbursement
Figure 16: Distribution of HCPCS Code Flag Index
Notes: The horizontal axis shows the Code Flag Index (CFI). We restrict the sample to HCPCS codes with
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Figure 17: Distribution of Code Flag Index weighted by service volumes: flagged physicians
vs. unflagged physicians.
Notes: The horizontal axis shows the Code Flag Index (CFI). We restrict the sample to HCPCS codes
with CFIs strictly larger than 0 and strictly smaller than 100. The solid line shows the distribution of CFIs
of codes billed by flagged physicians, and the dashed line shows that for unflagged physicians. Density is
weighted by a HCPCS code’s total service volume furnished by all physicians.
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and (c) shows that HCPCS codes with high CFIs do not necessarily have a lot of volumes,
but they do have disproportionate costs to Medicare relative to their volumes.
In Figure 17 we compare the distribution of CFIs among flagged physicians and that of
unflagged physicians, weighted by volume of service. By construction, flagged physicians
do tend to report more high-CFI codes.
2.4.4. Decomposing the Long Hours and Quantifying Potential Overbilling
The long hours worked as implied by the flagged physicians’ claims to Medicare can result
from high volumes of services with a given distribution of service intensity (the “extensive
margin”) and/or a larger fraction of higher-intensity services (the “intensive margin”). In
Table 23, we examine the composition of hours billed by flagged and unflagged physicians.
Columns (1) and (2) report the estimation results from OLS regressions using the volume
measure in that row as the dependent variable, and the flag dummy as the explanatory
variable, together with HRR fixed effects. Flagged physicians submit more than twice as
many service claims to Medicare in a year as unflagged physicians, have about twice as
many distinct Medicare patients in total, treat about twice as many Medicare patients per
day, and provide significantly more services per patient. However, flagged physicians tend
to file service claims with longer time requirement, resulting in fewer services furnished per
hour than unflagged physicians. Interestingly, the implied Medicare payment per reported
hour worked for flagged physicians is significantly lower than that for unflagged physicians.
Taking 2012 for example, flagged physicians on average furnish 170 percent more services per
year than unflagged physicians (7, 708+4, 540 = 12, 248 versus 4,540); they have 106 percent
more Medicare Part B FFS patients (2, 571 + 2, 430 = 5, 001 versus 2,430); they provide 62
percent more services on each patient (1.67 + 2.43 = 4.10 versus 2.43). They also tend to
provide higher intensity services, which take longer to furnish (2.88 − 1.34 = 1.54 versus
2.88 services per hour, or 39 versus 21 minutes per service) and generate more revenue
from Medicare payment ($8.90 per service). However, since the higher revenue services
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Flagged Unflagged
Year 2012 2013 2012 2013
Num. of services provided 7,707.660*** 7,769.498*** 4,540.285 4,490.308
[801.128] [785.011]
Num. of services per patient 1.665*** 1.203*** 2.434 2.376
[0.253] [0.191]
Num. of services provided per hour -1.340*** -1.374*** 2.880 2.897
[0.089] [0.081]
Num. of patients 2,571.489*** 2,846.790*** 2,429.509 2,424.339
[452.642] [463.427]
Num. of patients per day 7.026*** 7.799*** 6.638 6.642
[1.237] [1.270]
Num. of patients per hour -0.932*** -0.933*** 1.577 1.591
[0.057] [0.052]
Medicare payment per service ($) 8.897** 13.934*** 74.811 73.381
[3.758] [3.346]
Medicare payment per patient ($) 51.843*** 52.467*** 150.639 146.120
[8.750] [6.642]
Medicare payment per hour ($) -43.367*** -40.131*** 162.010 159.035
[5.619] [4.808]
N 2,292 2,120 93,741 93,913
Table 23: Volume of services supplied conditional on Hospital Referral Regions: flagged vs.
unflagged physicians
Notes: The table compares the volume of services furnished by physicians of different subgroups. We restrict
the sample to physicians billing at least 20 hours per week in at least one year. The first two columns report
the estimation results from OLS regressions using the volume measure in that row as the dependent variable,
and the flag dummy as the explanatory variable, together with HRR fixed effects. Standard errors clustered
at the HRR level are in brackets. ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The last two columns report the means of the
two unflagged groups as references. “Num. of patients” is an overestimation of the actual number of distinct
patients due to data limitation, because it is the physician-level sum of the number of distinct patients for
each code the physician billed. Hence a patient receiving more than one type of service will be counted
multiple times. “Num. of patients per day” is the average number of patients per day assuming 366 (365,
respectively) working days in year 2012 (2013, respectively). “Per hour” statistics are calculated using the
estimated total hours worked of each physician.
require longer time to furnish, the Medicare payment per hour for flagged physicians are
substantially ($43.37 per hour) lower than their unflagged peers.
The sizable difference in Medicare payment per hour between flagged and unflagged physi-
cians motivates our construction of the Overbilling Potential Factor (OPF), which quantifies
the extent to which there may be overbilling. We provide two alternative ways to construct
the OPF.
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(Fair hourly revenue)i × (Fair hours)
, (2.4)
where “Total revenue” is the observed annual Medicare Part B FFS payments of physician
i; “Fair hourly revenue” is the predicted hourly revenue for physician i based on an OLS
regression of the hourly revenues of unflagged physicians on observables, which include
physician gender, credential, years of experience, and a full set of specialty, HRR, and year
fixed effects; and “Fair hours” is set to be 8 hours per day multiplied by 365 days. An
OPF1 above 1 captures the excess revenue relative to the predicted “fair” amount that is
not explained by observed physician and local market characteristics.
Our second measure of overbilling potential is to compare the reported hours and the likely
true hours, where the latter is the unknown number of hours physicians actually worked.
Under the assumption that the goal of overbilling is to achieve the same revenue with fewer
actual hours, we have, for each flagged physician i:





≡ (Fair hourly revenue)i
(Reported hourly revenue)i
, (2.5)
where, as in (2.4), “Fair hourly revenue” is the predicted hourly revenue for physician i
based on an OLS regression of the hourly revenues of unflagged physicians on observables,
which include physician gender, credential, years of experience, and a full set of specialty,
HRR, and year fixed effects; “Reported hourly revenue” is simply the total revenue received
by physician i divided by the total hours reported by i, which we estimated based on i’s
claims.
The Overbilling Potential Factors (OPFs) corroborate the previous findings using the flag
indicator by showing the discrepancy in revenues, total or hourly, that are unexplainable by
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Flagged Physicians Unflagged Physicians
Reported hourly revenue ($) 116.325 157.434
(1.439) (0.172)
Predicted hourly revenue ($) 138.255 159.104
(0.688) (0.105)
Overbilling Potential Factor 1 1.907 0.575
(0.033) (0.001)
Overbilling Potential Factor 2 5.978 1.150
(0.162) (0.003)
N 4,412 187,654
Table 24: Hourly revenues and Overbilling Potential Factors (OPFs)
Notes: The table compares the hourly revenues and OPFs (defined in Equations (2.4) and (2.5)) between
flagged and unflagged physicians. We restrict the sample to physicians billing at least 20 hours per week in at
least one year. Reported hourly revenues are total revenues divided by total hours reported in one calendar
year. Predicted hourly revenues are obtained by first regressing reported hourly revenues on observables
(gender, credential, years of experience, a full set of specialty, HRR, and year fixed effects) using the unflagged
sample, and then predicting a “fair” hourly revenues for all physicians based on the regression estimates.
Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
physician observables.25 Because the construction of the OPFs uses a scale-free measure –
the hourly revenue, a key advantage of the OPFs is that they mitigate the problem that we
do not know the shares of Medicare service in physicians’ total workload. Therefore, it is
possible that a physician is not flagged based on implied hours worked previously because
Medicare is only a very small fraction of his/her patient pool, yet he/she may be flagged
based on the OPFs if the physician’s reported hourly revenue among his/her Medicare
billing is too low relative to the fair hourly revenues.
Table 24 summarizes the reported and predicted hourly revenues and the two OPFs. For
flagged physicians, the reported hourly revenue is $22, or 19 percent, less than the predicted
revenue; but for unflagged physicians, reported and predicted hourly revenues are almost
identical. Flagged physicians have an average OPF1 of 1.907, meaning that the total revenue
from Medicare Part B FFS beneficiaries is almost twice as high as that of an unflagged peer
with identical observable characteristics, assuming their actual hours worked are identical
(8 hours per day for 365 days). Similarly, the average OPF2 for flagged physicians is 5.978,
suggesting that the reported hours could be six times as much as the likely true hours
25Using the potentially untruthful billed hours is precisely motivated by this purpose. With a slight abuse
of terminology, the “null hypothesis” that the flagged physicians are truthfully reporting hours is “rejected”
if their implied hourly revenues are much lower than their peers with similar characteristics.
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worked.
Panels (a) and (c) in Figure 18 plot the distribution of OPF1 and OPF2, respectively, among
the flagged and unflagged physicians. Note that, despite the heterogeneity within flagged
and unflagged physicians, the distributions under both OPFs for the flagged physicians
represent a substantial rightward shift of those for the unflagged physicians. In Panel (b)
we present the scatter plots of the predicted hourly revenue and the reported hourly revenue.
It is clear that the majority of flagged physicians have lower reported hourly revenue than
the predicted hourly revenue, whereas the opposite is true for unflagged physicians.
2.4.5. Coding Decisions and Fee Differentials
We now test whether coding decisions respond to financial incentives provided by different
levels of service codes, and examine how they differ between flagged and unflagged physi-
cians. In particular, we are interested in physicians’ choice of code intensities conditional
on filing a code from a given cluster. Using the code cluster presented in Table 18 as an
example, we would like to know why a physician bills code 99203 more often than 99202
when a service in this code cluster – office or other outpatient visits for new patients – is
furnished.
For this purpose, we analyze the physicians’ coding decisions by K, the number of intensity
levels in a code cluster, for K = 3, 4 or 5. For each K ∈ {3, 4, 5} , we use the following
baseline regression specification:
Yijt = β0 + β1Flaggedit + β221{Intensityj = 2}+ · · ·+ β2K1{Intensityj = K}
+β32Flaggedit × 1{Intensityj = 2}+ · · ·+ β3KFlaggedit × 1{Intensityj = K}
+αHRR + ηJ + φt + εijt (2.6)
where Yijt is the number of times physician i filed code j in year t; Flaggedit is an indicator
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(c) Distribution of Overbilling Potential Factor 2
Figure 18: Overbilling Potential Factors (OPFs)
Notes: Panel (a) shows the distributions of OPF1 for flagged (left) and unflagged (right) physicians.
Panel (b) shows the predicted hourly revenues (on the vertical axis), based on OLS regression conditional
on physician gender, credential (MD dummy), years of experience, as well as a full set of specialty, HRR,
and year fixed effects, against reported hourly revenues (on the horizontal axis) for flagged and unflagged
physicians. The thick solid line is the “45-degree” line. Panel (c) shows the distributions of OPF2 for flagged
(left) and unflagged (right) physicians. The bin widths in all four histograms are 0.2.
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having intensity 2 in its cluster; 1{Intensityj = K} is defined likewise, with K, the highest
intensity level, being 3, 4, or 5 depending on the cluster; αHRR is the HRR fixed effect; ηJ
is the code cluster fixed effect, where J is the cluster that j belongs to; φt is the year fixed
effect; and εijt is the error which will be clustered at the physician level.
Our primary interest is in coefficients (β32, . . . , β3K), which capture the excess tendency
of flagged physicians to file codes at varying intensity levels relative to their unflagged
peers. A positive β3K , for example, indicates that flagged physicians bill more highest-
intensity codes than unflagged physicians. And because a higher code intensity translates
into more work RVU and thus greater Medicare reimbursement, this is consistent with
flagged physicians responding to financial incentives when choosing which code within a
cluster to bill. Note that being flagged does do not immediately imply having a different
distribution of code intensities. One could be flagged for billing many codes and/or for
higher-intensity codes. The empirical specification allows for both effects and does not
assume a priori the dominance of either effect: β1 captures the volume effect, whereas
(β32, . . . , β3K) capture the flagged physicians’ excess tendency to bill for codes of different
intensities.
Columns (1) to (3) in Table 25 report the estimation results on the subsample of codes
in clusters with K = 3, 4, 5, respectively. Taking K = 3, i.e., clusters of codes with three
different intensity levels, as an example, a flagged physician files 369 more codes with
intensity level 2, and 128 more codes with intensity level 3 than an unflagged physician
with identical observables. The same is true for other code clusters, although the estimates
are much noisier for those in K = 4 clusters due to a small sample size. These results show
that codes chosen by flagged physicians strongly tilt toward higher intensities to an extent
that is hard to explain by service specialization or exposure to different markets.
In Column (4) of Table 25, we pool codes from all clusters and re-classify the intensities to
three levels, low, middle, and high as specified in Table 26. The regression results show that
flagged physicians tend to file more mid-intensity codes than their unflagged peers, but not
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)





Flagged 246.9*** 542.9*** 37.36** 194.5*** 215.7*** 156.8***
[55.52] [209.9] [18.46] [16.63] [26.50] [18.84]
Intensity=2 242.2*** 169.7*** 11.87***
[2.796] [9.993] [3.230]






Flagged × (int=2) 369.2*** 155.4 91.08***
[69.39] [274.5] [22.25]
Flagged × (int=3) 128.2** 90.05 143.4***
[63.72] [267.4] [25.23]
Flagged × (int=4) 257.8 57.47**
[272.4] [23.03]
Flagged × (int=5) 0.115
[21.46]
Mid-intensity 240.0*** 21.48*** 342.5***
[1.761] [1.302] [2.837]
High-intensity 154.8*** 36.74*** 186.3***
[1.509] [1.277] [2.499]
Flagged × 91.72*** -114.4*** 231.0***
Mid-intensity [23.25] [26.77] [32.79]
Flagged × -21.58 -112.4*** 76.75***
High-intensity [20.17] [26.33] [28.22]
HRR Y Y Y Y Y Y
Code cluster Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year Y Y Y Y Y Y
Adjusted R2 0.194 0.057 0.172 0.158 0.164 0.081
Observations 399,907 53,521 561,657 1,015,085 508,478 506,607
Table 25: Billing patterns and code intensity level
Notes: The table reports OLS estimates of the partial effects of code intensity on the number of times the
code is filed. We restrict the sample in all specifications to physicians billing at least 20 hours per week in
at least one year, and HCPCS codes in the 28 well-defined clusters. Furthermore, Columns (1) to (3) are
only using the subsamples of code clusters with 3, 4, and 5 levels of intensities, respectively. Column (4)
pools codes in all clusters together, and re-classify intensities to low, middle, and high as specified in Table
26. Columns (5) and (6) use the subsample of codes with below- and above-average marginal increase in
work RVUs between two adjacent intensity levels, respectively. Physician characteristics, HRR fixed effects,
code cluster fixed effects, year fixed effects, and a constant term are included in all specifications but not
reported. Standard errors clustered at the physician level are in brackets. ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Original intensity Reclassified
K = 3 K = 4 K = 5 intensity
1 1 1 or 2 Low
2 2 or 3 3 Middle
3 4 4 or 5 High
Table 26: Reclassification of code intensities
Notes: This table shows how the original code intensities (shown in columns “K = 3,” “K = 4,” and
“K = 5”) are reclassified into three levels, low, middle, and high.
so much for high-intensity codes. This seems to contradict the hypothesis that financial
incentives affect the coding decisions of flagged physicians. However, we find very different
patterns when we run the baseline regression separately on the two subsamples where the
marginal increase in Work RVU between two adjacent levels is below average (Column (5))
and above average (Column (6)). For example, suppose that Work RVUs increase by 100
percent per intensity level on average, then codes 99201 through 99205 enter the regression
in Column (5) instead of (6) because the Work RVU increase between any two adjacent
intensities in that code cluster is less than 100 percent. We find that flagged physicians
do not tend to file more higher-intensity codes with below-average Work RVU increments;
but they do so for codes with above-average Work RVU increments. This shows that
flagged physicians do not simply over-file all codes with higher intensities. Instead, data
suggest that the coding patterns are consistent with a hypothesis that flagged physicians
respond to financial incentives – recall that work RVUs are closely related to Medicare
reimbursements. In particular, for codes where the marginal revenue from “upcoding” is
relatively low, flagged physicians actually file fewer mid- and high-intensity codes than their
peers; but they do file more mid- and high-intensity codes when the marginal gain in revenue
from “upcoding” is relatively high.26
26Note how conditioning on clusters helps mitigate the impact of confounding factors. For example, one
might be concerned that the results in Columns (5) and (6) are mechanically driven by the correlation
between service fee and time, i.e. flagged physician with long hours naturally billed more high-price codes
with high intensities and relatively fewer low-price ones, which is observationally similar to deliberately
selecting codes with larger-than-average fee differentials that we hypothesized. But because the regressions
already include cluster fixed effects, all results are conditional on the code cluster, which represents a given
service. Therefore, the long hours per se do not imply billing higher intensity codes within a given cluster,
and would not mechanically lead to flagged physicians’ inclination to bill certain codes depending on the fee
differentials.
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The regression analysis above focuses on upcoding within service clusters. There could
potentially be other ways of overbilling that are not captured in these results. Physicians
could bill for more of a given service code than it was actually provided, regardless of its
intensity; or could upcode across code clusters by misreporting the type of service provided
(e.g., office visits of new patients, which are paid more vs. office visits of established
patients, which are paid less). There is no shortage of such overbilling practices according
to Department of Health and Human Services (2015). For this reason, the regression results
above are likely to be lower-bound estimates of the extent to which flagged physician are
potentially overbilling.
2.5. Supplemental Results from External Data
Before concluding this chapter, we corroborate our findings using two external datasets.
Doing so both serves as a sanity check for our approach toward detecting potential Medicare
overbilling, and at the same time points to possible directions in which our approach may
improve existing ones.
2.5.1. Physician Working Patterns in the National Ambulatory Medical Care
Survey (NAMCS) Data
The NAMCS by the National Center for Health Statistics, Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, provides a nationally representative sample of office-based physicians. Each
sampled physician is randomly assigned a week for which detailed visit-level data are col-
lected. Given that the CMS Medicare Part B FFS sample covers the vast majority of
physicians in the U.S., the two should be fairly comparable.27
We first examine the self-reported fraction of Medicare services by physicians sampled in
NAMCS. In Table 27, “Medicare patients” are those whose primary payer is Medicare;
“Fraction of Medicare patients” is the weighted average of the fractions of such patients
among all the sampled patients of the reporting physician; “Fraction of Medicare services”
27We discuss the comparability of the two samples in more detail in the Appendix.
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and “Fraction of time spent with Medicare patients” are defined similarly using the number
of services and the recorded time physicians spent with Medicare patients; and “Fraction
of revenue from Medicare” is imputed from a categorical variable describing the fraction of
the reporting physician’s revenue from Medicare payments, with the categories being 0-25,
26-50, 51-75, and 76-100 percents. The figure reported in this table is calculated under the
assumption that the actual fractions are uniformly distributed within each bin.
NAMCS
Share of Medicare patients 0.259
(0.006)
Share of Medicare services 0.260
(0.006)
Share of time spent with Medicare patients 0.261
(0.006)
Share of revenue from Medicare 0.297
(0.005)
No. of Unique Physicians 3,583
Table 27: Share of Medicare services
Notes: Standard errors of the mean estimator are reported in parentheses.
Next, we look into physician hours worked. Ideally, we would like to use NAMCS to calculate
the self-reported total hours worked in the sampled week for each surveyed physician, who
are asked to document the time they spent on patients during each visit. However, NAMCS
does not sample all the visits within the chosen week, and the sampling rate varies from
100 percent for very small practices and 10 percent for very large practices. Because we
don’t have information on practice sizes (except for whether the physicians work in a solo
or group practice), we cannot infer the total number of visits from the NAMCS sample.
That said, the maximum sampled number of hours spent on Medicare patients per week is
15.17 for physicians working in a solo practice (all of whose visits are sampled), and 49.82
for those working in group practices (the size of which is unknown).
The above comparison shows that Medicare services typically account for about one-third of
a physician’s entire workload, and take far fewer hours than the 100-hour threshold we used
to flag potential overbilling (at least for physicians working in solo practices). This again
supports our view that the approach we develop to flag physicians for potential overbilling
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is likely to be conservative.
2.5.2. Comparison with the Comprehensive Error Rate Testing (CERT) Pro-
gram
Finally, we relate the HCPCS code CFIs that we constructed in Section 2.4.3 with the
findings from the CMS CERT program. CERT draws a “statistically valid random sample
of claims” (about 50,000) every year, requests documentation from the filing providers, and
hires medical review professionals to determine whether payments to these claims are proper
or not based on their documentation. The reviewers can disapprove improper payments
to claims that have insufficient documentation, questionable medical necessity, incorrect
coding, or for other reasons.28 The disapproval rate for Medicare Part B claims, calculated
as the percentage disapproved in all sampled Part B claims, is 18.93 percent in 2012, and
CMS reports Part B improper payment rate - the percentage of Medicare dollars paid
incorrectly - for 2012 to be 12.1 percent (see Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services
(2015a)).29
Applying the same idea as the Code Flag Index described in Section 2.4.3, we can use the
prevalence of a code j among the disapproved claims and its prevalence among the approved
claims to construct a Code Disapproval Index (CDI) for the 1,621 HCPCS codes reviewed
by CERT:
CDIj =
100× Pr (j|disapproved claims)
Pr (j|disapproved claims) + Pr (j|approved claims)
, (2.7)
where Pr (j|disapproved claims) is the fraction of claims for HCPCS code j among all disap-
proved claims; and Pr (j|approved claims) is the faction of claims for HCPCS code j among
all approved claims. The CDI also ranges from 0 to 100. If HCPCS code j appears only
among disapproved claims, then its CDI takes on a value of 100. If a code only appears
among approved claims, then its CDI is equal to 0.
28The disapproved claims will have any overpayment recouped, but do not receive other sanctions.
29“Improper payment” defined by CMS includes both overpayment and underpayment. The latter con-
tributes only 0.2 percentage points to the 12.1 percent improper payment rate as reported by Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services (2015a).
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We should note that the CDI as calculated from the pools of approved and disapproved
claims in CERT data is not directly comparable to the CFI we calculated in Section 2.4.3.
CDI is based on the prevalence of a code j among the disapproved claims relative to its
prevalence among the approved claims, while CFI is based on the prevalence of a code j
among the flagged physicians relative to its prevalence among the unflagged physicians.
Note that we flag physicians based on whether the hours worked implied by their claims
are implausibly long, but we do not take a stand on whether or not any particular claim
is suspicious. On the other hand, CERT program is examining whether particular claims
are legitimate, but does not take into account of the overall billings of the physicians.
Thus we believe that the CFI we construct and CDI calculated from the CERT data are
complementary.
In Figure 19 we compare CDIs and CFIs for the 1,621 HCPCS codes that appear in the
CERT data, where each HCPCS code is represented by a circle, with the radius proportional
to its total Medicare reimbursement in our CMS sample.30 Codes falling into the southwest
quarter of the plane have both CFIs and CDIs below 50. On the other hand, codes in
the northeast quarter are those with both indices above 50, and are thus more frequently
associated with (potentially) inappropriate billing practice. These two quarters are cases
where our flagging approach and CERT review results agree. On the other hand, codes in
the southeast quarter are those with high CDIs from CERT but low CFIs in our sample.
Similarly, codes in the northwest quarter are those with high CFIs but low CERT CDIs.
The overall unweighted correlation between the two indices is 0.1257.
The comparison between CDI and CFI suggests that our approach to constructing Code Flag
Index based on flagged and unflagged physicians could potentially contribute to existing
auditing methods. Re-formulating sampling strategies to focus more on HCPCS codes
with high CFIs, especially those where CFI and CERT CDI differ substantially, may help
better detect and deter inappropriate billing with limited regulatory resources. The CFI
30The HCPCS codes not reviewed by CERT make up 6.2 percent of total reimbursement in our CMS
sample.
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Figure 19: HCPCS Code Flag Index (CFI) and CERT Code Disapproval Index
Notes: The horizontal axis shows the CERT Code Disapproval Index, defined in Equation (2.7). The
vertical axis shows the CFI, defined in Equation (2.3). We restrict the sample to HCPCS codes filed by
physicians billing at least 20 hours per week in at least one year and sampled in CERT. The graph has 1621
codes in total. Each circle represents a code, with the radius proportional to total Medicare reimbursement.
The dashed line represents cases where the two indices are equal (i.e. a “45-degree” line). The solid horizontal
and vertical lines show indices of 50.
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we construct can help screen codes that are more likely to be associated with potential
overbilling.
2.6. Conclusion
In this chapter, we propose and implement a novel approach to detect potential overbilling
in Medicare reimbursement based on the simple idea that all physicians have a fixed time
budget in a given period (a calendar year, for example) and the services claimed for re-
imbursement require time to complete. We construct the implied hours worked at the
individual physician level based on service codes submitted to Medicare. We flag physicians
as potentially overbilling based on whether the implied hours worked are implausibly long.
One caveat, however, is that the estimated level of potential overbilling might be biased
downward due to data limitations, especially the exclusion of services submitted to payers
other than Medicare Part B FFS. Nonetheless, our method for detecting potential over-
billing is still useful with at least three advantages relative to the existing methods. First,
it imposes minimal data requirements, and is easy to implement, automate, and update
over time. Second, it mitigates the impact of confounding factors in the detection of over-
billing such as selection and physician heterogeneity, because all physicians face the same
time constraint regardless of their patient pool or practice patterns. Finally, it allows users
to freely choose the level of stringency when flagging potential overbilling. For example,
one could use a different threshold of weekly hours worked or, if higher-frequency data are
available, flag physicians based on claims filed in a quarter, a month, or even a week, in
which case there is less intertemporal smoothing than is permitted in our sample. Inter-
estingly, we also find suggestive evidence that the coding patterns of the flagged physicians
seem to be responsive to financial incentives: within code clusters with different levels of
service intensity, they tend to submit more higher-intensity service codes than unflagged
physicians; moreover, they are more likely to do so if the marginal revenue from submitting
mid- or high-intensity codes is relatively high.
Overbilling arises from the strong information asymmetry between providers, patients, pay-
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ers and regulators, exacerbated by the financial incentive of doing so under an FFS payment
regime. We believe that efficient and effective auditing, among other approaches, is cru-
cial to curbing, if not curing, the overbilling problem. Our approach provides a quick and
easy tool for detecting potential overbilling, but we would like to emphasize that it does
not provide definite evidence for fraudulent coding, nor does it substitute existing meth-
ods based on auditing. It is also silent on whether the current Physician Fee Schedule is
compensating the physicians fairly. Rather, we take the existing regulations as given, and
view our approach as a useful screening tool to identify individual physicians, specialties, or
HCPCS codes whose billing patterns are highly consistent with overbilling and are hard to
reconcile using observables. For example, the HCPCS code CFIs suggest that certain codes
are disproportionately associated with flagged physicians, and thus may need more audit-
ing attention. This can help improve the efficiency in the allocation of limited regulatory
resources.
Another possibility is to focus on correcting the distorted incentives of FFS, which would
require more changes to the existing system. Replacing FFS with capitation seems appeal-
ing, but could also introduce new distortions. For example, Geruso and Layton (2015) find
that providers tend to upcode the diagnoses of patients with Medicare Advantage plans to
game the risk-adjustment process. Effective auditing within the FFS can not only detect
error and fraud that already occurred, but also have a long-term deterrence effect.
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APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 1
A1. Proof of Proposition 1
A1.1. Overview of the proof
In this section, I present the complete proof of Proposition 1. First, recall the definition of
the Gittins index (same as Definition 1 and Proposition 1 in the main text):
Definition 2 For arm d in state (θd, ed, k, rd), construct a two-armed bandit process by
adding an auxiliary arm with lump-sum retirement payment M . The Gittins index for arm
d, Mdk(θd, ed, rd), is the infimum of all the M values that the physician is willing to take
and retire. That is
Mdk(θd, ed, rd) := inf
M
{M : φd(θd, ed, k, rd,M) = M} (A8)
Proposition 2 Under Assumption 1, the modified Gittins index policy that always selects













t , kt, r
dk
t ) | θ0, e0, k0, rdk0 ] (A9)
I follow the approach of Whittle (1982) and prove the proposition in 4 steps: (1) I start by
defining the one-step forward operator, Ld, and show that the optimal payoff from A9, G,
must also be optimal for the sequential one-step forward problem; (2) I then examine the
optimal payoff of the modified MAB, Φ, and establish the properties Φ must satisfy; (3) I
construct a candidate payoff, Φ̂, whose value is determined jointly by indexes of all arms
given the realized patient type k, {Mdk}d∈D; (4) finally, I show that Φ̂ is indeed the optimal
payoff, Φ, and the optimality is achieved by an index policy that always prescribes the arm
with the highest Mdk. Hence I have shown that the Gittins index policy is optimal for the
physician’s problem.
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A1.2. Step 1: Optimal payoff and the one-step forward problem
Let constants A and B be the uniform lower and upper bounds of total discounted payoffs,
respectively:
−∞ < A(1− β) ≤ udt (θdt , edt , kt, rdkt ) ≤ B(1− β) <∞ (A10)
Denote the maximum expected total discounted payoff function for the physician’s problem
(1.10) by G





βtut | θ0, e0, k0, r0] (A11)




with the one-step operator Ld defined as
LdG(θ, e, k, r) = ud(θd, ed, k, rdk) + βE[G(θ′, e′, k′, r′) | d,θ, e, k, r] (A13)
The one-step transition of states is such that θ′ and θ only differs in θdk; e′ and e only
differs in that ed′ = ed + 1; k′ is a new draw from the same distribution as kt; and r
′ is
expected by the physician to remain unchanged.
A1.3. Step 2: Modified MAB with an auxiliary arm for retirement
Now consider a modified version of the physician’s problem with the added option of taking
a given lump-sum payment M and retiring. Define the maximum expected total discounted
payoff function for this modified problem by Φ. Then we have








Let τ be the period in which the retirement option is chosen, then
Φ = Vc +ME[βτ | θ, e, k, r] (A15)
where Vc is the total discounted payoff from running the MAB before retirement. Note that
τ = +∞ is allowed, in which case retirement is never chosen and E[βτ ] = 0.
Similarly, define a modified two-armed bandit process with one arm being option d and the
other being retirement with lump-sum payment M . Let φd be the maximal expected payoff








M,ud(θd, ed, k, rdk) + βE[φ(θd′, ed′, k′, r′) | d,θ, e, k, r]
}
(A17)
The following properties of Φ and φd will become useful in the proof of the optimality of
an index policy.
Lemma A1 Φ(θ, e, k,M) is non-decreasing, convex in M . And
Φ(θ, e, k, r,M) =

G(θ, e, k, r) for M ≤ A
M for M ≥ B
(A18)
Proof. That Φ is non-decreasing in M and relationship (A18) are obvious: increasing
the payment for retirement cannot make the physician worse off; the retirement option
is disregarded when M is smaller than the minimum total discounted payoff A, and it is
taken immediately (τ = 0) when M exceeds the maximal total discounted payoff B. The
convexity of Φ in M follows from (A18) and (A15). 
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A1.4. Step 3: A candidate for Φ
Define Φ̂ as a candidate for the optimal expected payoff function






d, ed, k, rdk,m)
∂m
dm (A19)
Integration by parts yields (suppressing arguments for Φ̂)
Φ̂ = φd(θd, ed, k, rdk,M)P d(θ, e, k, r,M) +
∫ ∞
M
φd(θd, ed, k, rdk,m)dmP
d(θ, e, k, r,m)
(A20)
where P d is defined as
















Proof. By Lemma A1, φd is also non-decreasing and convex in M . Hence ∂φd/∂M is
non-negative and non-decreasing in M . It also follows from Lemma A1 that φd = M when
M ≥ Mdk, where Mdk is arm d’s Gittins index in Definition (1). Thus P d = 1 when M is
no smaller than the index for any arm d′ 6= d. 
Before proving the optimality of Φ̂, note that Φ̂ is constructed based on the following
observation:
∂Φ(θ, e, k, r,M)
∂M
= E[βτ | θ, e, k, r] =
∏
d′










where the first equality follows (A15) and the second equality from the independence across
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arms.31
A1.5. Step 4: Optimality of Φ̂ and the policy that achieves the optimality
To show that Φ̂ is indeed the optimal payoff under a Gittins index policy, it suffices to show
that it solves Equation (A14) by always choosing the arm with the largest index, Mdk.
I begin by showing the first part of (A14), i.e. Φ̂ ≥M :





Proof. Suppress the state variables (θ, e, k) for simplicity of exposition in this proof. Recall
that ∂φ/∂M is at most 1, hence













And the weak inequality (A27) becomes equality only when ∂φd′(m)/∂m = 1 for all d
′ ∈ D.
This coincides with condition (A24) by definition of the Gittins index Md′ . 
Now I show that Φ̂ also satisfies the second half of (A14):





31Whittle (1980) observed that P d (and ∂φd/∂m) is essentially a distribution function.
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Proof. First consider the effect of applying the one-step operator, Ld on P d(θ, e, k,M):



























E[βτd′ | θd′ , ed′ , k, rd′k] (A33)
= P d(θ, e, k, r,M) (A34)
Equality (A31) holds by Assumption (1), which abstracts away potentially persistent effects
of the current patient type k on the duration of trial, τd′ . And Equality (A33) holds because




, ) remain frozen when the one-step operator Ld chooses to operate
arm d 6= d′.
Now apply Ld to Φ̂ and we get
LdΦ̂ = Ldφd(θd, ed, k, r,M)P d(θ, e, k, r,M) +
∫ ∞
M
Ldφd(θd, ed, k, r,m)dmP
d(θ, e, r, k,m)
(A35)

















≥ 0. Moreover, P d is
non-negative. Hence Φ̂ ≥ LdΦ̂.
Moreover, we know that φd(M) = Ldφd(M) when M ≤Mdk. And that P d is non-decreasing
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in M , and is equal to 1 when M > max
d′ 6=d
Md
′k. These two restrictions on M jointly implies
that when Mdk = max
d′ 6=d
Md
′k ≥M , we have Φ̂ = LdΦ̂. 
It is now easy to prove Proposition 1. Lemmas A3 and A4 show that the candidate solution





. Furthermore, the conditions on M in
Lemmas A3 and A4 prescribe a policy for achieving the maximal expected payoff, which is
to always choose d for which Mdk = max
d′ 6=d
Md
′k ≥ M , i.e. the arm with the highest Gittins
index.
A2. Numerical Approximation of the Modified Gittins index
A2.1. Overview of the method
In this section, I derive the approximate Gittins index (1.13) and its full specification.
I adapt the approximation by Brezzi and Lai (2002), noting that their work is based on
Gittins’ formulation of the MAB process, which differs from the formulation I use in Chapter
1 following Whittle (1982). The two approaches differ in the specification of the auxiliary
arm: Gittins assumes the agent receives a fixed rate v in each period she chooses the
auxiliary arm, and that she still has the option of choosing the original arm, d; Whittle
assumes that the agent receives a one-time, lump-sum retirement pay M when she choses
the auxiliary arm, and that she can never operate the two-armed bandit machine again.
They use v and M as indexes, respectively.
Whittle (1982) compared the two approaches, noting that Gittins’ formulation gives rise
to an intuitive optimal stopping argument: between the auxiliary arm that pays a fixed
rate v and a risky arm, d, if the agent chooses former in some period, it must be that she
values v more than the combined value of d’s flow and continuation payoff. Further, the
states of d will remain frozen when it is inactive; the agent will then keep choosing the
same v in the next period, and for that matter all subsequent periods, hence the optimal
stopping rule. Whittle observes that Gittins’ formulation of the auxiliary arm elucidates the
economic intuition of the index, but makes the proof of optimality hard to follow (Whittle,
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1980). Whittle’s own formulation of the auxiliary arm does not employ an optimal stopping
rule–choosing the arm directly stops all future decision-making, but renders a simple proof.
Beyond these methodological distinctions, indexes under the two approaches do not differ





where β is the discount factor (Whittle, 1982).
I draw on the approximation of the Gittins index by Brezzi and Lai (2002) and adapt it
to my model in three ways: First, I convert Brezzi and Lai’s approximation (derived under
Gittins’ formulation) to one that suits the Whittle’s formulation that I use. Second, I
handle the uncertain starting states (in period (t + 1)) of the index in my model. Finally,
I complete the approximated Gittins index, which only accounts for Bayesian learning, by
adding the learning-by-doing effects and the financial incentives.
A2.2. The flow utility
The complete index for my model starts with the flow utility






t , kt, r
dk




t − c(edt ) (A38)
I separate the flow utility from the remainder of the problem for two reasons: first, the
effect of the current patient’s type is assumed to be transitory, thus only showing up in the
flow utility; second, as discussed in Chapter 1, the physician virtually has one “average”
type of patient in future periods from an ex ante perspective. The second point implies
that from period (t+ 1) onwards, the value of each arm can be summarized in a standard
Gittins index that no longer depends on patient types.
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A2.3. Step 1: approximated Gittins index for the standard MAB
From period (t+1) onward, it is as if the physician expects to have only one “average” type
of patient. Suppose the physician’s posterior belief about d’s match value for the average
type, after observing period t outcomes, has mean and variance µdt+1 and ν
d
t+1, respectively.
Then following Brezzi and Lai (2002), the closed-form approximation to the Gittins index
is
















where the (1 − β) in the denominator comes from using (A37) to convert the index under
Gittins’ formulation to one under Whittle’s. σ2µ,d = µ
d





s/2, s ≤ 0.2
0.49− 0.11s−0.5, 0.2 < s ≤ 1
0.63− 0.26s−0.5, 1 < s ≤ 5
0.77− 0.58s−0.5, 5 < s ≤ 15√
2 ln s− ln(ln s)− ln(16π), s > 15
(A40)
The posterior mean and variance, µdt+1 and ν
d
t+1, are intuitive to get. Suppose the physician
has observed the period t outcome and updated her belief about d’s match value with each
type k.32 Denote the posterior mean and variance as µdkt+1 and ν
dk
t+1, respectively. The
physician simply uses the weighted average of type-specific posterior means and variances
to calculate µdt+1 and ν
d
t+1:
32The beliefs regarding d’s match value for types that didn’t arrive in period t remain the same at the





































t+1 are the number of previous
successes and failures for the (d, k) combination up to, but not including (t+ 1).
A2.4. Step 2: taking expectation over the period-t outcome realization
The posterior means and variances, µdkt+1 and ν
dk
t+1, are the results of physician belief updat-
ing after she observes period-t outcomes. The outcome is not yet known to the physician
when she is to make the period-t choice. Accordingly, she takes expectation over the two
possible realizations of ydkt , with the probability of y
dk
t = 1 being µ
dk
t :









A2.5. Step 3: adjusting for learning-by-doing effects and financial incentives
So far the index has not captured the continuation value from learning by doing and future
financial incentives. Suppose the partial index M̃ prescribes a stopping time τ∗. Then one
can sum the financial incentives, net of the cost of furnishing treatment, as





αE(rdt+1+τ )− c(edt+1+τ )
)
(A44)




t+1+τ , is the expected revenue for the “average” type.
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A2.6. Complete specification
Assembling the parts derived above, I get the following complete specification of the Gittins
























αE(rdt+1+τ )− c(edt+1+τ )
) ∣∣∣θdt , edt , kt
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dk






























µd⊕t+1 is the average posterior mean after observing y
d
t = 1, which happens with probability
µdkt as perceived by the physician; and µ
d	
t+1 is that after observing y
d
t = 0, which happens






t+1 are defined similarly.
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A3. Supplemental Figures
Panel A. Surgical clipping
Panel B. Endovascular coiling
Figure 20: Illustration of clipping and coiling for brain aneurysms
Source: Brisman JL, Song JK, Newell DW. Cerebral aneurysms. NEJM 2006; 355:928-39.
Notes: The top figure illustrates the treatment of brain aneurysms with surgical clipping. With craniotomy,
the neurosurgeon places the small clip across the neck of the aneurysm to stop the artery blood from flowing
into the aneurysm. The bottom figure illustrates the treatment with endovascular coiling. The neurosurgeon
inserts a fine platinum coiling into the groin artery and navigates the blood vessel with the help of a catheter.
Once the coil reaches the bottom of the aneurysm, it is wound up into a ball that fills the aneurysm, thereby
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Figure 21: Counterfactual experiment: choice probabilities when physicians maximize flow
patient outcome (by physician characteristics)
Notes: The Data bars plot the observed choice probabilities. The Model bars plot the simulated choice
probabilities and patient outcomes, assuming physicians maximize current-period expected patient outcomes
(plus a treatment-specific, Type-I extreme value error). Clip stands for surgical clipping; coil stands for
endovascular coiling; obs stands for watchful observation, i.e. no intervention. Young physicians are those
with no more than 5 years of experience in the data. Teaching-hospital physicians are those working primarily
(measured by caseload) at a teaching hospital. If a physician works at multiple hospitals, the one with the
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Figure 22: Counterfactual experiment: patient outcomes when physicians maximize flow
patient outcome (by physician characteristics)
Notes: The Data bars plot the observed patient outcomes, i.e. the treatment success rates. The Model bars
plot the simulated success rates, assuming physicians maximize current-period expected patient outcomes
(plus a treatment-specific, Type-I extreme value error). A treatment is a success if the patient can be dis-
charged home and does not need assisted care. Clip stands for surgical clipping; coil stands for endovascular
coiling; obs stands for watchful observation, i.e. no intervention. Young physicians are those with no more
than 5 years of experience in the data. Teaching-hospital physicians are those working primarily (measured
by caseload) at a teaching hospital. If a physician works at multiple hospitals, the one with the largest share
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Figure 23: Counterfactual experiment: choice probabilities when physicians maximize flow
payoff (by physician characteristics)
Notes: The Data bars plot the observed choice probabilities. The Model bars plot the simulated choice
probabilities, assuming physicians maximize their own flow payoffs (plus a treatment-specific, Type-I extreme
value error). Clip stands for surgical clipping; coil stands for endovascular coiling; obs stands for watchful
observation, i.e. no intervention. Young physicians are those with no more than 5 years of experience in
the data. Teaching-hospital physicians are those working primarily (measured by caseload) at a teaching
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Figure 24: Counterfactual experiment: patient outcomes when physicians maximize flow
payoff (by physician characteristics)
Notes: The Data bars plot the observed treatment success rates. The Model bars plot the simulated success
rates, assuming physicians maximize their own flow payoffs (plus a treatment-specific, Type-I extreme value
error). A treatment is a success if the patient can be discharged home and does not need assisted care. Clip
stands for surgical clipping; coil stands for endovascular coiling; obs stands for watchful observation, i.e. no
intervention. Young physicians are those with no more than 5 years of experience in the data. Teaching-
hospital physicians are those working primarily (measured by caseload) at a teaching hospital. If a physician
works at multiple hospitals, the one with the largest share of the physician’s cases is used.
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APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 2
In Section B1 of this appendix, we discuss the institutional background regarding billing
and individual provider NPIs. In Section B2, we describe the representation of specialties
among the timed codes. In Section B3 we list and examine the codes with the longest
estimated time. In Section B4 we show that our results are not driven by residents who may
be working long hours. In Section B5 we show tables comparing physician characteristics
unconditional on Hospital Referral Regions (HRRs). In Section B6 we show that all of our
results are robust to using 112 or 168 weekly hours as the flagging thresholds. In Section
B7 we continue to show the robustness of our results using alternative time estimates,
namely using the 25th percentile of time needed, using the minimum time needed, using
E/M services only, and using the minimum time needed of E/M services only. In Section
B8 we examine whether results on the comparison of hourly revenues between flagged and
unflagged physicians are driven mechanically by the composition of RVUs. In Section B9
we discuss the comparability of our main sample derived from Medicare Utilization and
Payment data with the NAMCS data.
B1. Multiple Physicians Billing Under the Same NPI
In our analysis, it is important that all claims under the same NPI are services furnished
by the same individual. This should be the case per the request of NPI-related regulations.
NPI was introduced in 2005 to improve the administration of Medicare, Medicaid, and
other health programs, especially to facilitate electronic data transmission. According to
the NPI Final Rule by the Department of Health and Human Services, NPIs are only
assigned to “individuals and entities that are licensed and do furnish health care,” and
stay unchanged in most cases.33 NPIs with “entity type code” of 1 are individual human
beings (“individuals”), and those with “entity type code” of 2 are organizational providers
(“organizations”), such as hospitals, clinics, and nursing homes. Individual providers who
33An NPI is “a permanent identifier, assigned for life, unless circumstances justify deactivation,
such as a health care provider who finds that his or her NPI has been used fraudulently by another
entity” (see Department of Health and Human Services (2004)).
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are members of an organization and the organization they are affiliated with need to have
separate NPI numbers (Department of Health and Human Services (2004)). In addition, the
NPI Final Rule also requires that “[providers], according to Federal statute and regulations,
must be issued their own identification numbers in order to bill and receive payments from
Medicare.” Hence the providers have to bill for their own or have a billing agency do it on
their behalf, but cannot bill under other providers’ NPIs. Because of its many advantages,
NPIs are commonly used in scholarly articles to track physician activity (Gustafson et al.
(2011); Welch et al. (2014)). One paper using the unique physician identification numbers
(UPINs), which were established before NPIs, acknowledged that “in some cases, different
physicians and loosely affiliated practices bill under the same identifier,” and that the new
NPIs would have avoided this problem (Pham et al. (2007)).
We are confident that in the vast majority of cases the claims filed under the same NPI are
from the same provider. However, there may be exceptions to the above rules. In cases where
an auxiliary personnel furnished an “incident-to” service following CMS guidelines,34 the
auxiliary personnel may bill under the NPI of the physician who sets the plan of care (POC).
However, these exceptions have minimal influence. This is because (a) CMS guidelines for
“incident-to” services require that they must be furnished “under the [billing] physician’s
direct supervision,” which means the billing physician must be in the same designated office
area, and immediately available to provide assistance and direction. This indicates that the
physician is spending almost the same amount of time as the case where she herself furnishes
the service; (b) the places-of-service for these “incident-to” services are restricted to non-
facilities, which only account for part of our data. It is also possible for physician assistants
(PAs) in some specialties to provide part of or even all services to certain patients, although
it is not clear under whose NPI these services are billed in practice. But CMS requires
PAs bill under their own NPIs and receive 85 percent of the amount a physician would
receive (American Academy of Physician Assistants, 2010). Note that deliberately billing
34CMS defines “incident-to” services as “those services that are furnished incident to physician
professional services in the physician’s office (whether located in a separate office suite or within an
institution) or in a patient’s home” (see Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (2002)).
119
Specialty Num. of codes % in timed codes∗
Integumentary system 12 10.62
Musculoskeletal system 20 17.70
Cardiovascular/hemic/lymphatic/mediastinum 9 7.96
Digestive system 17 15.04
Urinary system 5 4.42
Genital system 2 1.77
Nervous system 2 1.77
Eye/ocular adnexa/auditory system 6 5.31
Radiology 18 15.93
Pathology and lab 5 4.42
Medicine 17 15.04
Table 28: Distribution of specialties among timed codes with objectively measured time
Notes: ∗ Timed codes refer to codes with objectively measured time from Zuckerman et al. (2014). The
15 code specialties are defined following the AMA coding guideline Gabbert et al. (2012). E/M services
and three other specialties, anesthesia, respiratory system, and endocrine system services, are not included.
As a result all HCPCS codes from these specialties with no representation (except timed E/M codes and
therapies) do not have a time estimate and end up being “zero-time” codes.
services furnished by PAs under a physician NPI is inappropriate billing, and is, in fact,
another form of overbilling (though to a lesser extent) given that the providers get more
reimbursement than what their services actually deserve.
B2. Representation of Specialties Among the Timed Codes
We show the representation of specialties among the timed codes in this section. Of the two
types of timed codes, the 145 codes with time information from the AMA coding guidelines
are either E/M services or therapies; the 112 codes with objective measured time from the
2014 CMS Survey (Zuckerman et al. (2014)) cover services from 11 of the 14 non-E/M code
specialties. Table 28 lists distribution of codes across the 11 specialties.
B3. Time-Taking Codes
The time needed for untimed codes is predicted using OLS estimated coefficients, which
could give rise to potential problems with codes whose work RVUs are farther away from
the mean. For this reason, we list the most time-taking codes in Table 29.35 Of the
approximately 5,000 HCPCS codes, 59 have estimated time needed above 120 minutes and
35We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting making this list.
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are filed for more than 100 times, by 20 or more unique physicians and at least one flagged
physicians.36
Apart from a few exceptions, these services are billed by very few flagged physicians. And
even among the flagged physicians who billed them, these services typically make up a
small fraction of all services: 30 codes have a maximum share of less than 10%, 46 have
maximum shares less than 20%, and 55 have maximum shares less than 30%. Note that
given the typically small number of flagged physicians who have ever filed these codes, the
maximum share may very well be affected by extreme values. Two services that make up a
significantly larger share of flagged physicians’ services are 27447, repair of the knee joint,
and 90960, dialysis services for patients 20 years and older. The estimated service time
for these two is 157.88 and 130.96 minutes, respectively, both of which are close to or even
smaller than the time needed in practice.37
The last row of the table reports the union of physicians who have ever filed one of the
above time-taking codes, which is 784 flagged physicians and 22,699 physicians (flagged
and unflagged combined). Conditional on being a flagged physician and having filed at
least one of these codes, all time-taking codes combined still only occupy a small fraction
of a physician’s total estimated time. The 75th percentile among flagged physicians with a
non-zero share is 27.52%, the 90th percentile 43.66%, even though the outlier share is over
95%.
Therefore we conclude that the “time-taking” services typically contribute a small share
to a physician’s total service time, whether individually or combined. While we could not
36We focus on codes that are the most time-consuming and filed not too infrequently because the goal of
examining these codes is to avoid incorrectly flagging a physician due to overestimation of the time needed.
Codes not associated with any flagged physicians do also introduce noise into our analysis but are only of
secondary concern.
37MedlinePlus by U.S. National Library of Medicine states that the knee joint replacement
“takes about 2 hours” (see https://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/ency/article/002974.htm). Time
needed for a dialysis depends on the specific program, but both the American Association
of Kidney Patients and the National Kidney Foundation report numbers ranging from 3 to
4 hours (see https://www.aakp.org/education/resourcelibrary/dialysis-resources/item/nocturnal-dialysis-
offers-better-health-while-you-sleep.html and https://www.kidney.org/atoz/content/dialysisinfo).
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rule out the possibility of overestimating the time needed for some services, such potential
biases will have limited impacts on the key findings because of the general unimportance of
these services in physicians’ practices.
B4. Are We Flagging Mostly Residents?
Residents are known to working long and continuous hours; and most regulations in recent
years restrict resident working hours to no more than 80 hours per week averaged over
four weeks (see Wolman et al. (2009)). Therefore extra caution must be exercised when
“flagging” residents, for whom it can be perfectly normal (unfortunately) to have extremely
long hours. For this reason, we only include in our main sample physicians at least one
year out of medical school (i.e. those graduated in or before 2011). However, residency can
range from one to seven years depending on the specialty, so it is still possible that some of
the physicians graduated in more recent years are residents.
In order to check that we are not flagging mostly residents, we first identify possible residents
in our sample and see how many of them are flagged. We mark physician i of specialty s
as a possible resident if i graduated in or after the year (2012− TRs ), where TRs is one year
plus the typical length of residency for specialty s. For example, the typical residency for
family practice is 3 years, therefore we mark family practice physicians as possible residents
if they graduated in or after 2008. We are adding one year in order identify all possible
residents - there could be variations in residency lengths, and some institutions require an
extra year after residency to focus on research. Moreover, we use 2012 in the formula for
finding possible residents so that the remainder of physicians are not residents in any year
in our sample, which covers both 2012 and 2013.
Table 30 summarizes the number of possible residents flagged in 2012 and 2013 under
varying thresholds. Only a handful of flagged physicians are possible residents, ranging
from 16 under the 80-hour threshold to only 2 or 3 under the 168-hour threshold. These






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Hours threshold 80+ 100+ 112+ 168+
Year 2012 2013 2012 2013 2012 2013 2012 2013
Num. of physicians flagged 4125 3838 2292 2120 1689 1546 615 530
Num. of possible residents 16 16 11 6 9 5 2 3
Possible residents (%) 0.388 0.417 0.480 0.283 0.533 0.323 0.325 0.566
Table 30: Number and fraction of possible residents flagged
Notes: The table reports the number and fraction of possible residents flagged in 2012 and 2013. Possible
residents are identified by their year of graduation from medical school. Physician i of specialty s us a
possible resident if i graduated in or after 2012 − TRs , where TRs is one year plus the typical length of
residency for specialty s.
not the residents with long hours that are driving our results.
B5. Comparison of Physician Characteristics Not Conditioning on HRR
The following two tables correspond to those in Section 4.1 and 4.4, respectively, except that
HRR fixed effects are not included. All the results remain qualitatively and quantitatively
similar.
In Table 31 we compare the characteristics of physicians across the following groups, ac-
cording to the column headings: (1) all physicians, (2) never flagged, (3) flagged in any
year, (4) flagged in 2012, (5) flagged in 2013, (6) flagged only in 2012, (7) flagged in both
2012 and 2013, and (8) flagged only in 2013. Table 31 shows that flagged physicians are
slightly more likely to be male, non-MD, more experienced, provide fewer E/M services,
work in substantially smaller group practices (if at all), and have fewer hospital affiliations.
Table 32 shows the differences between flagged and unflagged physicians in terms of volume
decomposition that are highly similar with those found when controlling for HRR fixed
effects as reported in Table 23 in the main text. In particular, flagged physicians have
significantly larger volumes of service, but much lower hourly revenues.
B6. Robustness of Results to Alternative Flagging Thresholds
In this section, we show the robustness of our main results to the choice of flagging thresh-
olds. One might be concerned, despite our deliberately conservative estimates of hours
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
All Never Ever 2012 2013 2012 only Both 2013 only
1(Male) 0.857 0.856 0.891 0.896 0.896 0.877 0.904 0.867
(0.001) (0.001) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.013) (0.008) (0.017)
1(MD) 0.838 0.844 0.660 0.667 0.714 0.500 0.741 0.624
(0.001) (0.001) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.020) (0.012) (0.024)
Experience (years) 24.14 24.12 24.69 25.14 24.20 26.15 24.70 22.71
(0.034) (0.034) (0.191) (0.208) (0.218) (0.393) (0.243) (0.470)
# providers in group 87.19 88.92 29.97 31.47 29.63 31.01 31.67 23.55
(0.869) (0.890) (2.981) (3.416) (3.538) (5.438) (4.302) (5.825)
# hospital affiliations 2.774 2.813 1.495 1.535 1.512 1.445 1.576 1.321
(0.006) (0.006) (0.035) (0.039) (0.040) (0.072) (0.046) (0.077)
1(in Medicare) 0.857 0.857 0.874 0.878 0.874 0.872 0.880 0.855
(0.001) (0.001) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.013) (0.008) (0.015)
1(in ERX) 0.463 0.463 0.466 0.483 0.500 0.365 0.535 0.395
(0.002) (0.002) (0.009) (0.010) (0.011) (0.018) (0.013) (0.021)
1(in PQRS) 0.396 0.396 0.399 0.404 0.424 0.327 0.439 0.378
(0.002) (0.002) (0.009) (0.010) (0.011) (0.018) (0.012) (0.021)
1(in EHR) 0.416 0.417 0.397 0.397 0.394 0.406 0.394 0.395
(0.002) (0.002) (0.009) (0.010) (0.011) (0.019) (0.012) (0.021)
Types of codes 2012 22.46 22.43 23.39 24.49 24.58 19.82 26.56 18.66
(0.053) (0.053) (0.373) (0.431) (0.439) (0.678) (0.536) (0.650)
Types of codes 2013 22.38 22.35 23.32 24.09 24.96 18.39 26.62 20.02
(0.052) (0.053) (0.368) (0.423) (0.443) (0.598) (0.538) (0.695)
Types of E/M 2012 6.179 6.228 4.573 4.678 4.551 4.639 4.695 4.120
(0.014) (0.015) (0.076) (0.086) (0.085) (0.166) (0.100) (0.163)
Types of E/M 2013 6.158 6.207 4.553 4.623 4.593 4.430 4.708 4.252
(0.014) (0.014) (0.076) (0.085) (0.086) (0.161) (0.099) (0.169)
N 96,033 93,209 2,824 2,292 2,120 704 1,588 532
Table 31: Characteristics of flagged physicians vs unflagged physicians
Notes: The table compares the means of physician characteristics across subgroups (standard errors of the
mean estimator are reported in parentheses). We restrict the sample to physicians billing at least 20 hours
per week in at least one year. “All” refers to all physicians in this sample. “Never” refers to physicians never
flagged in any year. “Ever” refers to those flagged in at least one year. “2012” and “2013” refer to those
flagged in 2012 and 2013, respectively. “2012 (2013) only” refers to those only flagged in 2012 (2013) but not
the other year. “Both” refers to those flagged in both years. Physician experience is imputed from the year
of graduation. # providers in group refers to the number of providers in the group practice where the billing
physician works at. It is 1 if the billing physician works in a solo practice. The number of hospital affiliations
is top coded at 5 in the data. 1(in Medicare) is an indicator that the physician accepts Medicare-approved
payment amount. 1(in ERX) is an indicator for participation in the Medicare Electronic Prescribing (eRx)
Incentive Program, which encourages eRx. 1(in PQRS) is an indicator for participation in the Medicare
Physician Quality Reporting System Incentive Program, which provides financial incentives to physicians
who report quality measures. 1(in EHR) is an indicator for participation in the Medicare Electronic Health




Year 2012 2013 2012 2013
Num. of services provided 12,548.683 12,365.218 4,540.285 4,490.308
(542.911) (562.219) (12.505) (12.658)
Num. of services per patient 4.167 3.704 2.434 2.376
(0.096) (0.089) (0.013) (0.009)
Num. of services provided per hour 1.651 1.648 2.880 2.897
(0.055) (0.048) (0.007) (0.008)
Num. of patients 5,126.103 5,297.308 2,429.509 2,424.339
(325.043) (347.764) (6.546) (6.582)
Num. of patients per day 14.006 14.513 6.638 6.642
(0.888) (0.953) (0.018) (0.018)
Num. of patients per hour 0.705 0.725 1.577 1.591
(0.033) (0.029) (0.004) (0.004)
Medicare payment per service ($) 80.208 83.180 74.811 73.381
(1.773) (1.834) (0.197) (0.198)
Medicare payment per patient ($) 197.804 193.769 150.639 146.120
(5.382) (4.222) (0.466) (0.422)
Medicare payment per hour ($) 118.541 118.677 162.010 159.035
(2.107) (2.033) (0.248) (0.246)
N 2,292 2,120 93,741 93,913
Table 32: Volumes of services supplied: flagged vs. unflagged physicians
Notes: The table compares the volumes of services furnished by physicians with different flag statuses.
Standard errors of the mean estimator are reported in parentheses. We restrict the sample to physicians
billing at least 20 hours per week in at least one year. “Num. of patients” is an overestimation of the actual
number of distinct patients due to data limitation, because it is the physician-level sum of the number
of distinct patients for each code the physician billed. Hence a patient receiving more than one type of
service will be counted multiple times. “Num. of patients per day” is the average number of patients per
day assuming 366 (365) working days in year 2012 (2013). “Per hour” statistics are calculated using the
estimated total hours worked of each physician.
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worked, that the 100-hour-per-week threshold might have caught physicians whose billing
truthfully reflects the services they provide. Now we use the two higher thresholds, 112 and
168 hours per week, and show that the main results persist under these thresholds.
B6.1. Who Reported Implausibly Long Hours?
Tables 33 and 34 are counterparts to Table 21 of Chapter 2, except that they use the two
alternative thresholds, respectively. The flagged physicians are still more likely to be males,
less likely to have an MD, slightly more experienced, work in much smaller group practices
and have fewer hospital affiliations. These results are highly similar to those obtained using
the 100-hour threshold in terms of sign, magnitude, and the level of statistical significance.
B6.2. What are the Specialties of Flagged Physicians?
Tables 35 and 36 show that SFIs for the 7 specialties in Table 22 remain qualitatively un-
changed. The 4 specialties that are over-represented among the flagged physicians, optom-
etry, dermatology, ophthalmology and pathology, still have SFIs above 50; the 3 specialties
that are under-represented, nephrology, cardiology and internal medicine, still have SFIs
below 50, although with slight changes in their rankings. In fact, the discrepancies in SFIs
become larger when we use a higher flagging threshold – over-represented specialties get
even larger SFIs, and under-represented specialties get even smaller SFIs.
B6.3. What Codes Do Flagged Physicians Tend to Bill?
Figure 25 plots the relationship between HCPCS Code Flag Indices (CFIs) and the proba-
bility a code is filed by a flagged physician. Not surprisingly, the non-linearity is preserved
under alternative flagging thresholds and becomes stronger when the threshold is higher.
Figures 26 and 27 plot the distribution of CFIs under the two alternative thresholds. We
still see that high-SFI codes have disproportionately high shares of reimbursement relative
to their volumes.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Mean of
Ever 2012 2013 2012 only Both 2013 only Never
1(male) 0.026*** 0.031*** 0.034*** 0.000 0.045*** -0.001 0.856
[0.008] [0.009] [0.009] [0.014] [0.010] [0.020]
1(MD) -0.224*** -0.217*** -0.165*** -0.393*** -0.137*** -0.260*** 0.843
[0.038] [0.042] [0.038] [0.052] [0.042] [0.041]
Experience (years) 0.784*** 1.013*** 0.420 1.755** 0.648** -0.299 24.124
[0.298] [0.347] [0.279] [0.719] [0.315] [0.588]
# providers in group -53.668*** -53.271*** -52.214*** -57.653*** -51.186*** -55.331*** 88.515
[5.991] [6.341] [6.797] [10.527] [7.239] [10.102]
# hospital affiliations -1.622*** -1.596*** -1.563*** -1.803*** -1.504*** -1.759*** 2.807
[0.121] [0.130] [0.108] [0.223] [0.115] [0.145]
1(in Medicare) 0.008 0.009 0.006 0.013 0.007 0.001 0.857
[0.008] [0.009] [0.009] [0.014] [0.011] [0.017]
1(in ERX) -0.020 -0.011 0.011 -0.113*** 0.035 -0.065** 0.463
[0.018] [0.020] [0.020] [0.026] [0.022] [0.029]
1(in PQRS) -0.006 -0.007 0.020 -0.081*** 0.026 0.001 0.396
[0.018] [0.020] [0.020] [0.028] [0.021] [0.031]
1(in EHR) -0.030* -0.030 -0.044** 0.008 -0.050** -0.026 0.417
[0.017] [0.019] [0.018] [0.026] [0.021] [0.028]
Types of codes 2012 -0.207 0.478 1.230 -4.419*** 2.708** -3.631*** 22.443
[1.086] [1.225] [1.074] [1.583] [1.236] [1.231]
Types of codes 2013 -0.101 0.348 1.794* -5.590*** 3.069** -2.414* 22.366
[1.086] [1.214] [1.086] [1.418] [1.240] [1.277]
Types of E/M 2012 -2.177*** -2.149*** -2.168*** -2.223*** -2.123*** -2.326*** 6.223
[0.183] [0.192] [0.181] [0.314] [0.190] [0.233]
Types of E/M 2013 -2.126*** -2.122*** -2.056*** -2.343*** -2.026*** -2.165*** 6.201
[0.183] [0.191] [0.182] [0.303] [0.190] [0.243]
N 2,085 1,689 1,546 539 1,150 396 93,948
Table 33: Characteristics of flagged physicians (threshold being 112 hours/week) vs. un-
flagged physicians, conditional on Hospital Referral Region (HRR)
Notes: The table summarizes the difference in physician characteristics between flagged subgroups and the
never-flagged subgroup (means reported in the last column) conditional on HRR. We restrict the sample
to physicians billing at least 20 hours per week in at least one year. The number in each cell is the
estimated coefficient from an OLS regression using the physician characteristic in the corresponding row as
the dependent variable, and the flag status dummy (defined by the heading of the column) as the explanatory
variable together with HRR fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the HRR level are in brackets. *
p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. “All” refers to all physicians in this sample. “Never” refers to physicians
never flagged in any year. “Ever” refers to those flagged in at least one year. “2012” and “2013” refer to those
flagged in 2012 and 2013, respectively. “2012 (2013) only” refers to those only flagged in 2012 (2013) but
not the other year. “Both” refers to those flagged in both years. Physician experience is imputed from the
year of graduation. # providers in group refers to the number of providers in the group practice where the
billing physician works at. It is 1 if the billing physician does not work in a group practice. The number of
hospital affiliations are top coded at 5 in the data. 1(in Medicare) is an indicator that the physician accepts
Medicare approved payment amount. 1(in ERX) is an indicator for participation in the Medicare Electronic
Prescribing (eRx) Incentive Program, which encourages eRx. 1(in PQRS) is an indicator for participation
in the Medicare Physician Quality Reporting System Incentive Program, which provides financial incentives
to physicians who report quality measures. 1(in EHR) is an indicator for participation in the Medicare
Electronic Health Record (EHR) Incentive Program, which uses financial incentives to reward the adoption
of certified EHR technology.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Mean of
Ever 2012 2013 2012 only Both 2013 only Never
1(male) 0.031*** 0.043*** 0.040*** 0.00900 0.064*** -0.0230 0.857
[0.012] [0.013] [0.014] [0.028] [0.016] [0.031]
1(MD) -0.380*** -0.366*** -0.324*** -0.512*** -0.281*** -0.447*** 0.842
[0.046] [0.052] [0.050] [0.055] [0.057] [0.054]
Experience (years) 1.081* 1.668*** 0.151 3.213*** 0.740 -1.410 24.13
[0.573] [0.635] [0.490] [1.190] [0.559] [0.902]
# providers in group -55.846*** -52.425*** -58.609*** -49.408* -54.156*** -70.516*** 87.67
[9.297] [10.052] [7.906] [25.371] [7.355] [16.062]
# hospital affiliations -2.128*** -2.108*** -1.987*** -2.455*** -1.901*** -2.227*** 2.790
[0.133] [0.147] [0.123] [0.211] [0.136] [0.154]
1(in Medicare) 0.00800 0.00400 0.00200 0.0200 -0.00400 0.0220 0.857
[0.014] [0.016] [0.015] [0.024] [0.019] [0.026]
1(in ERX) -0.058** -0.0410 -0.0370 -0.106*** -0.00100 -0.135*** 0.463
[0.026] [0.028] [0.029] [0.040] [0.031] [0.050]
1(in PQRS) -0.0140 -0.0150 0.00800 -0.0660 0.0140 -0.00800 0.396
[0.030] [0.033] [0.033] [0.048] [0.037] [0.049]
1(in EHR) -0.0310 -0.0480 -0.0310 -0.0300 -0.0590 0.0470 0.416
[0.031] [0.034] [0.034] [0.048] [0.038] [0.044]
Types of codes 2012 -3.386** -2.806 -1.088 -8.777*** 0.718 -6.070*** 22.47
[1.533] [1.783] [1.825] [1.316] [2.280] [1.419]
Types of codes 2013 -2.865* -2.532 -0.166 -9.167*** 1.394 -4.490*** 22.39
[1.561] [1.798] [1.874] [1.199] [2.320] [1.572]
Types of E/M 2012 -2.989*** -3.034*** -2.793*** -3.447*** -2.788*** -2.822*** 6.202
[0.170] [0.181] [0.177] [0.254] [0.189] [0.279]
Types of E/M 2013 -2.893*** -2.943*** -2.638*** -3.483*** -2.620*** -2.703*** 6.180
[0.166] [0.175] [0.171] [0.230] [0.181] [0.268]
N 763 615 530 233 382 148 95270
Table 34: Characteristics of flagged physicians (threshold being 168 hours/week) vs. un-
flagged physicians, conditional on Hospital Referral Region (HRR)
Notes: See notes to Table 33.
% in all Num. unflagged Num. flagged SFI
Specialty\Year 2012 2013 2012 2013 2012 2013
Optometry 1.893 1323 1448 495 370 95.43 93.98
Dermatology 4.185 3661 3638 359 382 84.56 86.52
Ophthalmology 7.960 7379 7383 265 261 66.73 68.36
Pathology 2.746 2585 2587 53 51 53.38 54.65
Nephrology 4.900 4655 4661 51 45 37.96 37.11
Cardiology 11.12 10597 10617 82 62 30.18 26.30
Internal Medicine 11.09 10607 10610 43 40 18.46 18.73
All physicians 94344 94487 1689 1546
Table 35: Physician specialties and flag status (threshold being 112 hours/week)
Notes: The table shows seven specialties with the highest SFIs among those with at least 50 flagged
physicians. “% in all” shows the fraction of physicians in a specialty among all physicians in our sample
(restricted to physicians billing at least 20 hours per week in at least one year). The last row labeled “All
physicians” shows the number of flagged (unflagged) physicians by year in our sample.
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Figure 25: The Relationship between HCPCS Code Flag Index and its Probability of Being
Filed by Flagged Physicians
Notes: The horizontal axis shows the probability of the HCPCS code being filed by a flagged physician
(in %). The vertical axis shows the Code Flag Index (CFI). We restrict the sample to HCPCS codes filed
by physicians billing at least 20 hours per week in at least one year. Each circle represents a HCPCS code,
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Figure 26: Distribution of HCPCS Code Flag Index (threshold = 112 hours/week)
Notes: The horizontal axis shows the Code Flag Index (CFI). We restrict the sample to HCPCS codes with
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Figure 27: Distribution of HCPCS Code Flag Index (threshold = 168 hours/week)
Notes: The horizontal axis shows the Code Flag Index (CFI). We restrict the sample to HCPCS codes with
CFIs strictly larger than 0 and strictly smaller than 100. Bandwidth is 2 for all three histograms.
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% in all Num. unflagged Num. flagged SFI
Specialty\Year 2012 2013 2012 2013 2012 2013
Optometry 1.893 1,551 1,614 267 204 96.39 95.79
Dermatology 4.185 3,908 3,894 112 126 81.64 85.36
Ophthalmology 7.960 7,551 7,578 93 66 65.65 61.08
Pathology 2.746 2,616 2,617 22 21 56.61 59.12
Nephrology 4.900 4,700 4,698 6 8 16.53 23.48
Internal Medicine 11.09 10,639 10,640 11 10 13.82 14.48
Cardiology 11.12 10,670 10,672 9 7 11.57 10.57
All physicians 95,418 95,503 615 530
Table 36: Physician specialties and flag status (threshold being 168 hours/week)
Notes: See notes to Table 35.
Figure 28 plots the CFI distributions for codes filed by flagged physicians (solid lines) and
by unflagged physicians (dashed lines). Again by construction, flagged physicians file more
high-CFI codes. The difference between flagged and unflagged physicians is more dramatic
when the higher flagging threshold, 168 hours per week, is used.
B6.4. Decomposing the Long Hours and Quantifying Potential Overbilling
Tables 37 and 38 show how the decomposition of services provided by flagged physicians
differs from that of unflagged physicians. Just as Table 23 shows, flagged physicians provide
more services and treat more Medicare Part B FFS patients in total; they also provide
more services per patient, and tend to choose services of higher intensity; with average
per-service revenues only slightly higher than those of unflagged physicians, they end up
with substantially lower imputed hourly revenues. Again, the differences are larger under
the 168-hour threshold.
Tables 39 and 40 compare the hourly revenues and Overbilling Potential Factors (OPFs)
between flagged and unflagged physicians. The results are still highly similar to those in
Chapter 2 using the 100-hour threshold, both qualitatively and quantitatively. In particu-
lar, flagged physicians have very large discrepancies between their reported and predicted
hourly revenues; their OPF1, which captures the excess revenue they get relative to their
unflagged peers (assuming identical hours worked), is still around 2; and their OPF2, which
describes the extent to which they could be over-reporting hours worked (assuming the
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Figure 28: Distribution of Code Flag Index weighted by service volumes: flagged vs. un-
flagged physicians
Notes: The horizontal axis shows the Code Flag Index (CFI). We restrict the sample to HCPCS codes
with CFIs strictly larger than 0 and strictly smaller than 100. The solid line shows the distribution of CFIs
of codes billed by flagged physicians, and the dashed line shows that for unflagged physicians. Density is
weighted by a HCPCS code’s total service volume furnished by all physicians.
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Flagged Unflagged
Year 2012 2013 2012 2013
Num. of services provided 8363.404*** 8643.937*** 4579 4523
[1047.754] [1054.903]
Num. of services per patient 2.007*** 1.459*** 2.438 2.380
[0.301] [0.228]
Num. of services provided per hour -1.457*** -1.459*** 2.874 2.891
[0.106] [0.099]
Num. of patients 2714.590*** 3128.023*** 2444 2436
[597.842] [627.702]
Num. of patients per day 7.417*** 8.570*** 6.677 6.675
[1.633] [1.720]
Num. of patients per hour -0.998*** -0.984*** 1.572 1.586
[0.069] [0.063]
Medicare payment per service ($) 6.011 11.512*** 74.91 73.48
[4.393] [4.309]
Medicare payment per patient ($) 44.109*** 47.909*** 151.1 146.5
[8.354] [8.081]
Medicare payment per hour ($) -51.834*** -49.186*** 161.9 158.9
[6.336] [5.439]
N 1689 1546 94344 94487
Table 37: Volume of services supplied conditional on Hospital Referral Regions: flagged vs.
unflagged physicians (threshold being 112 hours/week)
Notes: The table compares the volume of services furnished by physicians of different subgroups. We restrict
the sample to physicians billing at least 20 hours per week in at least one year. The first two columns report
the estimation results from OLS regressions using the volume measure in that row as the dependent variable,
and the flag dummy as the explanatory variable, together with HRR fixed effects. Standard errors clustered
at the HRR level are in brackets. ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The last two columns report the means of the
two unflagged groups as references. “Num. of patients” is an overestimation of the actual number of distinct
patients due to data limitation, because it is the physician-level sum of the number of distinct patients for
each code the physician billed. Hence a patient receiving more than one type of service will be counted
multiple times. “Num. of patients per day” is the average number of patients per day assuming 366 (365)
working days in the year 2012 (2013). “Per hour” statistics are calculated using the estimated total hours
worked of each physician.
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Flagged Unflagged
Year 2012 2013 2012 2013
Num. of services provided 11979.801*** 12488.739*** 4654 4596
[2593.733] [2728.369]
Num. of services per patient 3.443*** 2.880*** 2.453 2.389
[0.458] [0.352]
Num. of services provided per hour -1.583*** -1.614*** 2.861 2.878
[0.230] [0.219]
Num. of patients 3420.234** 4097.479** 2472 2465
[1485.181] [1653.190]
Num. of patients per day 9.345** 11.226** 6.753 6.754
[4.058] [4.529]
Num. of patients per hour -1.127*** -1.127*** 1.563 1.578
[0.144] [0.135]
Medicare payment per service ($) -13.288*** -7.560 75.06 73.66
[5.125] [4.943]
Medicare payment per patient ($) 26.464** 35.998*** 151.7 147.0
[12.141] [11.879]
Medicare payment per hour ($) -79.931*** -75.784*** 161.5 158.6
[7.233] [6.974]
N 615 530 95418 95503
Table 38: Volume of services supplied conditional on Hospital Referral Regions: flagged vs.
unflagged physicians (threshold being 168 hours/week)
Notes: See notes to Table 37.
goal of overbilling is to achieve the same revenue with fewer hours), ranges between 6.178
and 9.805. The results for unflagged physicians also barely change from those reported in
Chapter 2.
Figures 29 and 30 plot the OPFs for both flagged and unflagged physicians using the 112-
hour and the 168-hour thresholds, respectively. The distributions of flagged physicians’
OPF1 and OPF2 are still shifted rightward relative to the distributions of unflagged physi-
cians. Moreover, Panel (b)’s of both figures also show that many flagged physicians’ reported
revenues fall below their predicted “fair” hourly revenues, whereas the reverse is true for
unflagged physicians.
B6.5. Coding Decisions and Fee Differentials
Tables 41 and 42, counterparts to Table 25, present the regression results obtained under the
two alternative flagging thresholds. All key findings are robust to the choice of thresholds,
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Flagged Physicians Unflagged Physicians
2012 2013 2012 2013
Reported hourly revenue ($) 106.909 108.766 158.790 155.861
(2.418) (2.357) (0.243) (0.241)
Predicted hourly revenue ($) 131.204 134.543 160.605 157.387
(1.231) (1.156) (0.149) (0.148)
Overbilling Potential Factor 1 1.964 2.031 0.590 0.574
(0.061) (0.065) (0.001) (0.001)
Overbilling Potential Factor 2 7.347 6.178 1.165 1.143
(0.277) (0.270) (0.005) (0.004)
N 1,689 1,546 94,344 94,487
Table 39: Hourly revenues and Overbilling Potential Factors (OPFs) (threshold being 112
hours/week)
Notes: The table compares the hourly revenues and OPFs between flagged and unflagged physicians.
We restrict the sample to physicians billing at least 20 hours per week in at least one year. Reported
hourly revenues are total revenues divided by total hours reported in one calendar year. Predicted hourly
revenues are obtained by first regressing reported hourly revenues on observables (gender, credential, years
of experience, a full set of specialty, HRR, and year fixed effects) using the unflagged sample, and then
predicting a “fair” hourly revenues for all physicians based on the regression estimates. Standard errors are
reported in parentheses.
Flagged Physicians Unflagged Physicians
2012 2013 2012 2013
Reported hourly revenue ($) 74.501 78.803 158.415 155.527
(3.927) (3.962) (0.243) (0.241)
Predicted hourly revenue ($) 111.203 117.775 160.179 157.028
(2.140) (2.083) (0.150) (0.148)
Overbilling Potential Factor 1 2.189 2.315 0.606 0.589
(0.149) (0.164) (0.002) (0.001)
Overbilling Potential Factor 2 9.805 9.155 1.190 1.163
(0.449) (0.505) (0.005) (0.004)
N 615 530 95,418 95,503
Table 40: Hourly revenues and Overbilling Potential Factors (OPFs) (threshold being 168
hours/week)
Notes: See notes to Table 39.
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Figure 29: Overbilling Potential Factors (OPFs; threshold = 112 hours/week)
Notes: The two figures on the top show the distribution of OPF1 for flagged (left) and unflagged (right)
physicians. The two scatter plots in the middle are showing predicted hourly revenues (on the vertical axis,
based on OLS regression conditional on physician gender, credential (MD dummy), years of experience, as
well as a full set of specialty, HRR, and year fixed effect) against reported hourly revenues (on the horizontal
axis). The thick solid line is the “45-degree” line. The two figures on the bottom show the distribution of
OPF2 for flagged (left) and unflagged (right) physicians. The bin widths in all four histograms are 0.2.
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Figure 30: Overbilling Potential Factors (OPFs; threshold = 168hours/week)
Notes: The two figures on the top show the distribution of OPF1 for flagged (left) and unflagged (right)
physicians. The two scatter plots in the middle are showing predicted hourly revenues (on the vertical axis,
based on OLS regression conditional on physician gender, credential (MD dummy), years of experience, as
well as a full set of specialty, HRR, and year fixed effect) against reported hourly revenues (on the horizontal
axis). The thick solid line is the “45-degree” line. The two figures on the bottom show the distribution of
OPF2 for flagged (left) and unflagged (right) physicians. The bin widths in all four histograms are 0.2.
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except that estimates for flag-related variables tend to have larger standard errors. This is
because the thresholds used here lead to a much smaller group of flagged physicians, making
estimates noisier.
B6.6. Comparison with the Comprehensive Error Rate Testing (CERT) Pro-
gram
Figure 31 plots the comparison between HCPCS Code Flag Indices (CFIs) that we con-
structed using the CMS data and Code Disapproval Indices (CDIs) we calculated using
CERT auditing results. Under the higher thresholds (112-hour and 168-hour), CFIs be-
come more extreme, which adds to the incomparability of CFIs and CDIs (see discussion in
Chapter 2). This naturally reduces the correlation between the two indices.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)





Flagged 261.5*** 653.7* 33.56 178.2*** 193.8*** 145.9***
[68.48] [349.5] [22.71] [18.54] [31.79] [18.54]
Intensity=2 244.0*** 171.9*** 12.83***
[2.823] [10.13] [3.233]






Flagged × (int=2) 322.2*** -85.40 94.39***
[92.27] [405.6] [26.17]
Flagged × (int=3) 155.2* -61.57 151.8***
[82.93] [401.1] [30.12]
Flagged × (int=4) 395.3 43.17
[461.5] [28.50]
Flagged × (int=5) 14.60
[27.22]
Mid-intensity 240.2*** 19.46*** 343.9***
[1.764] [1.235] [2.846]
High-intensity 154.0*** 34.68*** 186.3***
[1.506] [1.206] [2.508]
Flagged × Mid-intensity 83.77*** -86.67*** 201.6***
[26.15] [31.93] [36.00]
Flagged × High-intensity -10.76 -84.58*** 71.07**
[23.46] [31.37] [32.40]
HRR Y Y Y Y Y Y
Code cluster Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year Y Y Y Y Y Y
Adjusted R2 0.190 0.052 0.171 0.157 0.163 0.079
Observations 399,907 53,521 561,657 1,015,085 508,478 506,607
Table 41: Billing patterns and code intensity level (threshold being 112 hours/week)
Notes: The table reports OLS estimates of the partial effects of code intensity on the number of times the
code is filed. We restrict the sample in all specifications to physicians billing at least 20 hours per week in at
least one year, and HCPCS codes in the 28 well-defined clusters. Furthermore, Columns (1) to (3) are only
using the subsamples of code clusters with 3, 4, and 5 levels of intensities, respectively. Column (4) pools
codes in all clusters together, and re-classify intensities to low, middle, and high as specified in Chapter 2.
Columns (5) and (6) use the subsample of codes with below- and above-average marginal increases in work
RVUs between two adjacent intensity levels, respectively. Physician characteristics, HRR fixed effects, code
cluster fixed effects, year fixed effects, and a constant term are included in all specifications but not reported.
Standard errors clustered at the physician level are in brackets. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)





Flagged 413.1 360.9* -19.39 158.1*** 172.7*** 140.6***
[257.9] [217.4] [25.07] [32.40] [60.80] [33.86]
Intensity=2 245.5*** 172.2*** 15.05***
[2.876] [10.32] [3.233]






Flagged × (int=2) 372.8 234.7 133.2***
[349.1] [597.3] [33.06]
Flagged × (int=3) 299.6 46.25 158.5***
[329.9] [386.2] [41.95]
Flagged × (int=4) 2161.3** 19.62
[942.5] [35.36]
Flagged × (int=5) 73.31*
[42.08]
Mid-intensity 240.5*** 16.75*** 346.0***
[1.763] [1.045] [2.852]
High-intensity 152.6*** 31.62*** 186.2***
[1.499] [0.993] [2.513]
Flagged × Mid-intensity 28.56 -43.80 64.26
[45.57] [64.89] [57.12]
Flagged × High-intensity -34.08 -40.24 -16.95
[40.33] [56.88] [60.56]
HRR Y Y Y Y Y Y
Code cluster Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year Y Y Y Y Y Y
Adjusted R2 0.186 0.049 0.170 0.155 0.161 0.077
Observations 399,907 53,521 561,657 1,015,085 508,478 506,607
Table 42: Billing patterns and code intensity level (threshold being 168 hours/week)
Notes: See notes to Table 41.
144
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Figure 31: HCPCS Code Flag Index (CFI) and CERT Code Disapproval Index
Notes: The horizontal axis shows the CERT Code Disapproval Index. The vertical axis shows the CFI. We
restrict the sample to HCPCS codes filed by physicians billing at least 20 hours per week in at least one year
and sampled in CERT. The graph has 1621 codes in total. Each circle represents a code, with the radius
proportional to total Medicare reimbursement. The dashed line represents cases where the two indices are
equal (i.e. a “45-degree” line). The solid horizontal and vertical lines show indices of 50.
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B7. Robustness of Results to Alternative Time Estimates
In this section, we show that our key findings are robust to alternative methods of estimating
the hours worked.38
Table 43 shows the number and fraction of physicians flagged under the baseline (Panel (a))
and alternative time imputation methods (Panels (b)-(e)). The baseline method is the one
used in the main text. We also tried imputing time for all codes using the 25th percentile
as well as the minimum in the required time range. For example, if a code requires 30-60
minutes face-to-face with the patient, we set the 25th percentile to be 37.5 minutes and the
minimum 30 minutes; if a code typically takes 30 minutes with no minimum requirement,
we set the 25th percentile to be 7.5 minutes and the minimum 0. The numbers of flagged
physicians, shown in Panels (b) and (c), are about 10% smaller than that in the baseline.
To be even more cautious with imputation, we only use timed codes in Panel (d), and only
the minimum time requirement for timed codes in Panel (e). It comes as no surprise that
the number of flagged physicians is about 60% smaller than the baseline numbers. But even
so, there are still a non-negligible group of physicians billing for long hours. Additionally,
the fractions of flagged physicians among those billing more than 20 (imputed) hours per
week remain relatively unchanged regardless of the imputation method.
Now we show, as in Section B6, that the key findings persist under these alternative time
estimates.
B7.1. Who Reported Implausibly Long Hours?
Table 44 shows how the characteristics of flagged physicians flagged differ from those of
unflagged physicians under the four alternative time estimation methods. We only report
the comparison between the group of physicians flagged in any year and the group of
unflagged physicians due to limited space and the similarity of comparison results of other
38We thank two anonymous referees for suggesting the alternative time estimation methods.
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Hours threshold 80+ 100+ 112+ 168+
Year 2012 2013 2012 2013 2012 2013 2012 2013
(a) Baseline method
Num. flagged 4125 3838 2292 2120 1689 1546 615 530
% flagged 4.879 4.618 2.711 2.551 1.998 1.860 0.727 0.63
(b) Using the 25th percentile of time needed
Num. flagged 3686 3443 2097 1937 1581 1457 597 516
% flagged 4.942 4.698 2.812 2.643 2.120 1.988 0.801 0.704
(c) Using the minimum time needed
Num. flagged 3184 2982 1903 1751 1463 1338 580 490
% flagged 5.285 5.062 3.159 2.972 2.428 2.271 0.963 0.832
(d) Using timed codes only
Num. flagged 1639 1449 948 826 771 627 362 279
% flagged 3.223 2.902 1.864 1.654 1.516 1.256 0.712 0.559
(e) Using the minimum time needed of timed codes only
Num. flagged 1188 1043 810 679 693 544 348 268
% flagged 4.243 3.757 2.893 2.446 2.475 1.960 1.243 0.965
Table 43: Number and fraction of physicians flagged under the baseline and alternative
methods
Notes: The table reports the number and fraction of flagged physicians in calendar years 2012 and 2013.
“Hours threshold” shows the cutoff number of hours billed per week above which a provider is flagged. “%
flagged” shows the fraction of flagged physicians among physicians who billed at least 20 hours per week in
the same calendar year.
groups. The flagged physicians are still more likely to be males, less likely to have an
MD, more experienced, work in much smaller group practices and have fewer hospital
affiliations. Once again these results are highly similar to those obtained using the baseline
time estimates.
B7.2. What are the Specialties of Flagged Physicians?
Table 45 shows that SFIs for the 7 specialties in Table 22 are also qualitatively unchanged.
The specialties over-represented (under-represented) among the flagged physicians remain
so under each of the four alternative time estimation methods.
B7.3. Decomposing the Long Hours and Quantifying Potential Overbilling
Table 46 shows how the decomposition of services provided by flagged physicians differs
from that of unflagged physicians. The findings are similar to those under the baseline
time estimates: flagged physicians provide more services and treat more patients, provide
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
25th percentile Minimum Time Timed minimum
1(male) 0.027*** 0.025*** 0.004 -0.009
[0.007] [0.008] [0.012] [0.012]
1(MD) -0.204*** -0.235*** -0.493*** -0.586***
[0.035] [0.036] [0.041] [0.032]
Experience (years) 0.585** 0.462 1.288*** 1.466***
[0.272] [0.300] [0.434] [0.481]
# providers in group service -52.506*** -52.589*** -74.698*** -76.472***
[5.907] [6.073] [9.984] [10.464]
# hospital affiliations -1.600*** -1.804*** -2.065*** -2.535***
[0.107] [0.099] [0.172] [0.103]
1(in Medicare) 0.002 0.003 -0.003 0.000
[0.008] [0.008] [0.010] [0.012]
1(in ERX) -0.014 -0.0290 -0.141*** -0.174***
[0.017] [0.018] [0.018] [0.017]
1(in PQRS) 0.000 0.000 -0.069*** -0.069***
[0.016] [0.018] [0.023] [0.026]
1(in EHR) -0.030** -0.032** -0.005 0.001
[0.015] [0.016] [0.023] [0.027]
Types of codes 2012 -0.315 -1.426 -9.178*** -11.502***
[0.949] [0.981] [0.934] [0.779]
Types of codes 2013 -0.181 -1.239 -8.958*** -11.219***
[0.949] [0.981] [0.933] [0.779]
Types of E/M codes 2012 -2.299*** -2.796*** -2.467*** -3.624***
[0.148] [0.118] [0.302] [0.140]
Types of E/M codes 2013 -2.252*** -2.748*** -2.441*** -3.583***
[0.148] [0.116] [0.299] [0.131]
N 2578 2339 1233 1047
Table 44: Characteristics of flagged physicians vs. unflagged physicians using alternative
time estimates, conditional on Hospital Referral Region (HRR)
Notes: The table summarizes the difference in physician characteristics between those ever flagged and
those never flagged conditional on HRR. We restrict the sample to physicians billing at least 20 hours per
week in at least one year. The number in each cell is the estimated coefficient from an OLS regression using
the physician characteristic in the corresponding row as the dependent variable, and the ever-flag indicator
as the explanatory variable together with HRR fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the HRR level
are in brackets. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Physician experience is imputed from the year of
graduation. # providers in group refers to the number of providers in the group practice where the billing
physician works at. It is 1 if the billing physician works in a solo practice. The number of hospital affiliations
is top coded at 5 in the data. 1(in Medicare) is an indicator that the physician accepts Medicare-approved
payment amount. 1(in ERX) is an indicator for participation in the Medicare Electronic Prescribing (eRx)
Incentive Program, which encourages eRx. 1(in PQRS) is an indicator for participation in the Medicare
Physician Quality Reporting System Incentive Program, which provides financial incentives to physicians
who report quality measures. 1(in EHR) is an indicator for participation in the Medicare Electronic Health
Record (EHR) Incentive Program, which uses financial incentives to reward the adoption of certified EHR
technology.
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(a) (b) (c) (d)
25th percentile Minimum Timed Timed minimum
Specialty Unfl. Fl. SFI Unfl. Fl. SFI Unfl. Fl. SFI Unfl. Fl. SFI
Optometry 1252 566 95.29 1254 564 95.70 1287 531 97.64 1291 527 97.96
Dermatology 3575 442 84.71 3605 412 84.97 3964 53 57.28 3979 38 52.89
Ophthalmology 7268 375 69.80 7287 356 70.73 7536 107 58.75 7541 102 61.39
Pathology 2568 68 54.26 2568 68 56.71 2607 29 52.73 2608 28 55.79
Nephrology 4635 74 41.70 4658 51 35.13 4708 1 2.09 4709 0 0
Cardiology 10576 103 30.38 10618 61 22.13 10650 29 21.45 10673 6 6.20
Internal Med. 10604 48 16.86 10624 28 11.53 10611 41 27.93 10644 8 8.12
All physicians 93936 2097 94130 1903 95085 948 95223 810
Table 45: Physician specialties and flag status using alternative time estimates
Notes: The table shows seven specialties with the highest SFIs among those with at least 50 flagged
physicians. Table only shows results for 2012 and suppresses highly similar results for 2013. “Unfl.” columns
show the number of unflagged physicians; “Fl.” columns show the number of flagged physicians. The last
row labeled “All physicians” shows the total number of flagged (unflagged) physicians in our sample.
more services per patient, gravitate towards services of higher intensity, and have lower
imputed hourly revenues. One thing to note here is that the comparison of payments are
different in the last two columns, where we only use timed codes to estimate hours worked
and to flag physicians. This by construction distorts the flagged group to be physicians
concentrating on E/M and therapy services, where most of our timed codes are from. These
services happen to receive lower reimbursements, which explains the seemingly strange lower
Medicare payment per service and per patient relative to unflagged physicians. Another
reason for the reversal of per-service and per-patient payment comparison results is that
the “benchmark” group has changed under the alternative time estimation methods: some
physicians who would be flagged under the baseline method are now classified into the
“unflagged” group when we only count the timed codes they provided; and this increases
the average payment in the unflagged group, making the payment of flagged physicians
lower relative to the unflagged.
Table 47 compares the hourly revenues and Overbilling Potential Factors (OPFs) between
flagged and unflagged physicians under the four alternative time estimation methods. The
results are again very similar to the baseline: the discrepancy between reported and pre-
dicted hourly revenues for unflagged physicians persists regardless of the alternative time
estimation method used; flagged physicians still have a much larger OPF1 than their un-
flagged peers, which reflects the excess revenue the former get (assuming identical hours
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25th percentile Minimum Timed Timed minimum
Num. of services provided 7541.191*** 7392.312*** 6374.464*** 5606.092***
[862.321] [947.670] [1133.655] [1232.388]
Num. of services per patient 1.793*** 1.967*** 3.909*** 4.390***
[0.269] [0.284] [0.331] [0.315]
Num. of services provided per hour -1.435*** -1.511*** -1.759*** -1.953***
[0.092] [0.098] [0.107] [0.100]
Num. of patients 2501.919*** 2341.628*** 638.2 138.0
[491.338] [535.972] [391.841] [383.723]
Num. of patients per day 6.836*** 6.398*** 1.744 0.377
[1.342] [1.464] [1.071] [1.048]
Num. of patients per hour -0.973*** -1.022*** -1.294*** -1.397***
[0.060] [0.063] [0.053] [0.045]
Medicare payment per service ($) 9.359** 9.951** -36.626*** -41.282***
[4.182] [4.644] [2.552] [2.143]
Medicare payment per patient ($) 51.682*** 53.276*** -14.635** -26.849***
[9.540] [10.552] [6.813] [5.129]
Medicare payment per hour ($) -47.409*** -51.140*** -100.455*** -113.915***
[5.946] [6.389] [5.674] [4.430]
N 2097 1903 948 810
Table 46: Volume of services supplied conditional on Hospital Referral Regions: flagged vs.
unflagged physicians using alternative time estimates
Notes: The table compares the volume of services furnished by flagged physicians with that by unflagged
physicians. Table only shows results for 2012 and suppresses highly similar results for 2013. We restrict
the sample to physicians billing at least 20 hours per week in at least one year. The numbers reported are
estimation results from OLS regressions using the volume measure in that row as the dependent variable,
and the flag dummy as the explanatory variable, together with HRR fixed effects. Standard errors clustered
at the HRR level are in brackets. ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. “Num. of patients” is an overestimation of
the actual number of distinct patients due to data limitation, because it is the physician-level sum of the
number of distinct patients for each code the physician billed. Hence a patient receiving more than one type
of service will be counted multiple times. “Num. of patients per day” is the average number of patients per
day assuming 366 working days in the year 2012. “Per hour” statistics are calculated using the estimated
total hours worked of each physician.
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worked); flagged physicians also have an average OPF2 that is above an order larger than
that of unflagged physicians, which shows the extent of potentially over-reported hours
(assuming the goal of overbilling is to achieve the same revenue with fewer hours).
25th percentile Minimum Timed Timed minimum
Flagged Unflagged Flagged Unflagged Flagged Unflagged Flagged Unflagged
Reported rev/hr ($) 112.1 157.4 108.1 157.4 56.91 157.4 38.49 157.4
(1.529) (0.171) (1.650) (0.171) (1.670) (0.171) (1.528) (0.171)
Predicted rev/hr ($) 136.0 159.1 133.7 159.1 110.9 159.1 101.6 159.1
(0.728) (0.105) (0.775) (0.104) (1.050) (0.104) (1.012) (0.104)
OPF1 1.909 0.577 1.907 0.580 1.187 0.601 1.016 0.603
(0.036) (0.001) (0.040) (0.001) (0.046) (0.001) (0.052) (0.001)
OPF2 6.457 1.150 6.997 1.150 12.55 1.152 14.48 1.152
(0.175) (0.003) (0.190) (0.003) (0.320) (0.003) (0.348) (0.003)
N 4034 188032 3654 188412 1774 190292 1489 190577
Table 47: Hourly revenues and Overbilling Potential Factors (OPFs) using alternative time
estimates
Notes: The table compares the hourly revenues and OPFs between flagged and unflagged physicians.
We restrict the sample to physicians billing at least 20 hours per week in at least one year. Reported
hourly revenues are total revenues divided by total hours reported in one calendar year. Predicted hourly
revenues are obtained by first regressing reported hourly revenues on observables (gender, credential, years
of experience, a full set of specialty, HRR, and year fixed effects) using the unflagged sample, and then
predicting a “fair” hourly revenues for all physicians based on the regression estimates. Standard errors are
reported in parentheses.
B7.4. Coding Decisions and Fee Differentials
Tables 48 through 51 are results for regressions of code choices on physician flag status and
code intensities. Most of the key findings under the baseline method remain, though we also
notice some changes. Note that the choice of a time estimation method leads to changes
in the composition of the “flagged” and the “unflagged” groups. For example, using only
timed codes to construct implied hours worked tends to flag physicians whose services focus
on E/M or therapy codes. Moreover, when we use the minimum time needed, low-intensity
codes are often assigned zero time, so only those who file a lot of mid- or high-intensity codes
would be flagged. In other words, the flagged indicator already conveys much information
about the code intensity, which could also explain the less clear coefficients on the interaction
terms between Flagged and intensity dummies.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)





Flagged 182.9*** 220.2* 33.19* 145.9*** 135.8*** 140.2***
[49.55] [125.4] [19.50] [13.82] [21.96] [16.59]
Intensity=2 244.1*** 171.2*** 12.20***
[2.839] [10.29] [3.242]






Flagged × (int=2) 244.5*** 148.7 91.02***
[73.12] [221.1] [22.71]
Flagged × (int=3) 167.0*** 288.9 116.7***
[63.36] [221.8] [25.75]
Flagged × (int=4) 775.0** 25.93
[304.5] [24.11]
Flagged × (int=5) 6.847
[23.21]
Mid-intensity 240.5*** 18.67*** 345.3***
[1.761] [1.147] [2.851]
High-intensity 153.9*** 33.79*** 187.2***
[1.502] [1.111] [2.509]
Flagged × Mid-int 54.36** -41.81* 114.5***
[21.23] [23.19] [30.00]
Flagged × High-int -7.711 -34.63 30.41
[17.96] [21.41] [27.82]
HRR Y Y Y Y Y Y
Code cluster Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year Y Y Y Y Y Y
Adjusted R2 0.188 0.050 0.171 0.156 0.162 0.078
Observations 399907 53521 561657 1015085 508478 506607
Table 48: Billing patterns and code intensity level (using the 25th percentile of time needed)
Notes: The table reports OLS estimates of the partial effects of code intensity on the number of times the
code is filed. We restrict the sample in all specifications to physicians billing at least 20 hours per week in at
least one year, and HCPCS codes in the 28 well-defined clusters. Furthermore, Columns (1) to (3) are only
using the subsamples of code clusters with 3, 4, and 5 levels of intensities, respectively. Column (4) pools
codes in all clusters together, and re-classify intensities to low, middle, and high as specified in Chapter 2.
Columns (5) and (6) use the subsample of codes with below- and above-average marginal increases in work
RVUs between two adjacent intensity levels, respectively. Physician characteristics, HRR fixed effects, code
cluster fixed effects, year fixed effects, and a constant term are included in all specifications but not reported.
Standard errors clustered at the physician level are in brackets. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)





Flagged 175.5*** 116.0 32.57 125.6*** 86.52*** 145.2***
[67.42] [126.5] [20.94] [12.95] [18.22] [17.68]
Intensity=2 245.4*** 173.1*** 12.39***
[2.872] [10.38] [3.239]






Flagged × (int=2) 90.29 -183.8 95.67***
[85.58] [143.4] [24.25]
Flagged × (int=3) 112.2 183.9 67.97**
[84.40] [230.9] [26.59]
Flagged × (int=4) 1231.0** -24.66
[497.9] [25.00]
Flagged × (int=5) 20.16
[25.95]
Mid-intensity 241.3*** 17.05*** 348.3***
[1.766] [1.049] [2.858]
High-intensity 153.9*** 32.19*** 188.9***
[1.497] [1.000] [2.511]
Flagged × Mid-int -8.245 8.870 -23.65
[19.18] [20.03] [27.37]
Flagged × High-int -39.46** 10.64 -64.79**
[17.66] [18.26] [29.01]
HRR Y Y Y Y Y Y
Code cluster Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year Y Y Y Y Y Y
Adjusted R2 0.186 0.048 0.170 0.155 0.161 0.077
Observations 399907 53521 561657 1015085 508478 506607
Table 49: Billing patterns and code intensity level (using minimum time needed)
Notes: The table reports OLS estimates of the partial effects of code intensity on the number of times the
code is filed. We restrict the sample in all specifications to physicians billing at least 20 hours per week in at
least one year, and HCPCS codes in the 28 well-defined clusters. Furthermore, Columns (1) to (3) are only
using the subsamples of code clusters with 3, 4, and 5 levels of intensities, respectively. Column (4) pools
codes in all clusters together, and re-classify intensities to low, middle, and high as specified in Chapter 2.
Columns (5) and (6) use the subsample of codes with below- and above-average marginal increases in work
RVUs between two adjacent intensity levels, respectively. Physician characteristics, HRR fixed effects, code
cluster fixed effects, year fixed effects, and a constant term are included in all specifications but not reported.
Standard errors clustered at the physician level are in brackets. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)





Flagged 329.3** 779.0** 4.952 249.7*** 443.4*** 106.9***
[136.8] [341.3] [28.66] [39.99] [75.96] [32.83]
Intensity=2 243.1*** 169.6*** 16.39***
[2.817] [10.02] [3.238]






Flagged × (int=2) 876.1*** 280.8 10.57
[159.9] [464.3] [34.83]
Flagged × (int=3) 435.2*** -42.86 34.27
[154.0] [402.9] [40.43]
Flagged × (int=4) 206.8 70.73*
[413.3] [37.69]
Flagged × (int=5) 33.33
[36.66]
Mid-intensity 240.1*** 18.12*** 343.4***
[1.760] [1.099] [2.879]
High-intensity 152.4*** 32.76*** 183.8***
[1.504] [1.047] [2.543]
Flagged × Mid-int 59.35 -323.5*** 270.8***
[52.22] [76.52] [62.13]
Flagged × High-int 28.88 -294.9*** 274.2***
[47.43] [75.95] [53.42]
HRR Y Y Y Y Y Y
Code cluster Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year Y Y Y Y Y Y
Adjusted R2 0.196 0.058 0.170 0.156 0.164 0.079
Observations 399907 53521 561657 1015085 508478 506607
Table 50: Billing patterns and code intensity level (using timed codes only)
Notes: The table reports OLS estimates of the partial effects of code intensity on the number of times the
code is filed. We restrict the sample in all specifications to physicians billing at least 20 hours per week in at
least one year, and HCPCS codes in the 28 well-defined clusters. Furthermore, Columns (1) to (3) are only
using the subsamples of code clusters with 3, 4, and 5 levels of intensities, respectively. Column (4) pools
codes in all clusters together, and re-classify intensities to low, middle, and high as specified in Chapter 2.
Columns (5) and (6) use the subsample of codes with below- and above-average marginal increases in work
RVUs between two adjacent intensity levels, respectively. Physician characteristics, HRR fixed effects, code
cluster fixed effects, year fixed effects, and a constant term are included in all specifications but not reported.
Standard errors clustered at the physician level are in brackets. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)





Flagged 285.8 341.0 -41.02 52.08* 133.2* 41.67
[210.3] [268.9] [25.12] [31.58] [75.49] [29.21]
Intensity=2 245.5*** 172.8*** 16.57***
[2.879] [10.37] [3.237]






Flagged × (int=2) 449.4 -362.4 28.63
[302.1] [326.3] [31.56]
Flagged × (int=3) 603.2** 41.81 -43.61
[289.3] [384.9] [35.61]
Flagged × (int=4) 1762.3** -21.02
[788.9] [33.35]
Flagged × (int=5) 86.17**
[42.21]
Mid-intensity 240.8*** 16.17*** 346.9***
[1.766] [1.001] [2.869]
High-intensity 152.0*** 30.75*** 185.8***
[1.499] [0.938] [2.528]
Flagged × Mid-int -90.76** -62.22 -143.5***
[38.41] [78.45] [42.19]
Flagged × High-int 22.55 -7.736 10.39
[36.88] [74.64] [51.06]
HRR Y Y Y Y Y Y
Code cluster Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year Y Y Y Y Y Y
Adjusted R2 0.186 0.049 0.170 0.154 0.161 0.077
Observations 399907 53521 561657 1015085 508478 506607
Table 51: Billing patterns and code intensity level (using minimum time needed of timed
codes only)
Notes: The table reports OLS estimates of the partial effects of code intensity on the number of times the
code is filed. We restrict the sample in all specifications to physicians billing at least 20 hours per week in at
least one year, and HCPCS codes in the 28 well-defined clusters. Furthermore, Columns (1) to (3) are only
using the subsamples of code clusters with 3, 4, and 5 levels of intensities, respectively. Column (4) pools
codes in all clusters together, and re-classify intensities to low, middle, and high as specified in Chapter 2.
Columns (5) and (6) use the subsample of codes with below- and above-average marginal increases in work
RVUs between two adjacent intensity levels, respectively. Physician characteristics, HRR fixed effects, code
cluster fixed effects, year fixed effects, and a constant term are included in all specifications but not reported.
Standard errors clustered at the physician level are in brackets. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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B8. Discussion of Hourly Revenue Comparison Results
In Table 24, we compared the reported hourly revenues of flagged and unflagged physicians.
One concern is that whether the significantly lower hourly revenues of flagged physicians
are a mechanical result of the variation in work RVUs and total RVUs across code intensi-
ties. This concern arises from the composition of total RVUs, which consists of work RVU
(wRVU), practice expense RVU (peRVU), and malpractice RVU (mpRVU). Recall that
we imputed the time needed for untimed codes from their wRVUs and a specialty-specific
“time-per-wRVU” obtained from timed codes; and that the service fee for each code is
(roughly) total RVU multiplied by a constant number, the Conversion Factor (CF). Hence







= Const.× wRVU + peRVU + mpRVU
wRV U
where everything is in terms of weighted averages over all the services provided by a given
physician. Note that if wRV U+peRV U+mpRV UwRV U decreases with code intensity (i.e. if wRVU
increases with intensity but peRVU and mpRVU do not), then there will be a mechanical
decline in hourly revenue for physicians who tend to bill high-intensity codes.
Hence we test whether this relationship is driving the significantly lower hourly revenue of
flagged physicians relative to unflagged physicians, and present the results in Table 52.
The dependent variable in all four specifications in Table 52 is the share of wRVU in to-
tal RVU (totRVU) in percents for each HCPCS code. Columns (1) and (2) show how
wRVU/totRVU changes with totRVU, using totRVU as a general measure of code inten-
sity. Column (1) finds that wRVU/totRVU increases by 0.04 percentage points with a
unit increase in totRVU. With a standard deviation increase in totRVU (22.93 units),
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Y = wRVU/totRVU (%)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All All E/M E/M
Total RVU 0.0403* -0.0370*
[0.0241] [0.0190]










Specialty FE N Y N N
Cluster FE N N Y Y
Adjusted R2 0.002 0.097 0.942 0.940
Observations 4181 4181 78 78
Statistics of totRVU and wRVU/totRVU
Sample Mean Median St. Dev.
totRVU All 16.21 9.5 22.93
E/M 3.09 2.88 1.44
wRVU/totRVU (%) All 41.27 44.55 20.26
E/M 66.16 66.35 10.91
Table 52: Variation in (wRVU/totRVU) across code intensities
Notes: We restrict the sample to HCPCS codes with nonzero total RVUs (totRVU). All RVU values are
taken from the 2012 Physician Fee Schedule using non-facility pricing amounts. The dependent variable
throughout is wRVU/totRVU measured in percents (%). Columns (1) and (2) show how wRVU/totRVU
changes with totRVU in general, without and with code specialty fixed-effects, respectively. Columns (3)
and (4) focus on E/M codes and controls for code cluster (consisting of 3-5 codes) fixed-effects. Column (3)
assumes a linear effect of code intensity on wRVU/totRVU, whereas Column (4) includes a dummy variable
for each level of intensity except for the baseline (Intensity=1). Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors
of the mean estimator are reported in brackets. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The bottom panel
shows summary statistics of totRVU and wRVU/totRVU that are helpful in interpreting the results. The
“Sample” columns specifies whether the statistics are calculated on the sample of 4,181 HCPCS codes or on
the subsample of 78 E/M codes.
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wRVU/totRVU only increase by 0.04 × 22.93 = 0.9172 percentage points, which is eco-
nomically insignificant given that the average wRVU/totRVU is 41.27%. Column (2) con-
trols for specialty fixed-effects because time imputation is specialty-specific, and finds that
wRVU/totRVU even slightly declines for HCPCS codes with larger totRVU, although the
effect is statistically marginally significant and economically insignificant.
Columns (3) and (4) focus on the 78 E/M codes with non-zero totRVU and a clear cluster
structure. Recall that each code cluster has 3 to 5 HCPCS codes representing the same
service at different levels of intensity. Column (3) examines how wRVU/totRVU varies
with code intensity within a cluster by including cluster fixed-effects, assuming a linear
relationship between intensity and the dependent variable. We find that wRVU/totRVU
increases by 1.81 percentage points per level of intensity on average, which is still small
compared with the average of 66.16% for E/M codes. Relaxing the linearity assumption
gives similar results: codes with intensity 2, 3, 4, and 5 are 2.59 to 7.39 percentage points
higher in wRVU/totRVU relative to the lowest intensity (Intensity=1). These effects are
qualitatively similar to those found in Column (3) and are also fairly small.
In conclusion, wRVU/totRVU does not vary significantly with code intensity or total RVU.
Hence we are confident that the lower reported hourly revenues of flagged physicians relative
to their unflagged peers are not a mechanical result of RVU composition.
B9. Comparability of the Main Sample and the NAMCS Sample
Table 53 shows the balancing test results between the NAMCS 2012 data and our main
sample constructed from the CMS Medicare Part B FFS Physician Utilization and Payment
Data. A few things are done to ensure the comparison between the two is sensible. NAMCS
restricts its sample to Doctors of Medicine (MD) and Doctors of Osteopathy (DO). The CMS
sample is thus also restricted to include only those with an MD or DO. A tiny fraction of
physicians are both MD and DO (59 in total) and they are counted as DOs for calculations in





1(solo practice) 0.367 0.307
(0.012) (0.001)
1(in IT incentive program) 0.423 0.543
(0.012) (0.001)
No. of Unique Physicians 3,583 472,110
Table 53: NAMCS and CMS physician characteristics
Notes: All NAMCS-related statistics are weighted. Standard errors of the mean estimator are reported in
parentheses.
practice) in the CMS sample is defined as having no more than 5 providers (including
nurses and physician assistants, etc.). NAMCS only asks the sampled physician whether
the (group) practice they belong to has applied for CMS incentive programs encouraging
effective use of health IT. Thus 1(in IT incentive program) in CMS is defined accordingly
as a dummy variable for participation in any of the incentive programs.
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